Rajender v. University of Minnesota, Civ. 4-73-435.

Decision Date16 February 1983
Docket NumberCiv. 4-73-435.
Citation563 F. Supp. 401
PartiesShyamala RAJENDER, on behalf of herself and a class of academic non-student employees and applicants at the University of Minnesota, Plaintiff, v. The UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA and the Regents of the University of Minnesota, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Paul Sprenger, Sprenger Olson & Shutes, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff class.

Steven Dunham, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendants.

ORDER

MILES W. LORD, Chief Judge.

Before this court is the Recommended Order for Amendment of the Consent Decree filed by the special masters in the above-entitled action. The recommended order was issued after a hearing at which the following persons appeared in support of the masters' February 1, 1982, Order to Show Cause: Paul C. Sprenger of Sprenger, Olson & Shutes, P.A., attorney for the class; Carolyn Chalmers and Kathleen Graham of Dayton, Herman, Graham & Getts; Dolores C. Orey of Kampf & Orey, P.A.,: Mark P. Wine of Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard & Donnelly; Gary A. Weissman of French & Weissman, P.A.; Laura Cooper of the Equal Employment Opportunity for Women Committee; representatives of the Faculty Advisory Committee for Women; and several members of the plaintiff class. Appearing in opposition to portions of the masters' Order to Show Cause were Peter S. Hendrixson of Dorsey & Whitney and Charles C. Mays of Leonard, Street and Deinard. Subsequent to the filing of the Masters' Recommended Order for Amendment of the Consent Decree, objections were filed by both claimants and the University, pursuant to Rule 53(e)(2), Fed.R. Civ.P.

On September 2, 1982, a hearing was held before this court. At that time, arguments of counsel were presented on the specific issue of the masters' recommended removal of the $6,000 limitation on partial attorneys' fees. Following the September 1982 hearing, additional fee information was requested of the University. The University complied with the court's request over a period of months, with the final affidavit submitted on December 2, 1982. The matter was then taken under advisement.

Having considered the objections of counsel, together with the Recommended Order and Memorandum of the Special Masters, this court adopts the recommendations in part and modifies in part.

FACTS

This dispute derives from a class action originally brought by Dr. Shyamala Rajender against the University of Minnesota. The plaintiff filed her complaint on September 5, 1973, and her Second Amended Complaint on September 6, 1975, alleging that the defendants were engaged in employment discrimination based upon sex and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.

On February 13, 1978, pursuant to a motion for class determination, the court entered an order establishing that the action be maintained as a class action on behalf of:

all women academic non-student employees who have been employed by the University of Minnesota at any time after March 24, 1972, women who have applied for but were denied employment by the University in such positions after that date or women who would have applied for such positions but for the discriminatory policies and practices of the University; all present women academic nonstudent employees; and all women who may in the future be employed in academic non-student positions or may in the future apply for but be denied such employment.

On April 24, 1978, the Court commenced a pilot trial of the Rajender claims and the sex-based claims of a subclass consisting of that portion of the class in the University's Chemistry Department on the Twin Cities campus. At the end of May 1978, the trial was recessed to enable the parties to explore the possibility of settlement. Following several rounds of extensive negotiations between plaintiffs' attorney Paul Sprenger and defendants' attorney Charles Mays, the parties began in January of 1980 a third round of settlement discussions which eventually produced the Consent Decree approved by this court on August 13, 1980. Portions of that Decree are the subject of the present Order.

DISCUSSION

The focal point of the present controversy is that section of the Decree which limits a prevailing plaintiff's recovery of attorneys' fees to "... a reasonable sum, not exceeding Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000), for partial attorneys' fees which she incurred because of the proceedings." Consent Decree, Section II, Paragraph 9 (August 1980). The Recommended Order filed by the special masters would have this court delete that portion of Section II, Paragraph 9 which reads, "... not exceeding Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000)," thereby lifting the previously imposed ceiling but retaining the qualifications that the fee recovery be "partial." Recommended Order for Amendment of Consent Decree, p. 2 (March 31, 1982). The defendants object to the masters' recommended amendment on a number of grounds, primarily the following:

1) the fee limitation was a bargained for material part of the Consent Decree; and

2) circumstances since the approval of the Decree, as reflected in the evidence presented at the show cause hearing, have not changed so drastically that the $6,000 limit on partial attorneys' fees is a source of grievous harm to the Rajender claimants. Responsive Memorandum of University of Minnesota in Opposition to Modification of Attorneys' Fee Provision in Consent Decree (March 8, 1983).

In addition to the foregoing, the defendants also object to the recommended changes by challenging the authority of the special masters to initiate the modification procedure. Because that challenge raises a threshold issue, this court will address the matter at this stage of the Order.

To resolve the problem, this court must look to two documents, the Consent Decree itself and the September 10, 1979, Order of Reference appointing the special master. The language of the Order of Reference provides that,

the powers and duties of the Special Master shall be those of the Court in resolving the issues herein, including the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under this order.

Order of Reference, paragraph 3 (September 10, 1979). Although that Order was entered prior to the final approval of the Consent Decree, it remains in effect as to those portions not specifically altered by subsequent decree.

The Consent Decree speaks only to the powers of the special master relating to the hearing and resolving of claims. Although not specifically enumerated in the Decree, the duties of the master to date have included the conducting of motion practice, the holding of elections, and the granting of exemptions to parties proceeding under the Decree. Both the University and the class have availed themselves of these extra-Decree powers and rightly so. For reasons of judicial economy, the powers of the master must be sufficiently broad to permit facilitating the remedial design of the Consent Decree without seeking leave of the court at every turn. As a practical matter, any powers of this court, unless otherwise limited by either the Order of Reference or the Consent Decree, shall be the powers of the masters in relation to the effectuation of the Decree. Therefore, based upon the empowering documents and the accepted practice of administering the Consent Decree, it is the opinion of this court that initiating the modification process was within the scope of the masters' authority.

The plaintiffs' sole objection to the masters' Recommended Order challenges the proposed change in the fee provision as follows:

The recommendation that the Consent Decree be amended so that the Special Masters have discretion to provide only partial attorneys' fees using criteria set out in the Memorandum is objected to as being ambiguous and permitting an interpretation contrary to Title VII, and further renders the Consent Decree inequitable, given the defendants' failure to comply with the Decree's provisions governing resolution of claims by internal processes."

Objections of Kathleen M. Graham (April 12, 1982). In order to resolve the instant controversy, this court must first consider the nature of a consent decree.

This court begins its examination of a consent decree by recognizing that the subject of the investigation is something of a hybrid in the law, having attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 926, 934 n. 10, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1974). Because consent decrees represent the agreements on precise terms reached by parties after negotiation, the scope of a decree must be found within its "four corners." See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971). The Supreme Court stated in ITT Continental Baking Co. that, "since a consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement purposes basically as a contract, reliance upon certain aids to construction is proper, as with any other contract." ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 238, 95 S.Ct. at 935. Such aids to construction would certainly include an examination of the circumstances surrounding the formation of the decree itself. See Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir.1981); ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 238, 95 S.Ct. at 935.

In the instant case, the Rajender Consent Decree embodies the bargained-for terms of the settlement of a Title VII action against the University of Minnesota by which each party relinquishes valuable rights in order to attain mutually acceptable benefits.

These contractual properties of a consent decree significantly define its scope. However, the terms of a decree are subject to an initial determination of reasonableness by the court...

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3 cases
  • Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 93-3059
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • 13 Diciembre 1994
    ...decree to settle a 1973 class action sex discrimination lawsuit brought by female academic employees. See Rajender v. University of Minn., 563 F.Supp. 401, 402-03 (D.Minn.1983) (discussing history of Rajender litigation), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 730 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir.1984). The ......
  • Rajender v. University of Minnesota
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • 26 Marzo 1984
    ...of the Decree's stated purpose." Shyamala Rajender v. University of Minnesota, No. 4-73-435, slip op. at 10 (D.Minn. Feb. 16, 1983). 563 F.Supp. 401. The Court then issued an order adopting, in part, the recommendations of the Special Masters. It struck The New York Times advertising requir......
  • Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 00-2192
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • 15 Junio 2001
    ...in compensation. In 1980, the University settled with the class by entering into a consent decree. Rajender v. Univ. of Minn., 563 F. Supp. 401, (D. Minn. 1983) (Rajender I), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 730 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1984). In 1983, several female faculty members filed peti......

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