558 U.S. 209 (2010), 09-5270, Presley v. Georgia

Docket Nº:09-5270.
Citation:558 U.S. 209, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675, 78 U.S.L.W. 4051
Opinion Judge:PER CURIAM.
Party Name:Eric PRESLEY, Petitioner, v. GEORGIA.
Judge Panel:Roberts, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor.
Case Date:January 19, 2010
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 209

558 U.S. 209 (2010)

130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675, 78 U.S.L.W. 4051

Eric PRESLEY, Petitioner,

v.

GEORGIA.

No. 09-5270.

United States Supreme Court

January 19, 2010

Roberts, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

[175 L.Ed.2d 677] [130 S.Ct. 722]PER CURIAM.

After a jury trial in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, petitioner Eric Presley was convicted of a cocaine trafficking offense. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. 285 Ga. 270, 674 S.E.2d 909 (2009). Presley seeks certiorari, claiming his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a public trial was violated when the trial court excluded the public from the voir dire of prospective jurors. The Supreme Court of Georgia's affirmance contravened this Court's clear prece­dents. Certiorari and petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are now granted, and the judg­ment is reversed.

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Before selecting a jury in Presley's trial, the trial court noticed a lone courtroom observer. Id., at 270–271, 674 S.E.2d, at 910. The court explained that prospective jurors were about to enter and instructed the man that he was not allowed in the courtroom and had to leave that floor of the courthouse entirely. Id., at 271, 674 S.E.2d, at 910. The court then questioned the man and learned he was Presley's uncle. Ibid. The court reiterated its instruction:

"'Well, you still can't sit out in the audience with the jurors. You [175 L.Ed.2d 678] know, most of the afternoon actually we're going to be picking a jury. And we may have a couple of pre-trial matters, so you're welcome to come in after we . . . complete selecting the jury this after­noon. But, otherwise, you would have to leave the sixth floor, because jurors will be all out in the hall­way in a few moments. That applies to everybody who's got a case.'" Ibid.

Presley's counsel objected to "'the exclusion of the public from the courtroom,'" but the court explained, "'[t]here just isn't space for them to sit in the audience.'" Ibid. When Presley's counsel requested "'some accommoda­tion,'" the court explained its ruling further:

"'Well, the uncle can certainly come back in once the trial starts. There's no, really no need for the uncle to be present during jury selection. . . . [W]e have 42 jurors coming up. Each of those rows will be occupied by jurors. And his uncle cannot sit and intermingle with members of the jury panel. But, when the trial starts, the opening statements and other matters, he can certainly come back into the courtroom.'" Ibid.

After Presley was convicted, he moved for a new trial based on the exclusion of the public from the juror voir dire. At a hearing on the motion, Presley presented evidence showing that 14 prospective jurors could have fit in the jury

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box and the remaining 28 could have fit entirely on one side of the courtroom, leaving adequate room for the public. App. to Pet. for Cert. E–37, E–41. The trial court denied the motion, commenting that it preferred to seat jurors throughout the entirety of the courtroom, and "it's up to the individual judge to decide . . . what's com­fortable." Id., E–38. The court continued: "It's totally up to my discretion whether or not I want family members in the courtroom to intermingle with the jurors and sit di­rectly behind the jurors where they might overhear some inadvertent comment or conversation." Id., at E–42 to E– 43. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia agreed, finding "[t]here was no abuse of discretion here, when the trial court explained the need to exclude spectators at the voir dire stage of the proceedings and when members of the public were invited to return [130 S.Ct. 723] afterward." 290 Ga.App. 99, 100–101, 658 S.E.2d 773, 775 (2008).

The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari and affirmed, with two justices dissenting. After finding "the trial court certainly had an overriding interest in ensuring that potential jurors heard no inherently prejudicial re­marks from observers during voir dire," the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected Presley's argument that the trial court was required to consider alternatives to closing the courtroom. 285 Ga., at 272, 273, 674 S.E.2d, at 911. It noted that "the United States Supreme Court [has] not provide[d] clear guidance regarding whether a court must, sua sponte, advance its own alternatives to [closure]," and the court ruled that "Presley was obliged to present the court with any alternatives that he wished the court to consider." Id., at 273, 674 S.E.2d, at 911, 912. When no alternatives are offered, it concluded, "there is no abuse of discretion in the court's failure to sua sponte advance its own alternatives." Id., at 274, 674 S.E.2d, at 912.

This Court's rulings with respect to the public trial right rest upon two different provisions of the Bill of Rights, [175 L.Ed.2d 679] both

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applicable to the States via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment directs, in relevant part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ." The Court in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948), made it clear that this right extends to the States. The Sixth Amendment right, as the quoted lan­guage makes explicit, is the right of the accused.

The Court has further held that the public trial right extends beyond the accused and can be invoked under the First Amendment. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I). This requirement, too, is binding on the States. Ibid.

The case now before the Court is brought under the Sixth Amendment, for it is the accused who invoked his right to a public trial. An initial question is whether the right to a public trial in criminal cases extends to the jury selection phase of trial, and in particular the voir dire of prospective jurors. In the First Amendment context that question was answered in Press-Enterprise I. Id., at 510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629. The Court there held that the voir dire of prospective jurors must be open to the public under the First Amendment. Later in the same Term as Press-Enterprise I, the Court considered a Sixth Amendment case concerning whether the public trial right extends to a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress certain evidence. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). The Waller Court relied heavily upon Press-Enterprise I in finding that the Sixth Amend­ment right to a public trial extends beyond the actual proof at trial. It ruled that the pretrial suppression hear­ing must be open to the public because "there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public." 467 U.S., at 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31.

While Press-Enterprise I was heavily relied upon in Waller, the jury selection issue in the former case was resolved

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under the First, not the Sixth, Amendment. Press-Enterprise I, supra, at 516, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The constitutional protection for the right of access that the Court upholds today is found in the First Amendment, rather than the public trial provision of the Sixth" (foot­note omitted)). In the instant case, the question then arises whether it is so well settled that the Sixth Amendment [130 S.Ct. 724] right extends to jury voir dire that this Court may proceed by summary disposition.

The point is well settled under Press-Enterprise I and Waller. The extent to which the First and Sixth Amend­ment public trial rights are coextensive is an open ques­tion, and it is not necessary here to speculate whether or in what circumstances the reach or protections of one might be greater than the other. Still, there is no legiti­mate reason, at least in the context of juror selection proceedings, to give one who asserts a First Amendment privilege greater rights to insist on public proceedings than the accused has. "Our cases have uniformly recog­nized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant." Gannett Co. v. [175 L.Ed.2d 680] DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979). There could be no explanation for barring the accused from raising a constitutional right that is unmistakably for his or her benefit. That rationale suffices to resolve the instant matter. The Supreme Court of Georgia was correct in assuming that the Sixth Amend­ment right to a public trial extends to the voir dire of prospective jurors.

While the accused does have a right to insist that the voir dire of the jurors be public, there are exceptions to this general rule. "[T]he right to an open trial may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial or the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information." Waller, 467 U.S., at 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31. "Such circumstances will be rare, however, and the balance of interests must be struck with special care." Ibid. Waller provided standards for courts to apply before excluding the public from any stage of a criminal trial:

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