Nash v. Estelle, 75-3772

Citation560 F.2d 652
Decision Date05 October 1977
Docket NumberNo. 75-3772,75-3772
PartiesIra NASH, Jr., Petitioner-Appellee, v. W. J. ESTELLE, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent- Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., John Pierce Griffin, Asst. Atty. Gen., David M. Kendall, Jr., 1st Asst. Atty. Gen., Joe B. Dibrell, Jr., Chief, Enforce. Div., Robert E. DeLong, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellant.

Michael A. Hatchell (Court-Appointed) Tyler, Tex., for petitioner-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before MORGAN and HILL, Circuit Judges, and NOEL, Senior District Judge. *

NOEL, Senior District Judge:

After a jury trial, petitioner, Ira Nash, Jr., was convicted of murder with malice and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one hundred years. His conviction was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Nash v. State, 477 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887, 93 S.Ct. 191, 34 L.Ed.2d 144. The court below, without holding an evidentiary hearing, granted Nash's application for writ of habeas corpus holding that the introduction of two written confessions into evidence in the state court trial was constitutional error.

Nash was arrested on a warrant on May 26, 1969, and was taken before a justice of the peace who informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). While in custody, Nash orally confessed the murder to several deputy sheriffs. 1 On the morning of June 2, 1969, Nash was brought to the district attorney's office to talk to Assistant District Attorney F. R. Files. The entire conversation was recorded on a magnetic tape and from that recording a written statement was prepared. That afternoon, Nash returned to Files' office, was again informed of his constitutional rights, reviewed the statement with Files, made minor corrections of it, and then signed the statement.

On June 3, Nash and Files, together with a deputy and a secretary, drove to the scene of the murder. Their conversation was taken in shorthand by the secretary who later prepared a second statement from her notes. That afternoon, Nash was brought to Files' office and signed the second statement.

The issue of the admissibility of these confessions is based upon whether the procedural guidelines set forth in Miranda were followed prior to the taking of the first written confession on June 2, 1969. At their first meeting, Nash told Files that he would like for an attorney to be appointed to represent him. An attorney was not appointed until after Nash had signed the two written confessions. Because of the importance of the request for counsel and the question of whether there was a waiver of the right to have counsel present at questioning, the conversation between Files and Nash on June 2, from its beginning through the signing of the waiver of rights follows:

2

The state court, in written findings of fact and conclusions of law, held that under the totality of the circumstances, Nash voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The court below held as a matter of law that Nash's right to counsel could not be waived. 3 We conclude that the application of a per se rule against waiver was improper in this case and therefore reverse.

Whether or not the right to counsel may be waived after the suspect has indicated his desire for representation by counsel has been previously considered by this Court. There are two lines of cases: those which hold that a subsequent waiver without the presence of counsel is involuntary per se and those which hold that a subsequent waiver could be voluntary. The results of these cases can only be reconciled by the difference between their facts.

The first Fifth Circuit case which considered this question was United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1969), wherein the Court stated:

Where there is a request for an attorney prior to any questioning, as in this case, a finding of knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to an attorney is impossible. . . . (T)he suspect has an absolute right to delay interrogation by requesting counsel. If such a request is disregarded and the questioning proceeds, any statement taken thereafter cannot be a result of waiver but must be presumed a product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.

409 F.2d at 493.

In Priest, the defendant was in custody in a hospital and was given a form which contained the Miranda warnings. Priest stated he did not want to sign the form until he had consulted with his attorney. The request for an attorney was ignored and the questioning proceeded until Priest had incriminated himself.

Priest was cited with approval in United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1977). However, the broad language which states that waiver is impossible was limited by the recognition in Massey that there may be a waiver under certain circumstances. To find a waiver, the "record must show that 'an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.' " 550 F.2d at 308. In Massey, there were no circumstances from which a waiver could be found. The defendant had made repeated requests to consult with an attorney and stated that he did not want to talk about his case with agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who were interrogating him. Despite these continued requests for counsel, the agents continued to interrogate him from the time of his arrest until he finally signed a waiver of rights form and made incriminating statements.

United States v. Blair, 470 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 908, 93 S.Ct. 1536, 36 L.Ed.2d 197, also held that there could be no waiver under the facts of the case. The suspect stated that he wanted an attorney present before any questioning took place, but in complete disregard of these requests, the police continued questioning him until he had incriminated himself.

These cases illustrate that where a suspect makes an unequivocal request to have counsel present during questioning and the police ignore that request and continue the interrogation, that a finding of knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to an attorney is impossible. The other lines of cases, however, hold that where a suspect makes a request for an attorney and pursuant to that request the police terminate the interrogation, subsequent circumstances may be found to be sufficient to establish that the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

In United States v. Anthony, 474 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1973), United States v. Hodge, 487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973), and United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1974), the defendants all requested counsel and the interrogations ceased. Thereafter, each defendant initiated further discussion and made incriminating admissions. These cases held that the defendants under such circumstances waived their right to counsel.

In the latter line of cases, the suspect initiated further conversation with the police after the evidence-seeking interrogation had ceased. In the former line of cases, the police continued the evidence-seeking interrogation despite the suspect's request for counsel. The present case falls into a middle area inasmuch as the interview was not terminated when Nash indicated a desire for counsel; however, evidence-seeking interrogation did cease. The question thus presented is whether all conversation must cease once a suspect indicates a desire for counsel or whether the suspect's wishes can be explored to determine exactly what he wants. Since this is a matter of first impression for this Court, we turn to the Miranda decision itself to resolve the question. Regarding a request for counsel, Miranda states:

Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.

384 U.S. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.

Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.

384 U.S. at 473-474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-1628.

While this language indicates that when a suspect makes a request for counsel there can be no further evidence-seeking interrogation without the presence of counsel, it does not preclude further inquiry to determine, for example, whether the suspect wants counsel appointed before making any statement to the police or merely wants counsel at the time of his trial. The Supreme Court in Miranda cited the practice of the FBI and stated that that practice was consistent with the procedure delineated in the Miranda decision. See 384 U.S. at 483-86, 86 S.Ct....

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • U.S. v. Robertson
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • 3 Noviembre 1978
    ...issue before this (C)ourt." United States v. Geders, 566 F.2d 1227, 1229 n.2 (5th Cir.), Rehearing en banc granted. See Nash v. Estelle, 560 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1977), Rehearing en banc 12 See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, ......
  • U.S. v. Hernandez
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • 16 Junio 1978
    ...waived his privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, supra,384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724; Nash v. Estelle, 5 Cir., 1977, 560 F.2d 652, 660, reh. en banc granted, 560 F.2d 660; United States v. Guzman-Guzman, 5 Cir., 1974, 488 F.2d 965; United States v. Bailey, 5 ......
  • Nash v. Estelle
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • 21 Junio 1979
    ...436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1964). A panel of this court reversed the grant of habeas corpus in a 2-1 decision. Nash v. Estelle, 560 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1978). On rehearing en banc, we reverse the grant of habeas corpus Henry Moore, a taxi driver, was found shot to death in his cab o......
  • United States ex rel. Sanders v. Rowe
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • 20 Noviembre 1978
    ...Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919, 98 S.Ct. 2266, 56 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978); Nash v. Estelle, 560 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1977), rehearing en banc granted, No. 75-3772 (Dec. 15, 1977); United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1977); Cf. Maglio v.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT