Winsley v. Cook County

• Decision Date: 22 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-2339.,08-2339.
• Citation: 563 F.3d 598
• Parties: Marsalette S. WINSLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COOK COUNTY, doing business as Cook County Department of Public Health, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

563 F.3d 598

Marsalette S. WINSLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COOK COUNTY, doing business as Cook County Department of Public Health, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08-2339.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued February 11, 2009.

Decided April 22, 2009.

William E. Hourigan, Attorney (argued), Decatur, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

William E.

Anita Alvarez, Pavlina Kochankovska, Attorney (argued), Office of Cook County State's Attorney, Federal Litigation Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before BAUER, RIPPLE and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Marsalette S. Winsley filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against her former employer, Cook County, Illinois (the "County"), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),¹ 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Cook County filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Ms. Winsley then filed this appeal. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we now affirm the judgment of the district court.

I BACKGROUND

A.

Marsalette Winsley is an African-American woman. She was employed, beginning in October 2001, as a Public Health Nurse I for the Department of Public Health for Cook County, Illinois. Prior to July 2003, she was assigned as a Genetics and Perinatal Hepatitis Coordinator in Oak Park, Illinois. In July of that year, Ms. Winsley took a leave of absence to undergo a hysterectomy and kidney surgery. Ms. Winsley returned to work in December 2003 and was assigned as a Family Case Manager in Maywood, Illinois. The position required her to drive to the homes of her clients in order to evaluate their condition and development.

In March 2004, Ms. Winsley was involved in an automobile accident. She did not seek emergency medical treatment after the accident, but she did contact her psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Bednarz, to tell him that she was suffering from panic attacks and inability to sleep. She also went to see her primary care physician; she told her doctor that she "had some pain in her head and along her left side" that lasted for "approximately two or three weeks after the accident." R.36 at 3. In April 2004, Dr. Bednarz diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). On his recommendation, Ms. Winsley took a leave of absence from April 6 through the end of the month. On April 24, Dr. Bednarz informed the County by letter that Ms. Winsley "could return to work part-time with minimal work-related driving." Id. at 4. Dr. Bednarz explained that the driving restriction was necessary because Ms. Winsley "would go into a full panic when she got into a car." Id.

For the six weeks following her leave of absence, the County allowed Ms. Winsley to work part-time at an office closer to her home. In early June 2004, however, the County informed her that she could not continue to work part-time and still retain her classification as a Public Health Nurse I. The County presented Ms. Winsley with four options: (1) "[r]equest a disability leave of absence and pursue benefits through the County's Annuity and Benefits Office," (2) "[r]esume full-time duties of a Public Health Nurse in Maywood, including field duties," (3) "[r]equest reassignment with demotion to a clinic nurse position," or (4) "[r]equest reassignment to part-time status ... in the category of Registered Nurse I." Id. at 6. Ms. Winsley chose the first option, and her disability leave of absence began in June. Also in June, Dr. Bednarz sent another note to the County informing it that Ms. Winsley "was still having severe symptoms of PTSD and continued to have difficulty driving." Id.

Ms. Winsley returned to work in December 2004 and was assigned once again to the Maywood office. She drove to and from work but did not drive to visit clients. She stopped coming to work in March 2005 and did not return to work until May of that year. In early May, Dr. Bednarz sent another note informing the County that Ms. Winsley could return to work if she did not have to drive during the work day, worked only 32 hours per week with Wednesdays off, and, if possible, was relocated to an office within 15 miles of her home. For the next eight weeks, the County did not require Ms. Winsley to drive during the day and let her have Wednesdays off. During this period, however, she received "unsatisfactory" evaluations for attendance and timeliness.

Around this time, Ms. Winsley told her supervisor that her co-workers were making her uncomfortable by asking her why she had been off work. Her supervisor directed the assistant supervisor to speak with Ms. Winsley's co-workers individually about the issue. Ms. Winsley wanted the supervisors to call a staff meeting to discuss the matter, but the supervisors declined to do so. At the next regular staff meeting, Ms. Winsley "announced that she wanted to say something to her peers about interrupting her work to ask her personal questions." Id. at 8. Her supervisors asked her to stop, but she refused. After being asked to stop a second time, she left the meeting. She went on a leave of absence the next day. In June 2005, she filed a charge with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging discrimination based on race and disability.

In late June 2005, Dr. Bednarz sent another note to the County informing it that Ms. Winsley could not return to work unless she was granted the previously requested changes to her work requirements. The County then requested that Ms. Winsley and her physician fill out a "Physical Demands Analysis" form to determine whether she could perform the essential job functions for her position. The analysis form stated that one of these functions was driving for two hours out of the eight-hour work day. Dr. Bednarz responded with a note stating that Ms. Winsley's "only restriction is no more driving than to & from work, otherwise full duty." Id. at 11.

Ms. Winsley returned to work in late November 2005. On November 22, she filed a union grievance. The County then agreed to reassign her to the Bridgeview office if Dr. Bednarz cleared her to do the two hours of driving required by her position.

In June 2006, Ms. Winsley missed approximately twenty days of work due to a house fire. On May 22, 2007, Ms. Winsley's supervisor gave her a memorandum noting her absenteeism over the previous eleven weeks and asking for an improvement over the following two months. On May 25, without notice, Ms. Winsley stopped going to work. She never returned to work, and formally resigned from her position on October 15, 2007.

B.

Ms. Winsley then filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that the County had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She also alleged that the County had engaged in retaliation after she filed her EEOC claim. After discovery, the County moved for summary judgment on all counts. In her response, Ms. Winsley cited repeatedly to assertions she had made in her own deposition, but did not point to any other evidence in support of her claims.

The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all of Ms. Winsley's claims. On her ADA claim, the court concluded that Ms. Winsley had not produced evidence sufficient to establish that she had a "disability" as that term was defined in the ADA. The court also held that she had failed to establish that she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job. Because she had failed to establish these two required elements, the court granted summary judgment on her ADA claims.

On her Title VII claim, the court concluded that Ms. Winsley had not made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination under either the direct or indirect method of proof. The court noted that she did not cite any direct or circumstantial evidence in the record that would support her argument under the direct method of proof. As to the indirect method of proof, the court held that she had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination because her deposition testimony—the only evidence she offered in support of her claims—did not establish that any similarly situated employee was treated more favorably.

Finally, the district court concluded that Ms. Winsley failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on her retaliation claim. The court held that her claim failed under the direct method because she had not established that the County had created a "hostile work environment" in response to her EEOC claim. The court also concluded that she had not made out a prima facie case via the indirect method, because, once again, her deposition testimony did not establish the existence of a similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably.

Ms. Winsley filed a timely appeal of the district court's decision.

II DISCUSSION

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all facts and reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.2007). Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery and disclosure materials on file, as well as any affidavits, demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A. Americans With Disabilities Act

To establish a violation of the ADA, an employee must show: "1) that she is disabled; 2) that she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; and 3) that the employer took an adverse job action against her because of her disability or failed to make a reasonable accommodation." Stevens v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

The district court...