Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. AT & T Inc.

Citation131 S.Ct. 1177,562 U.S. 397,179 L.Ed.2d 132
Decision Date01 March 2011
Docket NumberNo. 09–1279.,09–1279.
Parties FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al., Petitioners, v. AT & T INC. et al.
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Motion of the Acting Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint appendix granted.

Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.

D. Wayne Watts, Dallas, TX, Paul K. Mancini, Gary L. Phillips, Terri Hoskins, Washington, D.C., Geoffrey M. Klineberg, Counsel of Record, Brendan J. Crimmins, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., for AT & T Inc.

Adina H. Rosenbaum, Michael H. Page, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, Mary C. Albert, Counsel of Record, Washington, DC, for CompTel.

Austin C. Schlick, General Counsel, Peter Karanjia, Deputy General Counsel, Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, Michael A. Krasnow, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C., Neal Kumar Katyal, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Leonard Schaitman, Henry C. Whitaker, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Freedom of Information Act requires federal agencies to make records and documents publicly available upon request , unless they fall within one of several statutory exemptions. One of those exemptions covers law enforcement records, the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7)(C). The question presented is whether corporations have "personal privacy" for the purposes of this exemption.

I

The Freedom of Information Act request at issue in this case relates to an investigation of respondent AT & T Inc., conducted by the Federal Communications Commission. AT & T participated in an FCC-administered program—the E–Rate (or Education–Rate) program—that was created to enhance access for schools and libraries to advanced telecommunications and information services. In August 2004, AT & T voluntarily reported to the FCC that it might have overcharged the Government for services it provided as part of the program.

The FCC's Enforcement Bureau launched an investigation. As part of that investigation, AT & T provided the Bureau various documents, including responses to interrogatories, invoices, emails with pricing and billing information, names and job descriptions of employees involved, and AT & T's assessment of whether those employees had violated the company's code of conduct. 582 F.3d 490, 492–493 (C.A.3 2009). The FCC and AT & T resolved the matter in December 2004 through a consent decree in which AT & T—without conceding liability—agreed to pay the Government $500,000 and to institute a plan to ensure compliance with the program. See 19 FCC Rcd. 24014, 24016–24019.

Several months later, CompTel—"a trade association representing some of AT & T's competitors"—submitted a FOIA request seeking " [a]ll pleadings and correspondence’ " in the Bureau's file on the AT & T investigation. 582 F.3d, at 493. AT & T opposed CompTel's request, and the Bureau issued a letter-ruling in response.

The Bureau concluded that some of the information AT & T had provided (including cost and pricing data, billing-related information, and identifying information about staff, contractors, and customer representatives) should be protected from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 4, which relates to "trade secrets and commercial or financial information," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a–41a. The Bureau also decided to withhold other information under FOIA Exemption 7(C). Exemption 7(C) exempts "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" that "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." § 552(b)(7)(C). The Bureau concluded that "individuals identified in [AT & T's] submissions" have "privacy rights" that warrant protection under Exemption 7(C). Id., at 43a. The Bureau did not, however, apply that exemption to the corporation itself, reasoning that "businesses do not possess ‘personal privacy’ interests as required" by the exemption. Id., at 42a–43a.

On review the FCC agreed with the Bureau. The Commission found AT & T's position that it is "a ‘private corporate citizen’ with personal privacy rights that should be protected from disclosure that would ‘embarrass' it ... within the meaning of Exemption 7(C) ... at odds with established [ FCC] and judicial precedent." 23 FCC Rcd. 13704, 13707 (2008). It therefore concluded that "Exemption 7(C) has no applicability to corporations such as [AT & T]." Id., at 13710.

AT & T sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and that court rejected the FCC's reasoning. Noting that Congress had defined the word "person" to include corporations as well as individuals, 5 U.S.C. § 551(2), the court held that Exemption 7(C) extends to the "personal privacy" of corporations, since "the root from which the statutory word [personal] ... is derived" is the defined term "person." 582 F.3d, at 497. As the court explained, "[i]t would be very odd indeed for an adjectival form of a defined term not to refer back to that defined term." Ibid. The court accordingly ruled "that FOIA's text unambiguously indicates that a corporation may have a ‘personal privacy’ interest within the meaning of Exemption 7(C)." Id., at 498.

The FCC petitioned this Court for review of the Third Circuit's decision and CompTel filed as a respondent supporting petitioners. We granted certiorari, 561 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 61, 177 L.Ed.2d 1151 (2010), and now reverse.

II

Like the Court of Appeals below, AT & T relies on the argument that the word "personal" in Exemption 7(C) incorporates the statutory definition of the word "person." See Brief for Respondent AT & T 8–9, 14–15 (AT & T Brief); 582 F.3d, at 497. The Administrative Procedure Act defines "person" to include "an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 551(2). Because that definition applies here, the argument goes, "personal" must mean relating to those "person[s]": namely, corporations and other entities as well as individuals. This reading, we are told, is dictated by a "basic principle of grammar and usage." AT & T Brief 8; see id., at 14–15; see also 582 F.3d, at 497 (citing Delaware River Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440 F.3d 615, 623 (C.A.3 2006) (Fisher, J., concurring), for "[t]he grammatical imperativ[e]" that "a statute which defines a noun has thereby defined the adjectival form of that noun"). According to AT & T, "[b]y expressly defining the noun ‘person’ to include corporations, Congress necessarily defined the adjective form of that noun—‘personal’—also to include corporations." AT & T Brief 14 (emphasis added).

We disagree. Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own. The noun "crab" refers variously to a crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective "crabbed" can refer to handwriting that is "difficult to read," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 527 (2002); "corny" can mean "using familiar and stereotyped formulas believed to appeal to the unsophisticated," id., at 509, which has little to do with "corn," id., at 507 ("the seeds of any of the cereal grasses used for food"); and while "crank" is "a part of an axis bent at right angles," "cranky" can mean "given to fretful fussiness," id., at 530.

Even in cases such as these there may well be a link between the noun and the adjective. "Cranky" describes a person with a "wayward" or "capricious" temper, see 3 Oxford English Dictionary 1117 (2d ed. 1989) (OED), which might bear some relation to the distorted or crooked angular shape from which a "crank" takes its name. That is not the point. What is significant is that, in ordinary usage, a noun and its adjective form may have meanings as disparate as any two unrelated words. The FCC's argument that "personal" does not, in fact, derive from the English word "person," but instead developed along its own etymological path, Reply Brief for Petitioners 6, simply highlights the shortcomings of AT & T's proposed rule.

"Person" is a defined term in the statute; "personal" is not. When a statute does not define a term, we typically "give the phrase its ordinary meaning." Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 1267, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010)."Personal" ordinarily refers to individuals. We do not usually speak of personal characteristics, personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or personal tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial entities. This is not to say that corporations do not have correspondence, influence, or tragedies of their own, only that we do not use the word "personal" to describe them.

Certainly, if the chief executive officer of a corporation approached the chief financial officer and said, "I have something personal to tell you," we would not assume the CEO was about to discuss company business. Responding to a request for information, an individual might say, "that's personal." A company spokesman, when asked for information about the company, would not. In fact, we often use the word "personal" to mean precisely the opposite of business-related: We speak of personal expenses and business expenses, personal life and work life, personal opinion and a company's view.

Dictionaries also suggest that "personal" does not ordinarily relate to artificial "persons" such as corporations. See, e.g., 7 OED 726 (1933) ("[1] [o]f, pertaining to ... the individual person or self," "individual; private; one's own," "[3] [o]f or pertaining to one's...

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