State v. Bloom
| Decision Date | 10 March 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 10876,10876 |
| Citation | 90 N.M. 192,561 P.2d 465,1977 NMSC 16 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner, v. Frank BLOOM and Ralph Mikorey, Respondent. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
This cause is before us on a writ of certiorari directed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the convictions of aggravated assault upon a police officer contrary to § 40A--22--21A(1), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972), escape from the custody of a peace officer contrary to § 40A--22--10, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972), and battery upon a peace officer contrary to § 40A--22--23, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972), but reversed the conviction of both defendants for possession of marijuana contrary to § 54--11--23(B)(3), N.M.S.A.1953 (Supp.1975). State v. Bloom and Mikorey (consolidated), opinion issued March 16, 1976, 90 N.M. 226, 561 P.2d 925 (Ct.App.1976). We granted certiorari to review only the reversal of the convictions for possession of marijuana. We reverse the Court of Appeals, insofar as it reversed these convictions, and remand the case to that court with directions to affirm the judgment of the trial court as to all convictions.
In the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, by which the convictions for possession of marijuana were reversed, that court has detailed most of the pertinent evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress. This motion sought suppression upon the grounds that the stop, search, seizure and arrest were unlawful. The Court of Appeals upheld the legality of the arrest, so that question is not before us. What is before us is the question of the correctness of the holding by the majority of the Court of Appeals that the physical and testimonial evidence concerning the marijuana should have been suppressed by the trial court, because the stop and search of the vehicle and the seizure of the marijuana by the state police officer were illegal.
In addition to the evidence on this issue quoted in the majority opinion, we call attention to the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Wood upon this issue. We agree with his dissent.
As to the purposes for the initial stop of the vehicle by the officer, there were contradictions in the officer's testimony. However, it is clear that there was evidence that the officer, with the assistance of another officer, was conducting a general roadblock for the purposes of checking driver's licenses and car registrations, and searching for stolen vehicles. The Court of Appeals concedes these are lawful purposes for stopping vehicles pursuant to statutory authority, and we agree. However, the majority of that court say they 'have no doubt that the stopping of defendants' vehicle and requesting the driver's license and registration was merely an excuse to go beyond the sanctions permitted by the statute * * *.' They claim by 'so holding (they) are not avoiding the traditional standards of appellate review * * *' and that 'there are certain cases were the traditional approach would be closing one's eyes to the realities of the situation.' With these statements we disagree.
The majority went beyond the permissible scope of appellate review by not limiting itself to a consideration of whether the evidence substantially supported the trial court's finding that the motion to suppress should be denied. Conflicts in evidence are to be resolved by the finder of the facts, in this case the trial court, and this includes conflicts in the testimony of a witness, as in the testimony of the police officer in this case. State v. Landlee, 85 N.M. 449, 513 P.2d 186 (Ct.App.1973); State v. McKay, 79 N.M. 797, 450 P.2d 435 (Ct.App.1969). The trial court, as the finder of the facts, resolved the conflicts against the defendants, and it was not within the province of the majority of the Court of Appeals to resolve the conflicts the other way, merely because it felt to follow this 'traditional approach would be closing one's eyes to the realities of the situation.' The realities of the factual situation were for the trial court to determine, and not for the Court of Appeals. The determination of the weight and effect of the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn from both the direct and circumstantial evidence, is a matter reserved for the determination of the trier of the facts. State v. Vigil, 87 N.M. 345, 533 P.2d 578 (1975).
With regard to the claimed search of the trunk of the vehicle, defendant Mikorey, in his testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress, gave the following answers to the following questions posed by his attorney:
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