Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester

• Decision Date: 19 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-CV-6250 CJS.,07-CV-6250 CJS.
• Citation: 557 F.Supp.2d 387
• Parties: Sandra ROJAS, Plaintiff, v. The ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF ROCHESTER, the Pastoral Center of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, and Pastor Peter Enyan-Boadu, Individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

557 F.Supp.2d 387

Sandra ROJAS, Plaintiff, v. The ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF ROCHESTER, the Pastoral Center of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, and Pastor Peter Enyan-Boadu, Individually, Defendants.

No. 07-CV-6250 CJS.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

May 19, 2008.

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Christina A. Agola, Esq., Rochester, NY, for Plaintiff.

Brian Laudadio, Esq., Harris Beach PLLC, Pittsford, NY, for Defendant the Diocese of Rochester.

Charles A. Schiano, Sr., Esq., The Schiano Law Office, Rochester, NY, for Defendant Pastor Peter Enyan-Boadu.

DECISION AND ORDER

CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This is an action alleging "hostile environment" employment discrimination on the basis of sex, and retaliation, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New York Human Rights Law ("NYHRL"), Executive Law § 290 et seq., as well as state common-law claims for assault and battery. Now before the Court are Defendants' motions [# 5][# 16] to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' applications under Rule 12(b)(1) are denied, their applications under Rule 12(b)(6) are granted, to the extent that Plaintiffs retaliation claims are dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff is granted an opportunity to re-plead her retaliation claims as described below.

BACKGROUND

The following facts, taken from the Complaint, are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. At all relevant times, Sandra Rojas ("Plaintiff) was employed by the Diocese of Rochester ("DOR") as a Coordinator for Hispanic Migrant Ministry. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs duties were primarily religious in nature, and that, for purposes of this action, "she should be considered `clergy.'" (Plaintiffs Memo of Law [# 19-2] at 10).

In her capacity as Coordinator of Hispanic Migrant Ministry, Plaintiff worked at the Catholic parish in Brockport, New York, where Defendant Pastor Peter Enyan-Boadu ("Enyan-Boadu") served as pastor. Plaintiff indicates that Enyan-Boadu was her "co-worker," as opposed to her "supervisor," and she does not indicate that he had any supervisory authority over her. (Complaint [# 1] ¶ 31; PI. Memo of Law [# 19-2] at 4). In July 2006, on three occasions, Enyan-Boadu allegedly made unwelcome sexual advances toward Plaintiff, which included him kissing her and touching her breast.

Approximately three months later, on October 30, 2006, Plaintiff told her supervisor, Bernard Grizard ("Grizard"), DOR's Director of Parish Support Ministries, that he "need[ed] to take action," because Enyan-Boadu was "making [her] life miserable." (Complaint [# 1] ¶ 34). The Complaint does not indicate that Plaintiff said anything to Grizard regarding sexual harassment. The following day, October 31, 2006, Plaintiff met with Grizard and Mary Bauer ("Bauer"), who worked in DOR's Human Resources Department. Plaintiff "started to explain to Bauer about the hostile environment and work conditions in her work place as a result of [Enyan-Boadu's] harassment", but was told by Bauer to "stop ... stop ... stop ... tell me about it later, I do not want to know about your work environment right now." (Id. at ¶ 38). Bauer then asked Plaintiff to sign a letter of resignation, but Plaintiff refused. The following day, November 1, 2006, Plaintiff again met with Grizard, and again told him that Enyan-Boadu had "made her life miserable," though, again, the Complaint does not indicate that she said anything about sexual harassment. (Id. at ¶ 43). Grizard allegedly then presented Plaintiff with a letter dated October 31, 2006, stating that she had resigned, and told her that her employment would be terminated on November 28, 2006.

On November 2, 2006, Plaintiff sent an email to Grizard, indicating that she was not resigning. However, on November 9, 2006, Grizard informed Plaintiff that her employment was terminated. Also on November 2, 2006, Plaintiff sent an e-mail to DOR's Human Resources office, indicating that she "wanted to discuss `sexual misconduct,' " which appears to have been the first time that DOR received notice of such alleged misconduct involving her. (Id. at ¶ 47). The Human Resources office, though, did not respond until November 30, 2006, when it contacted Plaintiff to perform a "post-termination investigation" of her complaint of sexual harassment. (Id. at ¶ 52). Apparently, however, such post-termination investigation did not proceed, because Plaintiffs counsel directed DOR to have no contact with her client.¹

Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). However, on May 1, 2007, the EEOC dismissed the complaint, stating that Plaintiffs "position falls within the ministerial exemption."

On May 14, 2007, Plaintiff commenced the subject action, alleging five causes of action: 1) hostile environment discrimination under Title VII; 2) hostile environment discrimination under the NYHRL; 3) retaliation under Title VII; 4) retaliation under the NYHRL; and 5) assault and battery under New York common law. With regard to her retaliation claims, the Complaint states that Defendants retaliated against her "by failing to take any remedial action whatsoever in regards [sic] to Plaintiffs complaints of sexual harassment through the creation of a hostile work environment at the hands of Pastor Peter Enyan-Boadu as late as one month prior to her termination." [sic] (Complaint ¶¶ 76, 81).

On September 13, 2007, DOR filed its subject motion to dismiss [# 5], pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and, alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6). DOR maintains that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Title VII and NYHRL claims, based on the "ministerial exception" arising from the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, DOR contends that the "ministerial exception," a creation of federal common law, "exempts the employment relationship between a religious employer and its ministers from the coverage of employment laws." (DOR Memo at 3). Therefore, DOR argues, the Court cannot consider any of Plaintiffs Title VII or NYHRL claims, including her hostile environment claims. Alternatively, DOR contends that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation, under either Title VII or the NYHRL, because she has not alleged that she suffered "an adverse employment action." (Id. at 4). In moving to dismiss, DOR did not attempt to assert a defense pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. To the contrary, DOR argued that "the RFRA is not applicable in the current case because there was no governmental action." (DOR Memo at 5, n. 4). On October 12, 2007, Defendant Enyan-Boadu, filed a separate Motion to Dismiss [#16], "adopting" DOR's arguments "by reference."

On December 18, 2007, Plaintiff filed opposition papers, arguing both that the "ministerial exception" does not apply to this case, and that the Complaint adequately pleads claims for retaliation. More specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ministerial exception does not apply in Title VII cases, pursuant to Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.2006) ("Hankins"), which held that a religious freedom defense should be asserted under RFRA, as opposed to the federal common-law "ministerial exception." Plaintiff further maintains that although Defendants might be able to assert a defense under the RFRA, they have not done so. In that regard, Plaintiffs counsel specifically stated that "Defendants have not pled the RFRA as a defense at this juncture." (Agola Declaration [# 19] ¶ 22). Plaintiff also states that she has adequately pleaded a claim for retaliation, by alleging that her employment was terminated after she complained about "Enyan-Boadu's creation of a hostile work environment based on sex." (Plaintiffs Memo of Law at 21).²³

In reply, DOR states that the "ministerial exception" remains viable in Title VII cases, due to the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. O Centra Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal et al., 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) ("O Centro Espirita"), which was decided after Hankins. (See, Reply Memo at 2) ("[E]ven assuming that the Second Circuit's decision in Hankins requires this Court to perform an analysis under the RFRA, the ministerial exception remains applicable to Plaintiffs Title VII claims as a judicially crafted exception to the Act."). DOR further contends that, regardless of whether the Court applies the ministerial exception or the RFRA, the issue is whether application of Title VII will substantially burden DOR's religious freedom, and if so, whether such application is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. On that point, DOR maintains that such application would substantially burden DOR, and that there is no "governmental interest compelling enough to justify the substantial burden that secular employment requirements would place on the self-governance of a church," in light of the Church's "First Amendment right to manage and control its employment relationships with its ministers." (DOR Reply Memo at 7, 3) (quoting Hankins v. New York Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 516 F.Supp.2d 225, 236-37 (E.D.N.Y.2007)).

On February 14, 2008, counsel for the parties appeared before the undersigned for oral argument of the motion. Following oral argument, on March 21, 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. Mar.21, 2008) ("Rweyemamu"). On March 26, 2008, DOR's counsel submitted a supplemental letter brief, addressing the Rweyemamu decision. On April 1, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a responsive letter brief. The Court has thoroughly...