Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project

Decision Date21 June 2010
Docket Number09–89.,Nos. 08–1498,s. 08–1498
Citation130 S.Ct. 2705,561 U.S. 1,177 L.Ed.2d 355
PartiesEric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, et al., Petitioners, v. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT et al. Humanitarian Law Project, et al., Petitioners, v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

David D. Cole, for petitioners in 09–89.

Solicitor General Elena Kagan, for petitioners in 08–1498.

Elena Kagan, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondents.

David D. Cole, c/o Georgetown Univ. Law Center, Washington, DC, Counsel of Record for Respondents/Cross–Petitioners Humanitarian Law Project et al., Shayana Kadidal, Jules Lobel, Joshua M. Rosenthal, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, NY, Richard G. Taranto, Farr & Taranto, Washington, DC, Clifford Y. Chen, Watkins, Bradley & Chen LLP, New York, NY, Carol Sobel, Santa Monica, CA, Paul Hoffman, Schonbrun, De Simone, Seplow, Harris and Hoffman LLP, Venice, CA, Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, New York, NY, for Respondents in 08–1498 and Cross–Petitioners in 09–89, Humanitarian Law Project et al.

Elena Kagan, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Neal Kumar Katyal, Deputy Solicitor General, Jeffrey B. Wall, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Douglas N. Letter, Joshua Waldman, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondents.

Opinion

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Congress has prohibited the provision of “material support or resources” to certain foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). That prohibition is based on a finding that the specified organizations “are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1247, note following 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Findings and Purpose). The plaintiffs in this litigation seek to provide support to two such organizations. Plaintiffs claim that they seek to facilitate only the lawful, nonviolent purposes of those groups, and that applying the material-support law to prevent them from doing so violates the Constitution. In particular, they claim that the statute is too vague, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and that it infringes their rights to freedom of speech and association, in violation of the First Amendment. We conclude that the material-support statute is constitutional as applied to the particular activities plaintiffs have told us they wish to pursue. We do not, however, address the resolution of more difficult cases that may arise under the statute in the future.

I

This litigation concerns 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which makes it a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”1 Congress has amended the definition of “material support or resources” periodically, but at present it is defined as follows:

[T]he term ‘material support or resources' means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” § 2339A(b)(1); see also § 2339B(g)(4).

The authority to designate an entity a “foreign terrorist organization” rests with the Secretary of State. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1189(a)(1), (d)(4). She may, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, so designate an organization upon finding that it is foreign, engages in “terrorist activity” or “terrorism,” and thereby “threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.” §§ 1189(a)(1), (d)(4). [N]ational security’ means the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.” § 1189(d)(2). An entity designated a foreign terrorist organization may seek review of that designation before the D.C. Circuit within 30 days of that designation. § 1189(c)(1).

In 1997, the Secretary of State designated 30 groups as foreign terrorist organizations. See 62 Fed.Reg. 52650. Two of those groups are the Kurdistan Workers' Party (also known as the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, or PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The PKK is an organization founded in 1974 with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F.Supp.2d 1176, 1180–1181 (C.D.Cal.1998); Brief for Petitioners in No. 08–1498, p. 6 (hereinafter Brief for Government). The LTTE is an organization founded in 1976 for the purpose of creating an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka. 9 F.Supp.2d, at 1182; Brief for Government 6. The District Court in this action found that the PKK and the LTTE engage in political and humanitarian activities. See 9 F.Supp.2d, at 1180–1182. The Government has presented evidence that both groups have also committed numerous terrorist attacks, some of which have harmed American citizens. See App. 128–133. The LTTE sought judicial review of its designation as a foreign terrorist organization; the D.C. Circuit upheld that designation. See People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Dept. of State, 182 F.3d 17, 18–19, 25 (1999). The PKK did not challenge its designation. 9 F.Supp.2d, at 1180.

Plaintiffs in this litigation are two U.S. citizens and six domestic organizations: the Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) (a human rights organization with consultative status to the United Nations); Ralph Fertig (the HLP's president, and a retired administrative law judge); Nagalingam Jeyalingam (a Tamil physician, born in Sri Lanka and a naturalized U.S. citizen); and five nonprofit groups dedicated to the interests of persons of Tamil descent. Brief for Petitioners in No. 09–89, pp. ii, 10 (hereinafter Brief for Plaintiffs); App. 48. In 1998, plaintiffs filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the material-support statute, § 2339B. Plaintiffs claimed that they wished to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of the PKK and the LTTE in the form of monetary contributions, other tangible aid, legal training, and political advocacy, but that they could not do so for fear of prosecution under § 2339B. 9 F.Supp.2d, at 1180–1184.2

As relevant here, plaintiffs claimed that the material-support statute was unconstitutional on two grounds: First, it violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association under the First Amendment, because it criminalized their provision of material support to the PKK and the LTTE, without requiring the Government to prove that plaintiffs had a specific intent to further the unlawful ends of those organizations. Id., at 1184. Second, plaintiffs argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 1184–1185.

Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which the District Court granted in part. The District Court held that plaintiffs had not established a probability of success on their First Amendment speech and association claims. See id., at 1196–1197. But the court held that plaintiffs had established a probability of success on their claim that, as applied to them, the statutory terms “personnel” and “training” in the definition of “material support” were impermissibly vague. See id., at 1204.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. 205 F.3d 1130, 1138 (C.A.9 2000). The court rejected plaintiffs' speech and association claims, including their claim that § 2339B violated the First Amendment in barring them from contributing money to the PKK and the LTTE. See id., at 1133–1136. But the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the terms “personnel” and “training” were vague because it was “easy to imagine protected expression that falls within the bounds” of those terms. Id., at 1138; see id., at 1137.

With the preliminary injunction issue decided, the action returned to the District Court, and the parties moved for summary judgment on the merits. The District Court entered a permanent injunction against applying to plaintiffs the bans on “personnel” and “training” support. See No. CV–98–1971 ABC (BQRx), 2001 WL 36105333 (CD Cal., Oct. 2, 2001). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 352 F.3d 382 (C.A.9 2003).

Meanwhile, in 2001, Congress amended the definition of “material support or resources” to add the term “expert advice or assistance.” Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), § 805(a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 377. In 2003, plaintiffs filed a second action challenging the constitutionality of that term as applied to them. 309 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1192 (C.D.Cal.2004).

In that action, the Government argued that plaintiffs lacked standing and that their preenforcement claims were not ripe. Id., at 1194. The District Court held that plaintiffs' claims were justiciable because plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated a “genuine threat of imminent prosecution,” id., at 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted), and because § 2339B had the potential to chill plaintiffs' protected expression, see id., at 1197–1198. On the merits, the District Court held that the term “expert advice or assistance” was impermissibly vague. Id., at 1201. The District Court rejected, however, plaintiffs' First Amendment claims that the new term was substantially overbroad and criminalized associational speech. See id., at 1202, 1203.

The parties cross-appealed. While the cross-appeals were pending, the Ninth Circuit granted en banc rehearing of the panel's 2003 decision in plaintiffs' first action (involving the terms “personnel” and “training”). See 382...

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