L. A. Cnty. v. Humphries

Citation131 S.Ct. 447,562 U.S. 29,178 L.Ed.2d 460
Decision Date30 November 2010
Docket NumberNo. 09–350.,09–350.
Parties LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, v. Craig Arthur HUMPHRIES et al.
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Timothy T. Coates, Los Angeles, CA, for petitioner.

Andrew J. Pincus, Washington, DC, for respondents.

Timothy T. Coates, Counsel of Record, Alison M. Turner, Lillie Hsu, Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland LLP, Los Angeles, California, Mark D. Rutter, Carpenter, Rothans & Dumont, Los Angeles, California, for Petitioner Los Angeles County, California.

Scott L. Shuchart, Yale Law School, Supreme Court Clinic, New Haven, CT, Esther G. Boynton, San Diego, CA, Andrew J. Pincus, Counsel of Record, Charles A. Rothfeld, Paul W. Hughes, Admitted in New York only; D.C. admission pending, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), this Court held that civil rights plaintiffs suing a municipal entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show that their injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom. The case before the Court in Monell directly involved monetary damages. The question presented is whether the "policy or custom" requirement also applies when plaintiffs seek prospective relief, such as an injunction or a declaratory judgment. We conclude that it does so apply.

I

The case arises out of the following circumstances: The California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act, Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 11164 et seq. (West Rev. Supp.2010), requires law enforcement and other state agencies to investigate allegations of child abuse. These agencies must report to the California Department of Justice all instances of reported child abuse the agency finds "not unfounded," even if they are "inconclusive or unsubstantiated." §§ 11169(a), 11170(a)(3). The statute requires the department to include all these reports in a Child Abuse Central Index (Index), where they remain available to various state agencies for at least 10 years. § 11170(a). The statute also says that if

"a report has previously been filed which subsequently proves to be unfounded, the Department of Justice shall be notified in writing of that fact and shall not retain the report." § 11169(a).

The statute, however, does not set forth procedures for reviewing whether a previously filed report is unfounded, or for allowing individuals to challenge their inclusion in the Index. Nor, up until the time of this lawsuit, had California or Los Angeles County created any such procedures. But cf. § 11170(a)(2) ("The submitting agencies are responsible for the accuracy, completeness, and retention of the reports described in this section").

The two plaintiffs in this case were initially accused of child abuse. But they were later exonerated. They sought to have their names removed from the Index. Unable to convince the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department to remove them, they filed this § 1983 case against the attorney general of California, the Los Angeles County sheriff, two detectives in the sheriff's department, and the County of Los Angeles. They sought damages, an injunction, and a declaration that the defendants had deprived them of their constitutional rights by failing to create a procedural mechanism through which one could contest inclusion on the Index. See U.S. Const., Amdt. 14; Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment to all of the defendants on the ground that California had not deprived the plaintiffs of a constitutionally protected "liberty" interest. But on appeal the Ninth Circuit disagreed.

The Ninth Circuit held that the Fourteenth Amendment required the State to provide those included on the list notice and " ‘some kind of hearing.’ " 554 F.3d 1170, 1201 (2009). Thus the Circuit held that the plaintiffs were entitled to declaratory relief, and it believed that (on remand) they might prove damages as well. Ibid.

The Ninth Circuit also held that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties, thereby entitled to approximately $600,000 in attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (providing for payment of attorney's fees to parties prevailing on § 1983 claims). See No. 05–56467 (June 22, 2009), App. to Pet. for Cert. 1–4 (hereinafter First Fee Order); No. 05–56467 (Dec. 2, 2009), App. to Reply to Brief in Opposition 1–2 (hereinafter Second Fee Order). The Ninth Circuit wrote that Los Angeles County must pay approximately $60,000 of this amount. First Fee Order 3; Second Fee Order 2.

Los Angeles County denied that it was liable and therefore that it could be held responsible for attorney's fees. It argued that, in respect to the county, the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties. That is because the county is a municipal entity. Under Monell 's holding a municipal entity is liable under § 1983 only if a municipal "policy or custom " caused a plaintiff to be deprived of a federal right. 436 U.S., at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (emphasis added). And it was state policy, not county policy, that brought about any deprivation here.

The Ninth Circuit responded to this argument as follows: First, it said that county policy might be responsible for the deprivation. It "is possible," the Ninth Circuit said, that the county, "[b]y failing to" "creat[e] an independent procedure that would allow" the plaintiffs "to challenge their listing[,] ... adopted a custom and policy that violated" the plaintiffs' "constitutional rights." 554 F.3d, at 1202. Second, it said that "because this issue is not clear based on the record before us on appeal ... we remand to the district court to determine the County's liability under Monell ." Ibid. Third, it saw no reason to remand in respect to the county's obligation to pay $60,000 in attorney's fees. That, it wrote, is because "in our circuit ... the limitations to liability established in Monell do not apply to claims for prospective relief, " such as the declaratory judgment that the Circuit had ordered entered. First Fee Order 3–4 (citing Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 250 (C.A.9 1989) ; Truth v. Kent School Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 644 (C.A.9 2008) ; emphasis added).

The county then asked us to review this last-mentioned Ninth Circuit holding, namely, the holding that Monell 's"policy or custom" requirement applies only to claims for damages but not to claims for prospective relief. Because the Courts of Appeals are divided on this question, we granted the county's petition for certiorari. Compare Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 191 (C.A.2 2007) (holding that Monell 's"policy or custom" requirement applies to claims for prospective relief as well as claims for damages); Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dept., 315 F.3d 65, 71 (C.A.1 2002) (same); Greensboro Professional Fire Fighters Assn., Local 3157 v. Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962, 967, n. 6 (C.A.4 1995) (applying the Monell requirement to a prospective relief claim); Church v. Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1347 (C.A.11 1994) (same), with Chaloux, supra, at 251 (holding that Monell does not apply to prospective relief claims). See also Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 468 (C.A.7 2001) (reserving the question but noting the "predominant" view that " Monell 's holding applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought").

We conclude that Monell 's holding applies to § 1983 claims against municipalities for prospective relief as well as to claims for damages.

II
A

We begin with § 1983 itself, which provides:

"Every person who, under color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any ... other person ... to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States], shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." (Emphasis added.)

In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, this Court held that municipal entities were not "person[s]" under § 1983. The Court based this conclusion on the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871's enactment. It noted that Congress rejected an amendment (called the Sherman amendment) that would have made municipalities liable for damage done by private persons " ‘riotously and tumultuously assembled.’ " Id., at 188–190, and n. 38, 81 S.Ct. 473 (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 663 (1871)). This rejection, the Court thought, reflected a determination by the 1871 House of Representatives that " Congress had no constitutional power to impose any obligation upon county and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for the administration of state law.’ " 365 U.S., at 190, 81 S.Ct. 473 (quoting Cong. Globe, supra, at 804 (statement of Rep. Poland); emphasis added). The Court concluded that Congress must have doubted its "constitutional power ... to impose civil liability on municipalities." 365 U.S., at 190, 81 S.Ct. 473. And for that reason, Congress must have intended to exclude municipal corporations as § 1983 defendants. The statute's key term "person" therefore did not cover municipal entities. Id., at 191, 81 S.Ct. 473.

Sixteen years later, in Monell, the Court reconsidered the question of municipal liability. After reexamining the 1871 legislative history in detail, the Court concluded that Congress had rejected the Sherman amendment, not because it would have imposed liability upon municipalities, but because it would have imposed liability upon municipalities based purely upon the acts of others. That is to say, the rejected amendment would have imposed liability upon local governments "without regard to whether a local government was in any way at fault for the breach of the peace for which it was to be held for damages." 436 U.S., at 681, n. 40, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (emphasis added). In Monell 's view Congress may have thought that it...

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