Staub v. Proctor Hosp.

Citation179 L.Ed.2d 144,131 S.Ct. 1186,562 U.S. 411
Decision Date01 March 2011
Docket NumberNo. 09–400.,09–400.
Parties Vincent E. STAUB, Petitioner, v. PROCTOR HOSPITAL.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

562 U.S. 411
131 S.Ct.
1186
179 L.Ed.2d 144

Vincent E. STAUB, Petitioner,
v.
PROCTOR HOSPITAL.

No. 09–400.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 2, 2010.
Decided March 1, 2011.


Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.

Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae out of time granted.

Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.

Patricia Ann Millet, Aikin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP, Washington, DC, Eric Schnapper, Counsel of Record, School of Law, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, Julie L. Galassi Hasselberg, Rock, Bell & Kuppler LLP, Peoria, IL, for petitioner.

Roy G. Davis, Counsel of Record, Richard A. Russo, Abby J. Clark, Davis & Campbell L.L.C., Peoria, Illinois, for respondent.

Julie L. Galassi, Troy L. Plattner, Hasselberg, Rock, Bell & Kuppler LLP, Peoria, IL, Eric Schnapper, Counsel of Record, University of Washington School of

131 S.Ct. 1189

Law, William H. Gates Hall, Seattle, WA, Patricia Ann Millett, Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

Justice SCALIA, delivered the opinion of the Court.

562 U.S. 413

We consider the circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for employment discrimination based on the discriminatory animus of an employee who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment decision.

I

Petitioner Vincent Staub worked as an angiography technician for respondent Proctor Hospital until 2004, when he was fired. Staub and Proctor hotly dispute the facts surrounding the firing, but because a jury found for Staub in his claim of employment discrimination against Proctor, we describe the facts viewed in the light most favorable to him.

While employed by Proctor, Staub was a member of the United States Army Reserve, which required him to attend drill one weekend per month and to train full time for two to

562 U.S. 414

three weeks a year. Both Janice Mulally, Staub's immediate supervisor, and Michael Korenchuk, Mulally's supervisor, were hostile to Staub's military obligations. Mulally scheduled Staub for additional shifts without notice so that he would " ‘pa[y] back the department for everyone else having to bend over backwards to cover [his] schedule for the Reserves.’ " 560 F.3d 647, 652 (C.A.7 2009). She also informed Staub's co-worker, Leslie Sweborg, that Staub's " ‘military duty had been a strain on th[e] department,’ " and asked Sweborg to help her " ‘get rid of him.’ " Ibid. Korenchuk referred to Staub's military obligations as " ‘a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of taxpayers[’] money.' " Ibid. He was also aware that Mulally was " ‘out to get’ " Staub. Ibid.

In January 2004, Mulally issued Staub a "Corrective Action" disciplinary warning for purportedly violating a company rule requiring him to stay in his work area whenever he was not working with a patient. The Corrective Action included a directive requiring Staub to report to Mulally or Korenchuk " ‘when [he] ha[d] no patients and [the angio] cases [we]re complete[d].’ " Id., at 653. According to Staub, Mulally's justification for the Corrective Action was false for two reasons: First, the company rule invoked by Mulally did not exist; and second, even if it did, Staub did not violate it.

On April 2, 2004, Angie Day, Staub's co-worker, complained to Linda Buck, Proctor's vice president of human resources, and Garrett McGowan, Proctor's chief operating officer, about Staub's frequent unavailability and abruptness. McGowan directed Korenchuk and Buck to create a plan that would solve Staub's " ‘availability’ problems." Id., at 654. But three weeks later, before they had time to do so, Korenchuk informed Buck that Staub had left his desk without informing a supervisor, in violation of the January Corrective Action. Staub now contends this accusation was false: he had left Korenchuk a voice-mail notification that he was

562 U.S. 415

leaving his desk. Buck relied on Korenchuk's accusation, however, and after reviewing Staub's personnel file, she decided to fire him. The termination notice stated that Staub had ignored the directive issued in the January 2004 Corrective Action.

Staub challenged his firing through Proctor's grievance process, claiming that

131 S.Ct. 1190

Mulally had fabricated the allegation underlying the Corrective Action out of hostility toward his military obligations. Buck did not follow up with Mulally about this claim. After discussing the matter with another personnel officer, Buck adhered to her decision.

Staub sued Proctor under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., claiming that his discharge was motivated by hostility to his obligations as a military reservist. His contention was not that Buck had any such hostility but that Mulally and Korenchuk did, and that their actions influenced Buck's ultimate employment decision. A jury found that Staub's "military status was a motivating factor in [Proctor's] decision to discharge him," App. 68a, and awarded $57,640 in damages.

The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Proctor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 560 F.3d 647. The court observed that Staub had brought a " ‘cat's paw’ case," meaning that he sought to hold his employer liable for the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate employment decision. Id., at 655–656.1 It explained

562 U.S. 416

that under Seventh Circuit precedent, a "cat's paw" case could not succeed unless the nondecisionmaker exercised such " ‘singular influence’ " over the decisionmaker that the decision to terminate was the product of "blind reliance." Id., at 659. It then noted that "Buck looked beyond what Mulally and Korenchuk said," relying in part on her conversation with Day and her review of Staub's personnel file. Ibid. The court "admit[ted] that Buck's investigation could have been more robust," since it "failed to pursue Staub's theory that Mulally fabricated the write-up." Ibid. But the court said that the " ‘singular influence’ " rule "does not require the decisionmaker to be a paragon of independence": "It is enough that the decisionmaker is not wholly dependent on a single source of information and conducts her own investigation into the facts relevant to the decision." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the undisputed evidence established that Buck was not wholly dependent on the advice of Korenchuk and Mulally, the court held that Proctor was entitled to judgment. Ibid.

We granted certiorari. 559 U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2089, 176 L.Ed.2d 720 (2010).

II

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) provides in relevant part as follows:

"A person who is a member of ... or has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that membership, ... or obligation." 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a).

It elaborates further:

"An employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited ... under subsection (a), if the person's membership ... is a motivating factor in
131 S.Ct. 1191
the employer's action, unless the employer can prove that the
562 U.S. 417
action would have been taken in the absence of such membership." § 4311(c).

The statute is very similar to Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination "because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" and states that such discrimination is established when one of those factors "was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(a), (m).

The central difficulty in this case is construing the phrase "motivating factor in the employer's action." When the company official who makes the decision to take an adverse employment action is personally acting out of hostility to the employee's membership in or obligation to a uniformed service, a motivating factor obviously exists. The problem we confront arises when that official has no discriminatory animus but is influenced by previous company action that is the product of a like animus in someone else.

In approaching this question, we start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law. See Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1870, 1880–1881, 173 L.Ed.2d 812 (2009); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68–69, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007) ; Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (199...

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