Walker v. Martin, 09–996.

• Decision Date: 23 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–996.,09–996.
• Citation: 131 S.Ct. 1120,179 L.Ed.2d 62,562 U.S. 307
• Parties: James WALKER, Warden, et al., Petitioners, v. Charles W. MARTIN.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

562 U.S. 307

131 S.Ct. 1120

179 L.Ed.2d 62

James WALKER, Warden, et al., Petitioners,

v.Charles W. MARTIN.

No. 09–996.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 29, 2010.

Decided Feb. 23, 2011.

Todd Marshall, Sacramento, CA, for Petitioners.

Michael R. Bigelow, Sacramento, CA, appointed by this Court, for Respondent.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General of California, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. DeNicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, Deputy Attorney General, R. Todd Marshall, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Petitioners.

Michael B. Bigelow, Michelle Lee Goldberg, Sacramento, CA, Gary T. Ragghianti, Ragghianti and Freitas LLP, San Rafael, CA, for Respondent.

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns California's time limitation on applications for postconviction (habeas corpus) relief. The question presented: Does California's timeliness requirement qualify as an independent state ground adequate to bar habeas corpus relief in federal court?

California does not employ fixed statutory deadlines to determine the timeliness of a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus. Instead, California directs petitioners to file known claims "as promptly as the circumstances allow." In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, n. 5, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, 738, n. 5 (1993). Petitioners are further instructed to state when they first learned of the asserted claims and to explain why they did not seek postconviction relief sooner. In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, 317–318 (1998). Claims substantially delayed without justification may be denied as untimely. Ibid. ; Clark, 5 Cal.4th, at 765, n. 5, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d, at 738, n. 5.

California courts signal that a habeas petition is denied as untimely by citing the controlling decisions, i.e.,Clark and Robbins . A spare order denying a petition without explanation or citation ordinarily ranks as a disposition on the merits. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; see Harrington v. Richter, ante, at 9–10. California courts may elect to pretermit the question whether a petition is timely and simply deny the petition, thereby signaling that the petition lacks merit.

Petitioner below, respondent here, Charles W. Martin, presented the claims at issue—all alleging ineffective assistance of counsel—in a habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court nearly five years after his conviction became final. He stated no reason for the long delay. Citing Clark and Robbins, the court denied Martin's petition. In turn, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Martin's federal habeas petition raising the same ineffective assistance claims. Denial of Martin's state-court petition as untimely, the District Court held, rested on an adequate and independent state ground, i.e., Martin's failure to seek relief in state court "without substantial delay." See Robbins, 18 Cal.4th, at 787, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d, at 322.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision. Contrasting the precision of "fixed statutory deadlines" with California's proscription of "substantial delay," the appeals court held that California's standard lacked the clarity and certainty necessary to constitute an adequate state bar. 357 Fed.Appx. 793, 794 (2009) (relying on Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200 (C.A.9 2009) ).

In a recent decision, Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 612, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009), this Court clarified that a state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had discretion to reach the merits despite the default. Guided by that decision, we hold that California is not put to the choice of imposing a specific deadline for habeas petitions (which would almost certainly rule out Martin's nearly five-year delay) or preserving the flexibility of current practice, "but only at the cost of undermining the finality of state court judgments." Id., at ––––, 130 S.Ct. at 618. In so ruling, we stress that Martin has not alleged that California's time bar, either by design or in operation, discriminates against federal claims or claimants.

I

A

While most States set determinate time limits for collateral relief applications, in California, neither statute nor rule of court does so. Instead, California courts "appl[y] a general ‘reasonableness' standard" to judge whether a habeas petition is timely filed. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002). The basic instruction provided by the California Supreme Court is simply that "a [habeas] petition should be filed as promptly as the circumstances allow ...." Clark, 5 Cal.4th, at 765, n. 5, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d, at 738, n. 5.

Three leading decisions describe California's timeliness requirement: Robbins,Clark, and In re Gallego, 18 Cal.4th 825, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 959 P.2d 290 (1998). A prisoner must seek habeas relief without "substantial delay," Robbins, 18 Cal.4th, at 780, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d, at 317; Gallego, 18 Cal.4th, at 833, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 959 P.2d, at 296; Clark, 5 Cal.4th, at 783, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d, at 750, as "measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim," Robbins, 18 Cal.4th, at 787, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d, at 322. Petitioners in noncapital cases have "the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness." Id., at 780, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d, at 317.¹

California's collateral review regime differs from that of other States in a second notable respect: All California courts "have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings," Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 10, thus "no appeal lies from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus," Clark, 5 Cal.4th, at 767, n. 7, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d, at 740, n. 7."[A] prisoner whose petition has been denied by the superior court can obtain review of his claims only by the filing of a new petition in the Court of Appeal." Ibid. The new petition, however, must be confined to claims raised in the initial petition. See In re Martinez, 46 Cal.4th 945, 956, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 570, 209 P.3d 908, 915 (2009).

Because a habeas petitioner may skip over the lower courts and file directly in the California Supreme Court, In re Kler, 188 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1403, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 889, 891–892 (2010), that court rules on a staggering number of habeas petitions each year.² The court issues generally unelaborated "summary denials" of petitions that "d [o] not state a prima facie case for relief" or that contain "claims [that] are all procedurally barred." People v. Romero, 8 Cal.4th 728, 737, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388, 391 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). A summary denial citing Clark and Robbins means that the petition is rejected as untimely. See, e.g., Brief for Habeas Corpus Resource Center as Amicus Curiae 20, and n. 23. California courts have discretion, however, to bypass a timeliness issue and, instead, summarily reject the petition for want of merit. See Robbins, 18 Cal.4th, at 778, n. 1, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d, at 316, n. 1. See also Saffold, 536 U.S., at 225–226, 122 S.Ct. 2134.

B

In December 1986, Charles Martin participated in a robbery and murder in California. Martin fled the State, but eight years later he was extradited to California to stand trial. Convicted in state court of murder and robbery, Martin was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In 1997, the California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the California Supreme Court denied review.

Martin initiated his first round of state habeas proceedings in 1998, and the next year, the California Supreme Court denied his petition. He then filed a habeas petition in the appropriate U.S. District Court. Finding that Martin's federal petition included ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims he had not aired in state court, the District Court stayed the federal proceedings pending Martin's return to state court to exhaust his remedies there.³

In March 2002, Martin filed his second habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, raising the federal ineffective assistance claims his earlier filing omitted. He gave no reason for his failure to assert the additional claims until nearly five years after his sentence and conviction became final. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36, 39. In September 2002, the California Supreme Court denied Martin's petition in an order typical of that court's summary dispositions for failure to file "as promptly as the circumstances allow." Clark, 5 Cal.4th, at 765, n. 5, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d, at 738, n. 5. The order read in its entirety: "Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. (See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311.)." See App. to Pet. for Cert. 60.

Having exhausted state postconviction remedies, Martin returned to federal court and filed an amended petition. Based upon the California Supreme Court's time-bar disposition, the District Court dismissed Martin's belatedly asserted claims as procedurally precluded. Id., at 27, 57. The Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal order and remanded the case, directing the District Court to determine the "adequacy" of the State's time bar. Martin v. Hubbard, 192 Fed.Appx. 616, 618 (2006). The District Court again rejected Martin's petition, stating that "[t]he California timeliness bar as set forth in ... Clark / Robbins is clearly defined, well established and consistently...