Weekley v. Jones

• Decision Date: 01 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-2064,94-2064
• Citation: 56 F.3d 889
• Parties: Jimmie L. WEEKLEY, Appellee, v. Jimmie JONES, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 889

56 F.3d 889

Jimmie L. WEEKLEY, Appellee, v. Jimmie JONES, Appellant.

No. 94-2064.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 11, 1995.

Decided June 1, 1995.

Stacy Louise Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, argued, for appellant.

Michael Herman Maguire, Cape Girardeau, MO, argued, for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Following our remand in Weekley v. Jones, 927 F.2d 382 (8th Cir.1991), the district court entered a judgment granting Jimmie L. Weekley's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. The State of Missouri now appeals. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

BACKGROUND

In March 1980, a jury convicted Weekley of second degree murder of his wife, but could not agree on a sentence. The trial court sentenced Weekley to life imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, State v. Weekley, 621 S.W.2d 256 (Mo.1981), and his motions for post-conviction relief were denied.

Initially Weekley was represented by a public defender and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. See Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 552.030. ¹ He later retained counsel and withdrew the plea and entered a straight not guilty plea.

As the district court noted, the evidence against Weekley was "devastating." The first deputy sheriff on the death scene in June of 1978 saw Weekley standing in the doorway of his daughter's mobile home gripping the barrel of a shotgun "with the lower portion of his face blown off." His wife's body was in a bedroom of the home; she had been shot in the head. Three of Weekley's children also implicated him.

Weekley testified in his defense. He stated that the only thing he remembered after lying down on a couch was "it just got dark." He presented no other witnesses.

Following the shooting, Weekley was taken to a hospital for treatment of his gunshot wound. In August 1978, the prosecutor filed a motion for a competency examination, which the trial court granted. Under date of September 7, 1978, Dr. E. Corales reported that Weekley's past psychiatric history included a ten-day hospitalization in March 1973 for paranoid thoughts "directed towards his wife, whom he felt was having multiple affairs and ... had hired two gangs to kill him," a six-month hospitalization in 1976 following threats to commit suicide and murder his wife, a one-month hospitalization in 1977 after another suicide threat, and a readmission Dr. Sadashiv Parwatikar reevaluated Weekley. In a report dated November 4, 1978, the doctor noted that Weekley was taking his medication regularly and was cooperative. However, Weekley still could not remember shooting his wife and still believed that his wife had tried to kill him and had "little green men put acid in [his] shoes." Dr. Parwatikar diagnosed Weekley as having schizophrenia, paranoid type, in remission, borderline mental retardation with an IQ of 71 with some organic impairment in the verbal area, as well as complications from the gunshot wound. Dr. Parwatikar concluded that Weekley, having been medicated, was competent to stand trial. However, the doctor concluded that Weekley was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the crime "which made him act on his delusions against his wife," and recommended consideration of a not guilty by reason of insanity plea, noting that his schizophrenia was long-standing and could not be cured, but only arrested with ongoing medication.

                and out-patient treatment later that year for delusional thinking and an assault.  Weekley told Dr. Corales that, during his current hospital stay, he had seen "small people" running around his hospital room and that he had seen these "people" in the past "when they were putting acid in his boots and wanted to kill him."   Weekley knew his wife had been shot, but the only thing he remembered was that he had difficulty sleeping before the incident and that it was "dark."   Dr. Corales diagnosed Weekley as having paranoid schizophrenia manifested by disturbances in thinking, mood and behavior, borderline mental retardation, and brain dysfunction resulting from the self-inflicted gunshot wound.  Dr. Corales did not form an opinion as to whether Weekley was insane at the time of the crime because of lack of supporting material, but believed he was incompetent to stand trial.  However, Dr. Corales recommended reevaluation following surgery and treatment with anti-psychotic medication
                

At a conference on the morning of trial, the court considered the questions of Weekley's competency and withdrawal of his insanity plea. The court noted that a doctor had found him competent to stand trial and asked Weekley if he had the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his defense. He replied "Yeah." After several other questions, the court entered an order finding Weekley competent.

The court then asked Weekley if he wanted to withdraw the insanity plea. Trial counsel asked the court if he could question Weekley because he did not know if Weekley understood the legal terms. After Weekley hesitated in answering counsel's questions, the following took place:

COURT: Maybe I could put it a different way than [counsel]. What we're saying to you is do you want to plead insanity in this case, that is that you weren't responsible for your actions?

WEEKLEY: I understand what you mean, but I don't know what to say. I actually don't.

COUNSEL: I believe we have to rely upon his lawyer in this case and I take full responsibility for the sake of the record.... It was Mr. Weekley's desire that he invoke the defense of Not Guilty. Mr. Weekley by the very act of the offense does not remember ... a lot of things that took place. He was, you know seriously injured himself, but he feels that he is Not Guilty of Manslaughter, is that right?

WEEKLEY: For whatever reason.

COUNSEL: I mean Murder in the Second Degree or Manslaughter or anything. He does not feel that he killed his wife.

COURT: Mrs. Weekley, ² I'll have to rely on you somewhat. Do you feel that it's your husband's best interest to withdraw the Plea of Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Disease or Defect?

MRS. WEEKLEY: I don't know ... I do bedpans, you do lawbooks, OK.

* * * * * *

PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt but I believe ... that they can go with also Not Guilty and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity and combine the two.

COURT: Yes, you can raise both defenses at the same time if you want or you can raise one or the other. In other words, you can plead Not Guilty or Not Guilty and Not Guilty by the Reason of Mental Disease or Defect or Not Guilty by the Reason of Mental Disease or Defect.

COUNSEL: Well, the only reason we're here is we thought we were trying him on the grounds that he was Not Guilty. That's what you hired us for.

The court then asked Weekley if he was withdrawing his plea freely and voluntarily, had time to think about it, and had discussed it with counsel. Weekley said yes, and the court allowed Weekley to withdraw the insanity plea.

On direct appeal, Weekley raised issues regarding jury selection, instructions and evidence, which the state supreme court rejected; he did not raise any issue as to competency. In a post-conviction motion, Weekley argued that he was insane at the time of the crime and that counsel was ineffective for allowing him to withdraw his insanity plea. The post-conviction court found that defense counsel was not ineffective, noting that he was a well-known criminal defense attorney and that the trial court had questioned Weekley about withdrawing the plea. The court also mentioned that the trial court's competency finding was supported by the doctors' reports. On appeal, Weekley contended that counsel had failed to fully apprise him of the consequences of withdrawing the insanity plea and had coerced him into doing so. The appellate court summarily affirmed. Weekley filed a second post-conviction motion, renewing his ineffective assistance claim and adding another jury selection issue. The motion was denied, and the denial was summarily affirmed.

In his federal habeas petition, Weekley raised jury selection issues and an ineffective assistance of counsel issue relating to the withdrawal of the insanity plea. The district court denied relief and Weekley appealed.

This court reversed and remanded on all issues, holding that the record needed further development. In particular, we noted concern regarding Weekley's competency at the time of trial and instructed the district court "to take a second look" at its conclusions regarding trial counsel's ineffectiveness in the context of this court's concern regarding competency. 927 F.2d at 387. However, we directed the district court's attention to Wright v. Lockhart, 914 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1991), in which this court held that a competency claim was subject to a procedural bar. 927 F.2d at 387-88. We also directed the district court's attention to Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825, 830 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950, 111 S.Ct. 369, 112 L.Ed.2d 331 (1990), in which we held that counsel was ineffective for abandoning a defendant's only viable defense. 927 F.2d at 388.

On remand, the district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who held an evidentiary hearing. Weekley abandoned the jury selection issues, but pursued his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in advising him to withdraw the insanity plea. Counsel testified via deposition. He stated that he had been a defense attorney since 1947 and had used an insanity defense on numerous occasions. However, he believed it was a perilous defense, explaining that if the jury did not "buy" the defense, the defendant was sure to be convicted since he admitted the crime and the jury might be "revolt...