McDaniel v. Brown, 08–559.

Citation78 USLW 3381,78 USLW 4025,130 S.Ct. 665,175 L.Ed.2d 582,558 U.S. 120
Decision Date11 January 2010
Docket NumberNo. 08–559.,08–559.
PartiesE.K. McDANIEL, Warden, et al., Petitioners, v. Troy BROWN.
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

558 U.S. 120
130 S.Ct. 665
175 L.Ed.2d 582
78 USLW 3381
78 USLW 4025

E.K. McDANIEL, Warden, et al., Petitioners,
v.
Troy BROWN.

No. 08–559.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 11, 2010.



Sarah O'Rourke Schrup, Chicago, IL, Jeffrey T. Green, Rachel A. Dougan, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, Franny A. Forsman, Federal Public Defender, Paul G. Turner, Counsel of Record, John C. Lambrose, Michael Pescetta, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Las Vegas, NV, for respondent.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General of the State of Nevada, Keith G. Munro, Assistant Attorney General, David K. Neidert, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Robert E. Wieland, Counsel of Record, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Bureau of Criminal Justice, Reno, NV, for petitioners.


PER CURIAM.

[558 U.S. 121]

In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), we held that a state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if a federal judge finds that “upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781. A Nevada jury convicted respondent of rape; the evidence presented included DNA evidence matching respondent's DNA profile. Nevertheless, relying upon a report prepared by a DNA expert over 11 years after the trial, the Federal District Court applied the Jackson standard and granted the writ. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown v. Farwell, 525 F.3d 787 (C.A.9 2008). We granted certiorari to consider whether those courts misapplied Jackson. Because the trial record includes both the DNA evidence and other convincing evidence of guilt, we conclude that they clearly did.

[558 U.S. 122]

I

Around 1 a.m. on January 29, 1994, 9–year–old Jane Doe was brutally raped in the bedroom of her trailer. Respondent Troy Brown was convicted of the crime. During and since his trial, respondent has steadfastly maintained his innocence.1 He was, however, admittedly intoxicated when the crime occurred, and after he awoke on the following morning he told a friend “ ‘he wished that he could remember what did go on or what went on.’ ” App. 309.

Troy and his brother Travis resided near Jane Doe in the same trailer park. Their brother Trent and his wife Raquel lived in the park as well, in a trailer across the street from Jane Doe's. Both Troy and Trent were acquainted with Jane Doe's family; Troy had visited Jane Doe's trailer several times. Jane did not know Travis. The evening of the attack, Jane's mother, Pam, took Jane to Raquel and Trent's trailer to babysit while the three adults went out for about an hour. Raquel and Trent returned at about 7:30 p.m. and took Jane home at about 9:30 p.m. Pam stayed out and ended up drinking and playing pool with Troy at a nearby bar called the Peacock Lounge. Troy knew that Jane and her 4–year–old sister were home alone because he answered the phone at the bar when Jane called for her mother earlier that evening.

Troy consumed at least 10 shots of vodka followed by beer chasers, and was so drunk that he vomited on himself while he was walking home after leaving the Peacock at about 12:15 a.m. Jane called her mother to report the rape at approximately 1 a.m. Although it would have taken a sober man less than 15 minutes to walk home, Troy did not arrive at his trailer until about 1:30 a.m. He was wearing dark jeans, a cowboy hat, a black satin jacket, and boots. Two

[558 U.S. 123]

witnesses saw a man dressed in dark jeans, a cowboy hat, and a black satin jacket stumbling in the road between the two trailers shortly after 1 a.m.

The bedroom where the rape occurred was dark, and Jane was unable to conclusively identify her assailant. When asked whom he reminded her of, she mentioned both Troy and his brother Trent. Several days after the rape, she identified a man she saw on television (Troy) as her assailant but then stated that the man who had sent flowers attacked her. It was Trent and Raquel who had sent her flowers, not Troy. She was unable to identify Troy as her assailant out of a photo lineup, and she could not identify her assailant at trial. The night of the rape, however, she said her attacker was wearing dark jeans, a black jacket with a zipper, boots, and a watch. She also vividly remembered that the man “stunk real, real bad” of “cologne, or some beer or puke or something.” Id., at 172–173.

Some evidence besides Jane's inconsistent identification did not inculpate Troy. Jane testified that she thought she had bitten her assailant, but Troy did not have any bite marks on his hands when examined by a police officer approximately four hours after the attack. Jane stated that her assailant's jacket had a zipper (Troy's did not) and that he wore a watch (Troy claimed he did not). Additionally, there was conflicting testimony as to when Troy left the Peacock and when Pam received Jane's call reporting the rape. The witnesses who saw a man stumbling between the two trailers reported a bright green logo on the back of the jacket, but Troy's jacket had a yellow and orange logo. Finally, because Jane thought she had left a night light on when she went to bed, the police suspected the assailant had turned off the light. The only usable fingerprint taken from the light did not match Troy's and the police did not find Troy's fingerprints in the trailer.

Other physical evidence, however, pointed to Troy. The police recovered semen from Jane's underwear and from the

[558 U.S. 124]

rape kit. The State's expert, Renee Romero, tested the former and determined that the DNA matched Troy's and that the probability another person from the general population would share the same DNA (the “random match probability”) was only 1 in 3,000,000. Troy's counsel did not call his own DNA expert at trial, although he consulted with an expert in advance who found no problems with Romero's test procedures. At some time before sentencing, Troy's family had additional DNA testing done. That testing showed semen taken from the rape kit matched Troy's DNA, with a random match probability of 1 in 10,000.

The jury found Troy guilty of sexual assault and sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole after 10 years.2 On direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court considered Troy's claim that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, analyzing “whether the jury, acting reasonably, could have been convinced of [Troy's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brown v. Nevada, 113 Nev. 275, 285, 934 P.2d 235, 241 (1997)(per curiam). The court rejected the claim, summarizing the evidence of guilt as follows:

“Testimony indicated that Troy left the bar around 12:15 a.m., that Troy lived relatively close to the bar, and that Troy lived very close to Jane Doe. Troy had enough

[558 U.S. 125]

time to get from the bar to Jane Doe's house and to assault Jane Doe before she made the telephone call to her mother at approximately 1:00 a.m. While Jane Doe could not identify her assailant, her description of his clothing was similar to what Troy was wearing; she also said that her assailant smelled like beer or vomit and testimony indicated that Troy had been drinking beer and had vomited several times that night. Furthermore, testimony indicated that Troy got home at approximately 1:30 a.m., which gave him enough time to assault Jane Doe. Additionally, [witnesses] testified that they saw someone resembling Troy in a black jacket and black hat stumbling in the road near Jane Doe's house at 1:05 a.m. Troy also washed his pants and shirt when he got home, arguably to remove the blood evidence from his clothes. Finally, the DNA evidence indicated that semen collected from Jane Doe's underwear matched Troy's and that only 1 in 3,000,000 other people had matching DNA (the second DNA test indicated that 1 in 10,000 people had matching DNA).” Ibid., 934 P.2d, at 241–242.
Respondent also argued on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether the DNA evidence was reliable.
The court found respondent had not raised this issue in the trial court and concluded there was no plain error in the trial court's failure to conduct a hearing. Id., at 284, 934 P.2d, at 241.

In 2001, respondent sought state postconviction relief, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the DNA evidence. He argued that there were a number of foundational problems with the DNA evidence, and that if trial counsel had objected, the evidence would have been excluded or at least its importance diminished. He noted that because trial counsel “totally failed to challenge the DNA evidence in the case,” counsel “failed to preserve valid issues

[558 U.S. 126]

for appeal.” App. 1101. The state postconviction court denied relief, id., at 1489–1499, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, id., at 1500–1506.

Respondent thereafter filed this federal habeas petition, claiming there was insufficient evidence to convict him on the sexual assault charges and that the Nevada Supreme Court's rejection of his claim was both contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Jackson. He did not bring a typical Jackson claim, however. Rather than argue that the totality of the evidence admitted against him at trial was constitutionally insufficient, he argued that some of the evidence should be excluded from the Jackson analysis. In particular, he argued that Romero's testimony related to the DNA evidence was inaccurate and unreliable in two primary respects: Romero mischaracterized the random match probability and misstated the probability of a DNA match among his brothers. Absent that testimony, he contended, there was insufficient evidence to convict him.

In support of his claim regarding the accuracy of Romero's testimony, respondent submitted a report prepared by Laurence Mueller, a professor in ecology and evolutionary biology (Mueller Report). The...

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