Hui v. Castaneda

• Decision Date: 03 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08–1529.,08–1529.
• Citation: 130 S.Ct. 1845,559 U.S. 799,176 L.Ed.2d 703
• Parties: Esther HUI, et al., Petitioners, v. Yanira CASTANEDA, as personal representative of the Estate of Francisco Castaneda, et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

559 U.S. 799

130 S.Ct. 1845

176 L.Ed.2d 703

Esther HUI, et al., Petitioners,

v.Yanira CASTANEDA, as personal representative of the Estate of Francisco Castaneda, et al.

No. 08–1529.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 2, 2010.

Decided May 3, 2010.

Elaine J. Goldenberg

, Washington, DC, for petitioners.

Pratik A. Shah

, for United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting petitioners.

Conal Doyle

, Oakland, CA, for respondents.

David P. Sheldon

, Counsel of Record, Law Offices of David P. Sheldon, PLLC, Washington, D.C., Paul M. Smith, William M. Hohengarten, Elaine J. Goldenberg, Matthew S. Hellman, Jessica Ring Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C., Joshua A. Block, Jenner & Block LLP, New York, NY, for petitioner Commander Stephen Gonsalves.

Patrick L. Hurley

, Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez LLP, San Francisco, CA, Steven J. Renick, Counsel of Record, Mildred K. O'Linn, Timothy J. Kral, Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for petitioner Esther Hui.

Conal Doyle

, Willoughby Doyle, LLP, Oakland, CA, Thomas M. Dempsey, Law Offices of Thomas M. Dempsey, Beverly Hills, CA, Adele P. Kimmel, Counsel of Record, Amy Radon, Public Justice, P.C., Washington, DC, Arthur H. Bryant, Leslie A. Brueckner, Public Justice, P.C., Oakland, CA, for respondents.Opinion

Justice SOTOMAYOR

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether 42 U.S.C. § 233(a)

, as added, 84 Stat. 1870, precludes an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), against U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) personnel for constitutional violations arising out of their official duties. When federal employees are sued for damages for harms caused in the course of their employment, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–2680, generally authorizes substitution of the United States as the defendant.

Section 233(a)

makes the FTCA remedy against the United States “exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding” for any personal injury caused by a PHS officer or employee performing a medical or related function “while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” Based on the plain language of § 233(a), we conclude that PHS officers and employees are not personally subject to Bivens actions for harms arising out of such conduct.

I

Francisco Castaneda was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the San Diego Correctional Facility (SDCF) beginning in March 2006. According to the complaint later filed in the District Court, when Castaneda arrived at SDCF he had on his penis an irregular, raised lesion that measured roughly two centimeters square.¹ Castaneda promptly brought his condition to the attention of medical personnel working for the Division of Immigration Health Services, reporting that the lesion was growing in size and becoming more painful and that it frequently bled and emitted a discharge. Petitioner Dr. Esther Hui, a civilian PHS employee, was the physician responsible for Castaneda's medical care during his detention at SDCF. Petitioner Commander Stephen Gonsalves, a commissioned PHS officer, was a Health Services Administrator at SDCF during the relevant period.

Between March 2006 and January 2007, Castaneda persistently sought treatment for his condition. As his disease progressed, the lesion became increasingly painful and interfered with his urination, defecation, and sleep. In December 2006, Castaneda additionally reported a lump in his groin. A PHS physician's assistant and three outside specialists repeatedly advised that Castaneda needed a biopsy to ascertain whether he had cancer

. Petitioners denied requests for a biopsy and other recommended procedures as “elective.” App. 244, 249–251. Instead, Castaneda was treated with ibuprofen and antibiotics and was given an additional ration of boxer shorts.

After a fourth specialist recommended a biopsy in January 2007, the procedure was finally authorized. Instead of providing treatment, however, ICE released Castaneda from custody on February 5. A week later, biopsy results confirmed that Castaneda was suffering from penile cancer

. The next day, Castaneda had his penis amputated, and he began chemotherapy after tests confirmed that the cancer had metastasized to his groin. The treatment was unsuccessful, and Castaneda died in February 2008.

Three months before his death, Castaneda filed suit against petitioners in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. As relevant, Castaneda raised medical negligence claims against the United States under the FTCA and Bivens claims against petitioners for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.² After Castaneda's death, respondents—Castaneda's sister, Yanira Castaneda, and his daughter, Vanessa Castaneda (by and through her mother, Lucia Pelayo)—amended the complaint to substitute themselves as plaintiffs. Yanira and Vanessa Castaneda are respectively the representative of and heir to Castaneda's estate.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the claims against them, contending that § 233(a)

gives them absolute immunity from Bivens actions by making a suit against the United States under the FTCA the exclusive remedy for harms caused by PHS personnel in the course of their medical or related duties. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that § 233(a)

's text and history evidence a congressional intent to preserve Bivens actions. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1288–1295 (2008). Petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal.³

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment that § 233(a)

does not preclude respondents' Bivens claims. Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682 (2008).⁴ The court cited Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), for the proposition that a Bivens remedy is unavailable only when an alternative remedy is both expressly declared to be a substitute and can be viewed as equally effective, or when special factors militate against direct recovery. Looking to the statute's text and history, the court noted that § 233(a) does not mention the Constitution or recovery thereunder and found it significant that § 233 was enacted prior to this Court's decision in Bivens. Drawing further support for its view from the statute's legislative history and from subsequent congressional enactments, the Court of Appeals concluded that § 233(a) does not expressly make the remedy under the FTCA a substitute for relief under Bivens.

For essentially the reasons given in Carlson, 446 U.S., at 20–23, 100 S.Ct. 1468,

the Court of Appeals also determined that the FTCA remedy is not equally effective as a Bivens remedy. Unlike the remedy under the FTCA, the court reasoned, a Bivens remedy is awarded against individual defendants and may include punitive damages. Additionally, Bivens cases may be tried before a jury, and liability is governed by uniform federal rules rather than the law of the State in which the violation occurred. After further concluding that no special factors militate against finding a remedy available in these circumstances, the court held that respondents' Bivens action could proceed.

As the Ninth Circuit recognized, its holding conflicts with the Second Circuit's decision in Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2000)

, which construed § 233(a) to foreclose Bivens actions against PHS personnel. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 557 U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 49, 174 L.Ed.2d 632 (2009).

II

A

Our inquiry in this case begins and ends with the text of § 233(a)

. See Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 254, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000). The statute provides in pertinent part that:

“[t]he remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b)

and 2672 of title 28 ... for damage for personal injury, including death, resulting from the performance of medical, surgical, dental, or related functions, including the conduct of clinical studies or investigation, by any commissioned officer or employee of the Public Health Service while acting within the scope of his office

or employment, shall be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject-matter against the officer or employee (or his estate) whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” § 233(a)

(emphasis added).

Section 233(a)

grants absolute immunity to PHS officers and employees for actions arising out of the performance of medical or related functions within the scope of their employment by barring all actions against them for such conduct. By its terms, § 233(a) limits recovery for such conduct to suits against the United States. The breadth of the words “ exclusive” and “any” supports this reading, as does the provision's inclusive reference to all civil proceedings arising out of “the same subject-matter.” We have previously cited § 233(a) to support the contention that “Congress follows the practice of explicitly stating when it means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy.” Carlson, 446 U.S., at 20, 100 S.Ct. 1468. The meaning of § 233(a) has become no less explicit since we last made that observation.

Our reading of § 233(a)

's text is not undermined by the fact that the provision preceded our decision in Bivens. Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, that a Bivens remedy had not yet been recognized when § 233(a) was enacted does not support the conclusion that Congress, in making the remedy provided by the FTCA “exclusive of any other civil action,” did not mean what it said. Language that broad easily accommodates both known and unknown causes of action.

The later enacted Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), 102 Stat. 4563, further supports this understanding of § 233(a)

. The Westfall ...