United States v. Harvey

• Decision Date: 14 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-73-Cr-SMA.,82-73-Cr-SMA.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. William Joseph HARVEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

560 F. Supp. 1040

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. William Joseph HARVEY, et al., Defendants.

No. 82-73-Cr-SMA.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida, Miami Division.

August 30, 1982.

On Motion to Vacate Restraining Order February 14, 1983.

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Stanley Marcus, U.S. Atty., S.D. Fla., by Neil Karadbil, Asst. U.S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff.

James Jay Hogan, Joseph Beeler, Miami, Fla., for defendants.

                                                       INDEX
                   I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 ------------------pg. 1047
                  II. ALLEGED INVALIDITY OF ORDER UPON BASIS THAT AUTHORIZATION
                      TO APPLY THEREFOR WAS NOT PERSONALLY
                      DELEGATED --------------------------------------------------------------pg. 1048
                 III. AUTHORIZATION OF F.B.I. AGENTS TO INVESTIGATE
                      DRUG-RELATED OFFENSES --------------------------------------------------pg. 1049
                  IV. MARIJUANA-RELATED DRUG OFFENSES MAY BE PREDICATE
                      RACKETEERING ACTS UNDER RICO -------------------------------------------pg. 1050
                   V. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE OCTOBER 20, 1980 ORDER --------------------------pg. 1050
                      1. Sufficiency of probable cause in the Affidavit itself. --------------pg. 1050
                      2. Scope of RICO.-------------------------------------------------------pg. 1053
                      3. Continuation of future conversations about past bribes, homicides
                         etc. ----------------------------------------------------------------pg. 1053
                      4. Staleness of the probable cause. ------------------------------------pg. 1054
                      5. Necessity showing for the order was inadequate (use of alternative
                         investigative techniques. -------------------------------------------pg. 1055
                  VI. SEALING REQUIREMENTS  --------------------------------------------------pg. 1057
                 VII. THE ORDER OF NOVEMBER 20, 1980 WAS ALLEGEDLY INVALID -------------------pg. 1058
                      1. Carry-Over Objections. ----------------------------------------------pg. 1058
                      2. Insufficient probable cause for an extension. -----------------------pg. 1058
                      3. Was the district judge without authority to execute an extension
                         order outside his territorial jurisdiction but operative within his
                         territorial jurisdiction? -------------------------------------------pg. 1058
                

                VIII. THE ORDER OF DECEMBER 19, 1980 WAS ALLEGEDLY INVALID --------------------pg. 1058
                      1. Carry-Over Objections. -----------------------------------------------pg. 1058
                      2. Prior failure to name Defendant Kay as a target. ---------------------pg. 1058
                 IX.  ALLEGED § 2517(5) VIOLATION (DISCLOSURE OF TITLE III
                      INTERCEPT AS TO A § 848 OFFENSE) -----------------------------------pg. 1060
                      1. Section 848 was not an offense "other than those specified in the
                         order of authorization or approval" under § 2517(5). ------------pg. 1063
                      2. The requirement of § 2517(5) was met. ---------------------------pg. 1066
                  X.  THE EFFECT OF MISSING PAGE 21C ------------------------------------------pg. 1067
                      1. Alleged violations of Title III. -------------------------------------pg. 1070
                      2. The allegation of intentional omission and the effect of missing
                         page 21C on the showing of probable cause. ---------------------------pg. 1073
                 XI.  MINIMIZATION ------------------------------------------------------------pg. 1075
                XII.  FLORIDA STATE CHAPTER 934 INTERCEPT -------------------------------------pg. 1076
                      1. Probable Cause. ------------------------------------------------------pg. 1077
                      2. Lack of Necessity. ---------------------------------------------------pg. 1078
                      3. Improper Authorization. ----------------------------------------------pg. 1078
                      4. First and Second Extension Orders unlawful. --------------------------pg. 1078
                      5. No authorization in Florida Statutes to wiretap for marijuana
                         offenses. ------------------------------------------------------------pg. 1079
                      6. Whether § 2517(5) was violated regarding the state wiretap. -----pg. 1079
                

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS TITLE III ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND EVIDENCE DERIVED THEREFROM AND INCLUDING DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATE TITLE III WIRE INTERCEPT AND EVIDENCE DERIVED THEREFROM

ARONOVITZ, District Judge.

Defendants WILLIAM JOSEPH HARVEY, THOMAS SIKES and DENNIS KAY¹ addressed Motions to Suppress electronic surveillance and any evidence derived therefrom to a Title III oral intercept of communications of William Joseph Harvey, John Dennis Cason, Robert Jernigan, Bruce Emory Griffin, Wesley Simkins, Mike McCrary, Skip Hope, Arthur Michael Sakell, Joseph William Campbell, Jr., Gary Balough and Parker Peak, at the office of William Joseph Harvey, Defendant, located at 1945 South Dixie Highway, Delray Beach, Florida, a towing business conducted by Delray Towing Service, Inc., of which Harvey was alleged to be president.

The Honorable Eugene P. Spellman, U.S. District Judge, Southern District of Florida, entered the original order authorizing interception on October 20, 1980, for thirty (30) days (Defendant's Exhibit No. 4); an amended order on October 22, 1980 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 5); an order authorizing continued interception of oral communications for an additional thirty (30) days on November 20, 1980 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 16); and an order continuing interception for an additional thirty (30) days signed on December 19, 1980 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 26). The oral intercept commenced functioning on October 24, 1980, and remained in position and functioning until January 19, 1981.

A multitudinous attack has been made upon this Title III intercept. After reviewing extensively the original motions, all supplements thereto then pending, and the Government's omnibus response, this Court heard testimony and received evidence basically addressed to three (3) evidentiary issues, to-wit:

(1) The adequacy and sufficiency of minimization procedures and implementation;

(2) The effect of missing page 21C of the original affidavit of Harold Copus, Special Agent, F.B.I., not found among the unsealed original documents in this Title III intercept, as it related to the sufficiency of the affidavit itself to establish probable cause and as it related on a Delaware v. Franks 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667, infra, basis and all issues arising from the omission of Page 21C from the original affidavit; and

(3) The adequacy of disclosure pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 2517(3) and (5) in terms of a prior Florida state Title III wiretap and the federal Title III wiretap sub judice. Evidence was received with respect to the State Title III disclosure issue.

All other matters raised by the Defendants in these Motions to Suppress were legal issues and were heard extensively in oral arguments. The evidentiary hearings were conducted over a period of four days and oral argument thereon lasted one full day. Thereupon, having now considered the original Motion of William Joseph Harvey, five (5) Supplements thereto, the Motions of Thomas Sikes and Dennis Kay and all Supplements thereto, and considering the joinder therein of all co-defendants who are "aggrieved" persons, the Government's omnibus response, the testimony and evidence adduced and oral arguments, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is thereupon

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that each and every Motion to Suppress the Title III oral intercept and the evidence derived therefrom, and including Motions to Suppress the Florida Chapter 934 wire intercept and evidence derived therefrom, addressed by each and every Defendant entitled to do so by law is hereby DENIED, each respectively, for the reasons hereinafter set forth.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are made herein when applicable and required for those matters as to which testimony and evidence were received at an evidentiary hearing.

I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518

In its memorandum in support of the Motion to Suppress (p. 23) Defendant Harvey "candidly concedes that most federal and state courts faced with the issue have found Title III (18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.) constitutional on its face.... For the purpose of appeal, this issue is once again here raised...." In United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874, 96 S.Ct. 142, 46 L.Ed.2d 105 (1975), the Fifth Circuit joined in the holdings of other circuits that Title III meets the constitutional tests for electronic surveillance set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1966). See also United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 63, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 2622, 41 L.Ed.2d 223 (1974). The statute in question is constitutional.

II. ALLEGED INVALIDITY OF ORDER UPON BASIS THAT AUTHORIZATION TO APPLY THEREFOR WAS NOT PERSONALLY DELEGATED

18 U.S.C. § 2516 provides that the Attorney General or any Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney General may authorize an application for a wiretap. Here, authorization was given by Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann (in charge of the Criminal Division) pursuant to Order No. 799-78 entered by Attorney General Griffin Bell on August 15, 1978 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 21). In August, 1979, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti succeeded the Honorable Griffin Bell as Attorney General, although no new Order was issued prior to the wiretap authorization nor was the August 15, 1978 Order revoked. Two courts have specifically addressed the contention of Defendants which attempts to narrowly construe wiretap authorization from being exercised by any individuals other...