562 U.S. 562 (2011), 09-1163, Milner v. Department of Navy

Docket Nº:09-1163.
Citation:562 U.S. 562, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 179 L.Ed.2d 268, 79 U.S.L.W. 4169
Opinion Judge:Kagan, Justice
Party Name:Glen Scott MILNER, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.
Attorney:David S. Mann, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner. Anthony A. Yang, for Respondent. Paul L. Oostburg Sanz, J. Page Turney, Judy A. Conlow, Washington, D.C., Neal Kumar Katyal, Acting Solicitor General, Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Anthony A. Yang, A...
Judge Panel:KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito, concurring. Justice Breyer, dissenting.
Case Date:March 07, 2011
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 562

562 U.S. 562 (2011)

131 S.Ct. 1259, 179 L.Ed.2d 268, 79 U.S.L.W. 4169

Glen Scott MILNER, Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.

No. 09-1163.

United States Supreme Court

March 7, 2011

Argued December 1, 2010.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 09–1163.

[131 S.Ct. 1260] [179 L.Ed.2d 272] Syllabus [*]

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requires federal agencies to make Government records available to the public, subject to nine ex­emptions. This case concerns Exemption 2, which protects from dis­closure material "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." 5 U.S. C.§552(b)(2). This provision replaced an Administrative [179 L.Ed.2d 273] Procedure Act (APA) exemption for "any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency, " 5 U.S.C. §1002 (1964 ed.). Congress believed that the "sweep" of the phrase "internal management" had led to excessive withholding, and drafted Exemption 2 "to have a narrower reach." Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 362-363, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11.

In Rose, the Court found that Exemption 2 could not be invoked to withhold Air Force Academy honor and ethics hearing summaries. The exemption, the Court suggested, primarily targets material con­cerning employee relations or human resources. But the Court stated a possible caveat: That understanding of the provision's coverage governed "at least where the situation is not one where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation." Id., at 369, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11. The D. C. Circuit subsequently converted this caveat into a new definition of Exemption 2's scope, finding that the exemption also covered any "predominantly internal" materials whose disclosure would "signifi­cantly ris[k] circumvention of agency regulation or statutes." Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1056–1057, 1074, 216 U.S. App. D.C. 232 Courts now use the term "Low 2" for human resources and employee relations records and "High 2" for records whose disclo­sure would risk circumvention of the law.

Petitioner Milner submitted FOIA requests for explosives data and maps used by respondent Department of the Navy (Navy or Government) in storing munitions at a naval base in Washington State. Stating that disclosure would threaten the security of the base and surrounding community, the Navy invoked Exemption 2 and refused to release the data. The District Court granted the Navy summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the High 2 interpretation.

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Held:

Because Exemption 2 encompasses only records relating to em­ployee relations and human resources issues, the explosives maps and data requested here do not qualify for withholding under that exemption. Pp. 1264 – 1271, 179 L.Ed.2d, at 277-285.

(a) Exemption 2 shields only those records relating to "personnel rules and practices." When used as an adjective in this manner, the key statutory word "personnel" refers to human resources matters. For example, a "personnel department" deals with employee prob­lems and interviews applicants for jobs. FOIA Exemption 6 provides another example, protecting certain "personnel . . . files" from disclo­sure. §552(b)(6). "[T]he common and congressional meaning of . . . 'personnel file' " is a file maintained by a human resources office col­lecting personal information about employees, such as examination results and work performance evaluations. Rose, 425 U.S., at 377, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11. [131 S.Ct. 1261] Ex­emption 2 uses "personnel" in the exact same way. An agency's "per­sonnel rules and practices" all share a critical feature: They concern conditions of employment in federal agencies-such matters as hiring and firing, work rules and discipline, compensation and benefits. These items currently fall within the so-called Low 2 exemption. And under this Court's construction of the statutory language, Low 2 is all of 2.

FOIA's purpose reinforces this reading. The statute's goal is "broad disclosure, " and the exemptions must [179 L.Ed.2d 274] be "given a narrow com­pass." Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151, 109 S.Ct. 2841, 106 L.Ed.2d 112. A narrow construction stands on especially firm footing with respect to Exemption 2, which was intended to hem in the expansive withhold­ing that occurred under the prior APA exemption for "internal man­agement" records.

Exemption 2, as interpreted here, does not reach the requested ex­plosives information. The data and maps, which calculate and visu­ally portray the magnitude of hypothetical detonations, in no way re­late to "personnel rules and practices, " as that term is most naturally understood. Pp. 1264 -1266, 179 L.Ed.2d, at 277-279.

(b) The Government's two alternative readings of Exemption 2 cannot be squared with the statute. Pp. 1266 -1270, 179 L.Ed.2d, at 279-284.

(c) While the Navy has a strong security interest in shielding the explosives data and maps from public disclosure, the Government has other tools at hand to protect such information: FOIA Exemption 1 prevents access to classified documents; Exemption 3 applies to re­cords that any other statute exempts from disclosure; and Exemption 7 protects "information compiled for law enforcement purposes" if its release, inter alia, "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual, " §552(b)(7)(F). The Navy's ar­gument that the

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explosives information is exempt under Exemption 7 remains open for the Ninth Circuit to address on remand. And if these or other exemptions do not cover records whose release would threaten the Nation's vital interests, the Government may of course seek relief from Congress. Pp. 1270-1271, 179 L.Ed.2d, at 284.

575 F.3d 959, reversed and remanded.

David S. Mann, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Anthony A. Yang, for Respondent.

Paul L. Oostburg Sanz, J. Page Turney, Judy A. Conlow, Washington, D.C., Neal Kumar Katyal, Acting Solicitor General, Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Leonard Schaitman, Howard S. Scher, Peter A. Winn, Attorneys Department of Justice Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

Kagan, Justice

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552, requires federal [131 S.Ct. 1262] agencies to make Government records available to the public, subject to nine exemptions for specific categories of material. This case concerns the scope of Exemption 2, which protects from disclosure material that is "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." §552(b)(2). Respondent Department of the Navy (Navy or Government) invoked Exemption 2 to deny

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a FOIA request for data and maps used to help store explosives at a naval base in Washing­ton State. We hold that Exemption 2 does not stretch so far.

I

Congress enacted FOIA to overhaul the public-disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §1002 (1964 ed.). That section of the APA "was plagued with vague phrases" and gradually became more "a withholding statute than a disclosure statute." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973). Congress intended FOIA to "permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view." Id., at 80, 93 S.Ct. 827, [179 L.Ed.2d 275] 35 L.Ed.2d 119. FOIA thus mandates that an agency disclose records on request, unless they fall within one of nine exemptions. These exemptions are "explicitly made exclusive, " id., at 79, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119, and must be "narrowly construed, " FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630, 102 S.Ct. 2054, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982).

At issue here is Exemption 2, which shields from com­pelled disclosure documents "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." §552(b)(2). Congress enacted Exemption 2 to replace the APA's ex­emption for "any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency, " 5 U.S.C. §1002 (1964 ed.). Believing that the "sweep" of the phrase "internal man­agement" had led to excessive withholding, Congress drafted Exemption 2 "to have a narrower reach." Depart­ment of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 362-363, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976).

We considered the extent of that reach in Department of Air Force v. Rose. There, we rejected the Government's invocation of Exemption 2 to withhold case summaries of honor and ethics hearings at the United States Air Force Academy. The exemption, we suggested, primarily targets material concerning employee relations or human re­sources: "use of parking facilities or regulations of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like." Id., at 363, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1965)

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(hereinafter S. Rep.)); see Rose, 425 U.S., at 367, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11. " [T]he general thrust" of Exemption 2, we explained, "is simply to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining [such information] for public inspection." Id., at 369, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11. We concluded that the case summaries did not fall within the exemption because they "d[id] not concern only routine matters" of "merely internal significance." Id., at 370, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11. But we stated a possible caveat to our interpretation of Exemption 2: That understanding of...

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