Wilkins v. Gaddy
Decision Date | 22 February 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 08–10914.,08–10914. |
Citation | 559 U.S. 34,130 S.Ct. 1175,175 L.Ed.2d 995 |
Parties | Jamey L. WILKINS, Petitioner, v. Officer GADDY. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
559 U.S. 34
130 S.Ct. 1175
175 L.Ed.2d 995
Jamey L. WILKINS, Petitioner,
v.
Officer GADDY.
No. 08–10914.
Supreme Court of the United States
Feb. 22, 2010.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992), this Court held that “the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury.” In this case, the District
Court dismissed a prisoner's excessive force claim based entirely on its determination that his injuries were “de minimis.” Because the District Court's approach, affirmed on appeal, is at odds with Hudson's direction to decide excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed.
I
In March 2008, petitioner Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilkins' pro se complaint alleged that, on June 13, 2007, he was “maliciously and sadistically” assaulted “[w]ithout any provocation” by a corrections officer, respondent Gaddy.1 App. to Pet. for Cert. C–4. According to the complaint, Gaddy, apparently angered by Wilkins' request for a grievance form, “snatched [Wilkins] off the ground and slammed him onto the concrete floor.” Ibid. Gaddy “then proceeded to punch, kick, knee and choke [Wilkins] until another officer had to physically remove him from [Wilkins].” Ibid. Wilkins further alleged that, “[a]s a result of the excessive force used by [Gaddy], [he] sustained multiple physical injuries including a bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness” and “psychological trauma and mental anguish including depression, panic attacks and nightmares of the assault.” Ibid.
The District Court, on its own motion and without a response from Gaddy, dismissed Wilkins' complaint for failure to state a claim. Citing Circuit precedent, the court stated that, “[i]n order to state an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that he received more than a de minimus [sic] injury.” No. 3:08–cv–00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), pp. 1, 2 (citing Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 483 (C.A.4 1998); Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1166 (C.A.4 1997) (en banc); footnote omitted). According to the court, Wilkins' alleged injuries were no more severe than those deemed de minimis in the Circuit's Taylor and Riley decisions. Indeed, the court noted, Wilkins nowhere asserted that his injuries had required medical attention.
In a motion for reconsideration, Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prejudice his claim. He asserted that he had been prescribed
, and continued to take, medication for his headaches and back pain, as well as for depression. And he attached medical records purporting to corroborate his injuries and course of treatment.
Describing reconsideration as “an extraordinary remedy,” the court declined to revisit its previous ruling. No. 3:08–cv–00138 (WD NC, Aug. 25, 2008), p. 1. The medical records, the court observed, indicated that some of Wilkins' alleged injuries “were pre-existing conditions.” Id., at 3. Wilkins had sought treatment for high blood pressure and mental health issues even before the assault. The court acknowledged that Wilkins received an X ray after the incident “to examine his ‘bruised heel,’ ” but it “note [d] that bruising is generally considered a de minimus [sic] injury.” Id., at 4. The court similarly characterized as de minimis Wilkins' complaints of back pain and headaches. The court denied Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. In a summary disposition, the Court of Appeals affirmed “for the reasons
stated by the district court.” 308 Fed.Appx. 696, 697 (CA 4,2009).
II
In requiring what amounts to a showing of significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim, the Fourth Circuit has strayed from the clear holding of this Court in Hudson. Like Wilkins, the prisoner in Hudson filed suit under § 1983 alleging that corrections officers had used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Evidence indicated that the officers had punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach without justification, resulting in “minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip” as well as loosened teeth and a cracked partial dental plate. 503 U.S. at 4, 112 S.Ct. 995. A Magistrate Judge entered judgment in Hudson's favor, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an inmate must prove “a significant injury” in order to state an excessive force claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (1990)
(per curiam). According to the Court of Appeals, Hudson's injuries, which had not required medical attention, were too “minor” to warrant relief. Ibid.
Reversing the Court of Appeals, this Court rejected the notion that “significant injury” is a threshold requirement for stating an excessive force claim. The “core judicial inquiry,” we held, was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995; see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319–321, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,” the Court recognized, “contemporary standards of decency always are violated ... whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. 995; see also id., at 13–14, 112 S.Ct. 995 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (“The Court today appropriately puts to rest a seriously misguided view that pain inflicted by an excessive use of force is actionable under the Eighth Amendment only when coupled with ‘significant injury,’ e.g., injury that requires medical attention or leaves permanent marks”).
This is not to say that the “absence of serious injury” is irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995. “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular situation.” Ibid.(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078). The extent of injury may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied. As we stated in Hudson, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal...
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