National Rejectors Industries v. United Steelworkers of America

• Decision Date: 30 August 1977
• Docket Number: No. 77-1318,77-1318
• Citation: 562 F.2d 1069
• Parties: 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2120, 82 Lab.Cas. P 10,113 NATIONAL REJECTORS INDUSTRIES, etc., Appellee, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, etc., et al., Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1069

562 F.2d 1069

96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2120, 82 Lab.Cas. P 10,113

NATIONAL REJECTORS INDUSTRIES, etc., Appellee, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, etc., et al., Appellants.

No. 77-1318.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 17, 1977.

Decided Aug. 30, 1977.

James E. Youngdahl (argued and on rebuttal) and Kenneth L. Schorr, Little Rock, Ark., on brief for appellants.

Edward Katze, Atlanta, Ga. (argued), Lovic A. Brooks, Jr., Charles A. Edwards, Atlanta, Ga., and Don M. Schnipper of Wood, Smith & Schnipper, Hot Springs, Ark., on brief for appellee.

Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, and LAY and ROSS, Circuit Judges.

ROSS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellee National Rejectors Industries (NRI or the company) commenced this action in district court seeking money damages and injunctive relief to redress violations and to compel specific performance of a collective-bargaining agreement. Defendant-appellants are the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO (the union), its Local No. 6178 (the local), and several union officials. Disputes had arisen between the parties culminating in the suspension of large numbers of union employees for violations of company work rules, resulting in a sharp decline in productivity at the company's plant. The district court assumed jurisdiction pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and granted an injunction enjoining, inter alia, further violations of the work rules, and ordering the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration proceedings. Pending appeal, the district court stayed the latter portion of its order. Similarly, an administrative panel of this court stayed the remainder of the order pending resolution on the merits. For the reasons hereafter stated, we dissolve these stays and affirm the judgment of the district court. ¹

I.

NRI is a subsidiary of a Delaware corporation and maintains an office and plant in Hot Springs, Arkansas where it manufactures coin and currency changing devices. The company employs over 400 persons at its Hot Springs plant, some 300 of which are production and maintenance workers. The union and its local have been the exclusive collective bargaining representatives for the company's production and maintenance workers since 1961. The parties have stipulated that the company is an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of sections 2(7) and 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(7) and 185. It is likewise agreed that the union is a labor organization within the meaning of section 2(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), and that it is engaged in representing employee members in the Western District of Arkansas. See LMRA § 301(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 185(c)(2).

The company and the union are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement. ² Article XXXIV of the agreement provides that "there shall be no strikes, slow-ups, stoppages of work * * * or other interference with the operations of the Company during the term of this Agreement." Article XV provides that all disputes concerning the meaning or application of the agreement be resolved by a four-step grievance and arbitration procedure. ³ "Step 1" calls At a meeting in December 1976 an incident occurred which resulted in the company's discharging Frankie Joe Russell, president of the local union, and suspending for 30 days two other officers of the local. ⁴ The union filed grievances with respect to these actions. Russell and the two suspended officers were designated members of the local's grievance committee for purposes of "Step 2" of the grievance procedure outlined above. When Step 2 negotiations were reached, the company requested that further proceedings be conducted at the next higher level, over the local's grievance committee, in accordance with its interpretation of Article XV of the collective-bargaining agreement. ⁵ The union refused, insisting that Russell and the two suspended officers be involved in the grievance proceedings. The company in turn refused to meet with Mr. Russell, but remained willing to proceed at the next higher level. The union then filed grievances over the company's refusal to abide by the grievance procedures. At this point, negotiations between the parties reached an impasse.

for any grievance to be first submitted by the affected employee to his foreman, the latter to respond in writing to the grievance. "Step 2" provides that appeals by either party be submitted to a meeting between management representatives and the grievance committee of the local union. "Step 3" requires further appeals to be resolved at a meeting between the national organization of the union and representatives of company executives. If the dispute is still not resolved, "Step 4" provides for submission of the matter to final and binding arbitration, and specifies a method of selecting an arbiter.

On January 13, 1977, the union filed charges against the company with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that the dismissal and suspensions of the local officers constituted unfair labor practices under section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158, in violation of rights guaranteed in section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157. On February 22nd, the NLRB filed a complaint against the company incorporating these allegations.

In early March 1977 the company promulgated six new work rules for employees at the Hot Springs plant. ⁶ The union was Under procedures established by the company for enforcing its work rules, an employee was given a verbal warning following his first violation; a second violation resulted in a written warning. Following a third violation, the employee was informed that further violations would result in his being temporarily suspended.

given notice of these rules, but again refused to negotiate with the company without Mr. Russell being present as a representative. The company then placed the rules into effect on March 14. Clois Lishbrook, acting president of the local in the absence of Mr. Russell, told company representatives that she did not intend to comply with the new rules and stated that she did not think any of the other union employees should comply with them either.

Within four days after the new rules went into effect, 138 employees had been suspended for violating them. The union immediately filed grievances with respect to each of these suspensions. By this time, production at the plant had dropped to 30% of normal. In an effort to maintain an active work force, the company decided on March 18 to suspend further enforcement of the rules. ⁷ Later that day, the company notified the union that it was willing to waive the intermediate steps of the grievance procedure and begin immediate arbitration on all the grievances theretofore filed by the union. The company also offered to continue suspending enforcement of the work rules pending resolution of these grievances through arbitration. When the union refused, the company sought relief in the district court.

The district court found that, by violating the work rules, union employees had engaged in concerted activity calculated to slow up and impede production at the plant, that this activity was precipitated by disputes then existing between the union and the company, that these disputes were arbitrable and, therefore, that these actions violated Articles XV and XXXIV of the collective-bargaining agreement. Accordingly, the court entered its order enjoining further union efforts to impede production at the plant and requiring the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. The union responded by filing this appeal.

II.

We are confronted at the outset with the union's contention that the instant case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, thus depriving the district court of its power to issue an injunction. This argument is based on the preemption doctrine, announced in San Diego Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), which teaches that "(w)hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the (National Labor Relations) Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." Id. at 245, 79 S.Ct. at 780.

The union asserts that the company's dismissal of Frankie Joe Russell, its Accordingly, we reject the union's claim that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.

subsequent refusal to meet with him, and its promulgation of the new work rules are unfair labor practices under § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158. This may well be true, though the question is not before us. ⁸ It does not follow, however, that such a conclusion would serve to divest the district court of jurisdiction in this case, which was brought to enforce the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement under § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). ⁹ It has long been recognized that, by its enactment of § 301, "Congress deliberately chose to leave the enforcement of collective agreements 'to the usual processes of the law.' " Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513, 82 S.Ct. 519, 526, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962). Thus, in cases brought under § 301, the district court's jurisdiction is not curtailed even if the disputed activity also constitutes an unfair labor practice. Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 297 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977); William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters District Council of Jacksonville, 417 U.S. 12, 16, 94 S.Ct. 2069, 40 L.Ed.2d 620 (1974).

III.

The union next contends that the district court was precluded from issuing an injunction by the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. ¹⁰ In making this argument the union candidly acknowledges that in Boys Markets v....