Lim v. Taxicab Com'n

Decision Date22 September 1989
Docket NumberNo. 87-1122.,87-1122.
Citation564 A.2d 720
PartiesHun Kim LIM, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TAXICAB COMMISSION, Respondent.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Lawrence D. Levien, with whom Dawn E. Starr and Julie A. Boesky, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for petitioner.

Martin B. White, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Frederick D. Cooke, Jr., Corp. Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Lutz Alexander Prager, Asst. Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for respondent.

Before NEWMAN and SCHWELB, Associate Judges, and KERN, Senior Judge.

NEWMAN, Associate Judge:

The District of Columbia Taxicab Commission (Commission) found appellant Lim, a licensed Virginia taxicab driver, guilty of unlicensed hacking, for transporting a passenger within the District of Columbia in violation of a Reciprocity Agreement entered into between Washington, D.C. and Virginia. This agreement provides that a taxicab driver licensed in one jurisdiction cannot transport a passenger within the boundaries of the other jurisdiction although a driver may enter the other jurisdiction to pick up a prearranged fare returning to the driver's jurisdiction.

Lim advances three grounds for reversal: that the newly-created Commission does not have jurisdiction to regulate the flow of interstate taxi travel pursuant to the Reciprocity Agreement, that the Commission's finding was based on insubstantial and hearsay evidence, and that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its handling of Lim's case. We affirm.

I

Early on a hot summer morning in July, 1987, Hun Kim Lim drove a passenger from a hotel in Rosalyn, Virginia to the corner of 19th and F Streets, N.W., in the District of Columbia. Lim operated his own taxicab as part of the Arlington Yellow Cab fleet and was fully licensed in accordance with Virginia law. Lim testified before the Taxicab Commission that on the way into the District the passenger, who apparently was enjoying his air-conditioned ride, had asked Lim if he would return to 19th and F Streets at around 11:30 a.m., or "perhaps a little earlier" to take him back to his hotel in Rosslyn and then to National Airport.1 Lim agreed and in the meantime returned to Virginia where he picked up a few other fares. According to his manifest, he left the Pentagon at 10:30 a.m. to return to 19th Street, where he waited in his parked cab and, upon seeing the passenger with whom he had the alleged prearrangement, drove to where he stood.

Lim's taxi was immediately stopped by Hack Inspector Smith; the citation noted the time as 10:54 a.m. Smith was working in conjunction with a special check-point at the corner of 19th and F Street to check all taxis for proper registration, identification, and driver's permits. At Lim's hearing, Smith testified that Lim's passenger stated that he wanted to go to "Northwest New Hampshire Avenue." Smith also testified that when stopped, Lim stated, "Well, I won't do it no more this time, just forgive me." Smith ordered the passenger out of the car, and put him in a D.C. taxi. The passenger's name, telephone number and address were not recorded; no effort was made to contact this passenger, and he did not testify at Lim's hearing.

Smith failed to request Lim's manifest for that day since, according to Smith, the passenger told him that he wanted to go to Northwest New Hampshire Avenue. Lim later provided a copy of that day's manifest, which showed the prearranged fare. A representative from Lim's taxicab company testified that the $11.00 anticipated fare would have justified Lim's efforts.

Lim was charged with two violations including operating a taxicab in the District without a valid D.C. hacker's license in violation of 18A DCMR § 822.2 (1987)2 and operating an unauthorized vehicle within the District of Columbia in violation of 18A DCMR § 822.3 (1987).3

Lim appealed the citations to the Commission and a hearing was held on September 16, 1987. Prior to oral argument, the Commission acknowledged that it would allow Lim's counsel to submit a brief at a later date after he had an opportunity to review the hearing transcript. At the same time, the Commission allowed counsel to submit an eight page written motion and memorandum to dismiss the proceedings. At the end of the oral hearing, Lim's counsel renewed his request to file a brief, a request that was apparently relied upon by counsel for the District as well:

LIM'S COUNSEL: Again, I would request the opportunity to submit a brief unless the Commission sees fit simply to dismiss the case. That is fine for [Lim]. I want the opportunity to argue credibility and make a submission of the facts based upon the official transcript of the proceeding.

COMMISSIONER: Very well, Mr. Kassouf [District Counsel], do you wish to make a closing statement?

DISTRICT COUNSEL: In light of his request, I will just make a response to his brief.

The Commission agreed to allow both parties to file briefs.

Immediately thereafter, the Commission convened elsewhere to consider the case and returned with a decision that Lim was guilty of hacking without a license, and dismissed the unlicensed vehicle charge. Lim's counsel was then told that he could still file a brief, but that it would serve as a motion for reconsideration. The written findings of the Commission were issued four months later, after counsel had filed a notice of appeal.

II.

The first question we must address is whether the Taxicab Commission had jurisdiction to hear Lim's case. Lim contends that because this case involved a violation of a 1962 Reciprocity Agreement with Virginia, the Commission, a local District of Columbia agency, does not have jurisdiction to regulate the interstate conduct of Virginia taxicabs. We disagree.

The Commission was established in 1986 pursuant to the "Taxicab Commission Establishment Act" of 1986 (Act). D.C.Code §§ 40-1701-40-1720 (1986 & Supp. 1989). The Act clearly vests the Commission with jurisdiction over the intrastate regulation of taxicabs. D.C.Code § 40-1704 (1986)4 Onabiyi District of Columbia Taxicab Commission, 557 A.2d 1317, 1318 (D.C. 1989) (Commission has exclusive authority to regulate intrastate taxicabs). The Act also authorizes the Commission to enforce all provisions of the Act including the provision barring unlicensed hacking. Onabiyi, supra, 557 A.2d at 1319; see also D.C. Code § 40-1719(a).5

In 1962, long before the creation of the Commission, the District entered into a reciprocal agreement with Virginia, under which interstate taxi travel between Virginia and the District would be governed. Specifically, the Reciprocity Agreement states:

Taxicabs registered in one jurisdiction and entering the other jurisdiction for the purpose of discharging passengers will not be permitted to pick up or transport passengers intrastate.

Taxicabs registered in one jurisdiction will be permitted to enter the other jurisdiction to pick up passengers on telephone calls or prearrangement.

Reciprocity Agreement § 7(b), (c). Evidently, enforcement of this provision has rested historically with the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department.

Based on the foregoing provisions, the Commission found Lim guilty of violating D.C. Municipal Regulation 822.2, which prohibits unlicensed hacking. The Commission concluded, we think correctly, that:

Virginia and D.C. reciprocity rules . . . clearly show that pre-arranged and radio transmitted pick-ups of an out of state taxicab to another jurisdiction are allowed. However, the cab may only transport the passenger back to the cab's home jurisdiction; otherwise the driver has made an illegal and unauthorized intrastate trip for hire, which is construed as unlicensed hacking.

Thus, since the authority for a Virginia taxi to travel within the District is granted through the Reciprocity Agreement, violation of that agreement will constitute unlicensed hacking, which is interdicted by 18A DCMR § 822.2.

The Commission's decision is fully consistent with D.C.Code § 40-1719(a). This section provides that taxi drivers must be licensed pursuant to an applicable D.C. license "or in the event of licensure by another jurisdiction pursuant to reciprocal agreement," see D.C.Code § 40-1719(a), and that enforcement of this provision rests with the Commission. See Onabiyi, supra, 557 A.2d at 1319. There exists no reason why the District and Virginia cannot, if they so choose, enter into an interstate agreement whose terms will be enforced independently by the two jurisdictions within their respective boundaries.6 Once that provision is violated, the licensed Virginia driver is no longer licensed for purposes of hacking within the District.

Finally, the Commission's interpretation of the Act and the underlying regulations is fully consistent with the legislative history of the Act, which strongly emphasizes that the purpose of the Act was to consolidate "the District's regulation of the taxicab industry in one agency of government. In effecting this purpose the bill proposes to abolish fragmented governmental authority over taxicabs and establishes a District of Columbia Taxicab Commission."7 THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND CABLE TELEVISION, D.C.Law 6-97, on Bill 6-159, at 1 ("Committee Report"); see also Onabiyi, supra, 557 A.2d at 1318. Indeed, the Committee Report highlights centralization as the only purpose of the bill in order to effectuate the organized and efficient development of taxi services in the District.8

III.

We next address the question of whether the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence. An agency decision must be accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of law based on substantial evidence. Citizens Association of Georgetown, Inc. v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 402 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C. 1979); D.C.Code § 1-1509(e) (1979); accord, ...

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