Hashiro v. General Elec. Co.

• Citation: 56 F.3d 71
• Decision Date: 15 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-17249,93-17249
• Parties: NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Noboru and Lorraine HASHIRO, individually and as Co-Special Administrators of decedent Lloyd H. Hashiro's estate, Dennis Hashiro, Clyde Hashiro, Gordon Hashiro, and Donna Sue Hashiro, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, a New York corporation, Basic Technologies, Inc., a New York corporation, fka Basic Hydraulics and Industrial Equipment, Limited, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, a division of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Martin Zachary, Sylvania, a Connecticut corporation, Karma Ltd., Co., Pan Am World Services, Inc., Defendants - Appellees. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, a New York Corporation, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. MIT LINCOLN LABORATORY, a division of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Basic Technologies, INC., a New York corporation, fka Basic Hydraulics and Industrial Equipment, Limited, John Does 1-10, Doe Partnerships 1-10, Doe Corporations 1-10, and Doe Governmental Entities 1-10, Third-Party Defendants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 71

56 F.3d 71

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Noboru and Lorraine HASHIRO, individually and as Co-Special

Administrators of decedent Lloyd H. Hashiro's estate, Dennis

Hashiro, Clyde Hashiro, Gordon Hashiro, and Donna Sue

Hashiro, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, a New York corporation, Basic

Technologies, Inc., a New York corporation, fka Basic

Hydraulics and Industrial Equipment, Limited, MIT Lincoln

Laboratory, a division of Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, Martin Zachary, Sylvania, a Connecticut

corporation, Karma Ltd., Co., Pan Am World Services, Inc.,

Defendants - Appellees.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, a New York Corporation, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. MIT LINCOLN LABORATORY, a division of Massachusetts

Institute of Technology, Basic Technologies, INC., a New

York corporation, fka Basic Hydraulics and Industrial

Equipment, Limited, John Does 1-10, Doe Partnerships 1-10,

Doe Corporations 1-10, and Doe Governmental Entities 1-10,

Third-Party Defendants.

No. 93-17249.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 5, 1995.

Decided May 15, 1995.

Before: PREGERSON, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM ^*

Noboru and Lorraine Hashiro, individually and as administrators of the estate of Lloyd Hashiro, and other members of the Hashiro family (collectively, "plaintiffs") appeal the district court's dismissal of defendant MIT Lincoln Laboratory ("MIT") for lack of personal jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and we affirm.

Plaintiffs sued MIT and other defendants in the United States District Court in Hawaii for damages resulting from the death of Lloyd Hashiro, who suffered fatal injuries when he fell from a hydraulically operated platform while working at the Millimeter Wave Radar Installation on Roi Namur, Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. In their appeal from the district court's dismissal of MIT for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs argue alternatively that (1) the court had general personal jurisdiction over MIT, (2) even if general jurisdiction is not present, the court had specific personal jurisdiction, and (3) in any event, MIT waived its personal jurisdiction defense because it failed to raise it in a timely manner. We review the district court's determination de novo. Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986).

1. Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction Defense

As MIT notes in its brief, "[Plaintiffs] argue for the first time on appeal that MIT waived its right to object to personal jurisdiction .... There has been waiver here, but the waiver is that of Plaintiffs, who failed to raise this issue before the trial court." We agree.

This Court generally will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Bolker v. Comm'r. of Internal Revenue, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985). This general rule, however, has three exceptions. If any of these exceptions apply, the Court, in its discretion, may address the issue. None of the exceptions applies here. This is not the "exceptional case" in which review is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. The waiver issue did not arise while this appeal was pending because of a change in the law. Nor is the waiver issue a purely legal one independent of the factual record or dependent on a record that has been fully developed. See id. Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs' waiver argument and address the merits of the personal jurisdiction issue.

2. General Personal Jurisdiction

When a plaintiff alleges jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant pursuant to Hawaii's long-arm statute, H.R.S. Sec. 634-35(c) requires that the cause of action relate to the defendant's contacts in Hawaii. Shaw v. North American Title Co., 76 Hawaii 323, 876 P.2d 1291 (1994); Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark v. Pacific-Peru Const. Corp., 558 F.2d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, Hawaii's long-arm statute does not authorize general personal jurisdiction over MIT.

Plaintiffs argue that general personal jurisdiction is nevertheless appropriate because MIT has been "doing business" in Hawaii, making it "present" in that forum and thereby subjecting it to general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction, however, exists only if the defendant has "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum. See Fields v. Sedgwick Assoc. Risks, Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1986); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 (1984). The Supreme Court has upheld general jurisdiction only once, see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. Ct. 413 (1952), and we "regularly have declined to find general jurisdiction even where the contacts were quite extensive." Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Nav. Co., Inc., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993). In this case, we agree with the district court that "MIT's contacts with the State of Hawaii are not nearly sufficient to establish general jurisdiction." Order...