U.S. v. Ahrendt

Citation560 F.3d 69
Decision Date19 March 2009
Docket NumberNo. 06-1254.,06-1254.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William AHRENDT, Defendant, Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

David A.F. Lewis, for appellant.

Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Paula D. Silsby, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

Before LIPEZ, MERITT,* and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.

HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

William Ahrendt1 challenges his cocaine conspiracy conviction and 210-month sentence. He alleges that the district court committed two errors at trial: declining to order a reevaluation of his competency and excluding evidence of a psychological evaluation. He also alleges that the court committed two errors at sentencing by applying a leadership enhancement and by failing to treat certain prior offenses together when evaluating his criminal history.

I. Background

The following background facts on Ahrendt's role in the cocaine conspiracy were elicited at Ahrendt's trial.

During the relevant time, Ahrendt lived in Bangor, Maine, in an apartment from which he allowed others to "come and go." He sold drugs out of his apartment, and provided drugs for people to use while in his apartment. In November 2003, he met Sandra Hurd, who took advantage of Ahrendt's "very high clientele" to "set up shop" in his apartment selling drugs. Hurd solicited two other individuals, Randy Brimley and Kelvin Deloatch, for the operation. Hurd, Brimley and Deloatch were generally responsible for bringing multiple shipments of cocaine per week from Massachusetts to Bangor, Maine.2

On arrival in Bangor, some of the cocaine would be taken to Ahrendt's apartment, although most of it was stored elsewhere in Bangor. If there was not enough cocaine at Ahrendt's apartment, someone other than Ahrendt would be dispatched to another location in Bangor to replenish supplies. In Ahrendt's apartment, the cocaine was weighed, packaged and sold to buyers who would come to the apartment. Ahrendt was one of the people who would weigh the cocaine. He was also one of the sellers, although Deloatch sold the lion's share. In addition, some of the powder cocaine was cooked into crack cocaine in the apartment. Brimley did most of the cooking, although Ahrendt also cooked small quantities of powder into crack. If either Deloatch or Brimley were present, one of them would take money from the drug sales to store it elsewhere in Bangor; if not, Ahrendt would hold the money until Deloatch or Brimley arrived.

At his trial, Ahrendt acknowledged that he used drugs himself, sold drugs, and gave drugs to other people. He also acknowledged that he weighed cocaine with his own scales, packaged it, and cooked powder cocaine into crack. He testified, however, that he was not part of the conspiracy, that he was an "outsider" and "kept in ... the dark." He testified that he "didn't have any specific arrangements with these individuals.... They came and went, just like everybody else that came in my door."

Several months of police investigation culminated in the arrest of seven people, including Ahrendt, in April 2004. After Ahrendt's arrest and his pre-trial incarceration at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, issues arose as to his competency to stand trial. On motion of his counsel, Ahrendt was evaluated by a forensic psychologist on staff at Fort Devens who submitted a written report to the court. This report relied on Ahrendt's mental health records from both the Bangor Mental Health Institute (BMHI) and from Acadia Hospital in Bangor, as well as on interviews with Ahrendt.

Ahrendt had been hospitalized at BMHI from December 2001 to April 2002. He was treated for symptoms including suicidal impulses, poor concentration and disorganized thoughts; treated with antidepressants and an antipsychotic drug; and given multiple diagnoses (Major Depressive Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder). Between 2002 and 2004, Ahrendt was treated on an outpatient basis at Acadia Hospital in Bangor for "mood alterations, vague complaints of auditory hallucinations, and multiple suicide threats." He was further diagnosed with Major Depression, Recurrent, With Psychotic Features; History of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Not Otherwise Specified; and Personality Disorder with Histrionic and Narcissistic Features. He was treated with a variety of psychotropic medications. Neither set of records discussed Ahrendt's substance use.

The report posited that because Ahrendt was using drugs during the pendency of his prior hospitalizations, his "degree of drug use could possibly explain" the symptoms reported in his medical records. The report concluded by diagnosing Ahrendt with Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified and with substance use-related diagnoses, but noted that these diagnoses did not "appear to be impairing his level of functioning to consult with his attorney or make rational decisions regarding his legal matters."

After the submission of the report, the district court held a competency hearing in January 2005. At that hearing, the report was admitted into evidence without objection.3 The court also engaged in a discussion with Ahrendt about his competency, asking if he understood what was happening and explaining the legal standard for competency in response to Ahrendt's questions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled Ahrendt competent to stand trial, pledging to "remain diligent regarding [the competency] issue during the course of any further proceedings."

At around this time, Ahrendt began sending letters to the court. The letters expounded upon Ahrendt's personal philosophy and view of the justice system.4 At an April 2005 hearing on an unrelated issue, the court commented that "the letters could be interpreted as threatening." Ahrendt's counsel responded that the letters were not threatening, and that Ahrendt was "a person who just lives in a different world than the rest of us."

At a May 2005 hearing on a request for a continuance, Ahrendt's counsel reported that his client had been evaluated by mental health professionals and in counsel's opinion, "there are some serious problems there." At a July hearing on counsel's motion to withdraw, which was denied, the court questioned Ahrendt about his relationship with counsel. Ahrendt stated, "it basically comes down to, sir, [that] your law stands against my beliefs, and I'd like to represent my beliefs against your law, and that's it. My law stands for love, and yours stands against the Almighty God, and that's the battle." Ahrendt explained that he wanted to "change [the justice] system" and asked the court, "Why don't you help me do what I'm trying to accomplish?"

As trial approached, Ahrendt's counsel filed a notice of intent to introduce as expert evidence the testimony of clinical psychologist Dr. Jeffrey Aston. Based on interviews with Ahrendt, Dr. Aston had prepared testimony that agreed with the Fort Devens Report that Ahrendt was "technically competent," and offered further explanation of Ahrendt's point of view and behavior.

[Ahrendt] is obviously given to a peculiar turn of mind which interprets everything in terms of a highly abstracted philosophy of life.... In Mr. Ahrendt's view, the world consists of persons who are motivated either by negative selfishness ("Lust") or positive altruism ("Love"). For him, drug use resembles an almost sacramental consumption of what the "Divine" Lovingly provides us, while society's war on drugs is a misguided Lust to control what others do.

The government filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude this testimony. The court agreed with the government and ruled the proffered testimony inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 403, explaining that the testimony had "a significant potential for confusing and misleading the jury and causing unfair prejudice." The court noted that such testimony might invite jury nullification, stating, "[t]he sincerity of Mr. Ahrendt's belief that he is entitled to the `sacramental consumption' of drugs is not properly before the Court."

Several weeks before trial, the court permitted Ahrendt to waive his right to counsel and represent himself, with his former counsel serving as standby counsel. At this time, his counsel had expressed concern that Ahrendt would not pursue a sensible defense strategy. The court specifically asked if counsel was requesting a reevaluation of Ahrendt's competency, and counsel replied that he could not make such a request "in good faith."

At trial in September 2005, Ahrendt cross-examined the government's witnesses, eliciting testimony bearing on the credibility of at least one witness, and made a successful hearsay objection. Ahrendt also testified in his own defense. Despite his efforts, the jury convicted Ahrendt of conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with the intent to distribute, both cocaine and cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 & 841(a)(2).

In the presentence investigation report ("PSR") prepared for Ahrendt's sentencing, he was given a two-level leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for his role in the conspiracy. The resulting offense level was thirty-four. The PSR also listed four prior convictions. Although Ahrendt had been sentenced for three of those offenses on the same day, and the three offenses had occurred within one week of each other and had similar characteristics, each conviction was counted separately, as a "prior sentence" under § 4A1.2(a)(2). Ahrendt was accordingly awarded eight criminal history points, putting him in Criminal History Category ("CHC") IV. See § 4A1.1 (two points awarded for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days). Ahrendt's Guidelines Sentencing Range ("GSR"), based on an offense level of thirty-four and a CHC of IV, was 210-262 months.

The court remarked at the commencement of the sentencing hearing in January 2006 that it wanted to be as fair as possible...

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