U.S. v. Youngblood, CRIM. A. 99-1.

Decision Date11 May 1999
Docket NumberNo. CRIM. A. 99-1.,CRIM. A. 99-1.
Citation56 F.Supp.2d 518
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Michael YOUNGBLOOD a/k/a "Michael Williams"

Donald M. Padova, Philadelphia, PA, for Michael Youngblood a/k/a Michael Williams, Defendant.

Timothy R. Rice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for U.S.

MEMORANDUM

BARTLE, District Judge.

On April 1, 1999, after a four day jury trial, defendant Michael Youngblood, also known as Michael Williams, was convicted of thirty-four counts of extortion, bank fraud, tax evasion, and failure to file tax returns. He was acquitted on one count of failing to file a federal income tax return. Presently before the court is the defendant's motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct.

The charges, in large part, arose out of the defendant's involvement, in 1996 and 1997, in the construction of a homeless shelter in Philadelphia known as Deliverance Center of Hope — II, a project of the Deliverance Center of Hope, Inc., a non-profit corporation affiliated with the Deliverance Evangelistic Church. In an agreement formed in 1995 and 1996 with the non-profit corporation, the City of Philadelphia (the "City") had agreed to provide $850,000 for the project. This sum was thought to be the amount needed to complete the renovations and run the shelter for a few months.

The defendant was the long-time personal aide to Philadelphia Councilwoman Jannie Blackwell. With the tacit acquiescence of city officials, he assumed the role of de facto general contractor at the shelter construction site. He hired and fired the contractors, submitted their invoices to the Deliverance Center of Hope, Inc. for payment, and delivered the checks to pay the workers and contractors. He was the one who told the non-profit corporation what checks to write on the funds supplied by the City. As time went on, the project began to suffer delays and expenses began greatly to exceed the budget. Finally, when the City stopped the funding, the project came to a halt. The City had spent approximately $1.7 million, and the project was never completed. The jury found, based on overwhelming evidence, that the defendant had extorted money from various contractors he brought onto the job and that he had fraudulently endorsed checks.

The tax charges against the defendant covered the years 1993 through 1997. The defendant had joined the City of Philadelphia payroll in June, 1992, working as an aide to Councilwoman Jannie Blackwell, but was fired by the City in February, 1993. By agreement between the parties, no evidence was offered regarding the reason for his termination in 1993. After his termination, the defendant continued to work for Councilwoman Blackwell, who paid him out of her own salary. He also received a salary for his work at the Deliverance Center of Hope — II, as well as the extorted money and the amounts of the forged checks. The jury found that he failed to file returns in 1994 through 1997 and that he evaded taxes for the years 1996 and 1997. Again, on the counts for which he was convicted, there was a plethora of evidence.

The trial attracted extensive media attention. Articles about the defendant and the case appeared in Philadelphia's newspapers, the Philadelphia Daily News and The Philadelphia Inquirer, before, during, and after the trial. There were also reports about the case on television. During voir dire, prospective jurors were asked whether they had heard anything about the case or knew anything about the defendant. Juror No. 2 was silent on this subject during the jury selection process. It was not until he was empaneled that he indicated he knew anything about the case. Before the testimony began, he was called to sidebar. He told the court and the attorneys that he did not want to serve and that he already knew about the case. When he was asked what, specifically, he knew, he said only that he was present in City Hall the day the defendant was indicted. He assured the court that, despite this knowledge, he could be fair and impartial and decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial. While the government requested that the juror be dismissed, defense counsel objected. We declined to dismiss Juror No. 2.

Prior to the receipt of any evidence, the jurors took an oath, swearing that "[they] will well and truly try the issue joined in this indictment between the United States of America and defendant Michael Youngblood, also known as Michael Williams, and that [they] will a true verdict render according to the evidence, so help [them] God ..." We then gave the jury preliminary instructions. We explained, "Anything you may see or hear outside the courtroom is not evidence and must be disregarded. You are to decide the case solely on the evidence presented here in the courtroom." We also charged that during the trial jurors were not to discuss the case among themselves or with anyone else, they were not to try, in any way, to learn anything about the case outside the courtroom, and they were not to read about the case in the newspaper or to listen to radio or television reports about it.

At the beginning of the fourth and last day of trial, defense counsel brought it to the court's attention that the day's Philadelphia Daily News featured a full-page photograph of the defendant on its cover, along with several articles about him inside. The court asked the jurors whether any of them had seen the paper. Those who answered in the affirmative were brought to sidebar for further questioning. Although they confirmed that they had seen the cover, none of them had read the articles. Neither the government nor the defense requested that any of the jurors be excused. The court then repeated to the entire jury its instruction that the jurors were to avoid any news coverage relating to the case and that they were to decide the case solely based upon the evidence admitted at trial. Finally, before the jury retired to deliberate, the court again directed the jury to decide the case on the evidence presented.

On April 1, the jury returned with its verdict of guilty on twelve counts of extortion sixteen counts of bank fraud, two counts of tax evasion, and four counts of failure to file an income tax return. It found defendant not guilty on one count, charging failure to file a tax return for the year 1993.

One week later, the defendant filed a motion for an order directing the Court Clerk to provide the defense with the names and addresses of jurors. In support of the motion, defense counsel reported that after the verdict, one of the jurors had approached him with the following information:

that the other jurors had their decision made prior to deliberation .... that a number of the jurors based their verdict on the "character" of the defendant .... that one of the other jurors informed the rest that the defendant was a founder of the Junior Black Mafia and [stated] "what else could you expect" .... [and] that other jurors knew more about the case and the defendant then [sic] they disclosed to the Court.

The government opposed the request for the jurors' names and addresses. It argued that any questioning of jurors must be conducted on-the-record by the court in the presence of all parties.

During phone conferences with the court on April 9, counsel agreed that the court should conduct a further inquiry. The court proposed calling in four of the twelve jurors, including Juror No. 2, the one who made the remarks to defense counsel, Juror No. 1, who was the foreperson, and two others randomly selected. Neither counsel objected to the proposal. Both sides were invited to submit proposed questions. We scheduled the hearing for April 15, 1999. The court then issued orders directing Jurors Nos. 1 and 2, and the two randomly selected jurors, Nos. 4 and 7, to appear for the hearing.

On April 15, each of the four jurors was questioned in open court, but outside the presence of one another. Juror No. 2, who had made the initial comments to defense counsel, told the court that no juror had mentioned anything about the Junior Black Mafia or the defendant's purported connection with the Junior Black Mafia. He also asserted that no juror had made any comment about Youngblood's prior criminal record and that he had not mentioned anything about the defendant's involvement with drugs. He explained that his post-verdict remarks to defense counsel were prompted by an incident that occurred at the end of the first day of deliberations. At that time, another juror asked him if he wanted to serve on the jury. He answered that initially he did not desire to do so because he "knew already about the case," but that he had been called to sidebar and asked what he knew, and then he was not dismissed. Thereafter, a juror asked him if, being from the city, he felt threatened because of the defendant's "background." Juror No. 2 responded that the other juror did not specify what was meant by the term "background." When the court asked what Juror No. 2 had disclosed to the other jurors concerning his prior knowledge of the case, he said he told them that he was in City Hall the day the defendant was indicted and "all the cameras" were there, and told them he knew that the trial was ready to begin. Juror No. 2's explanation was inconsistent with what was recorded in the defendant's motion, which had precipitated the hearing.

Juror No. 1, the foreperson, recalled that at the end of the first day of deliberations, after the jurors had voted on all of the fraud and extortion charges and had moved on to the tax charges, one of the jurors wondered out loud what the defendant had done to be fired from the official City payroll in 1993. At that point, according to Juror No. 1, Juror No. 2 "briefly mentioned" to the rest of the jurors that the defendant had "a criminal past" involving drugs. The foreperson further related to the court that the jury "decided that that was...

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    ...United States v. Flemming, 223 Fed.Appx. 117, 124 (3d Cir.2007); Urban, 404 F.3d at 778; Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 242; United States v. Youngblood, 56 F.Supp.2d 518, 523 (E.D.Pa.1999). "None of these factors is dispositive. Our determination of whether the defendant was prejudiced `turns on all o......
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    ...117, 124 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 778 (3d Cir. 2005); Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 242; United States v. Youngblood, 56 F. Supp. 2d 518, 523 (E.D. Pa. 1999)). The ultimate decision to grant or deny a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Se......

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