State v. Patterson
| Decision Date | 10 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. M2016-01716-SC-R11-CD,M2016-01716-SC-R11-CD |
| Citation | 564 S.W.3d 423 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee v. Jonathan David PATTERSON |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Seth Clayton Crabtree, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jonathan David Patterson.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor General; Alexander C. Vey, Assistant Attorney General; Bryant C. Dunaway, District Attorney General; Bret Gunn, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Cornelia A. Clark, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J., and Sharon G. Lee, Holly Kirby, and Roger A. Page, JJ., joined.
We granted this appeal to determine what showing, if any, a defendant must make to prevail on a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, where the defendant pleaded guilty without an agreement as to sentencing, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a defendant must present post-sentencing information or developments warranting a reduction of sentence to prevail on a Rule 35 motion. We disagree and limit this standard to Rule 35 motions seeking reduction of specific sentences imposed in exchange for guilty pleas, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant’s Rule 35motion and reducing his aggregate sentence.
The relevant facts are not disputed. In July 2015, the defendant, Jonathan David Patterson, broke into several cars and a building in Putnam County. He stole two vehicles and also stole property from inside the vehicles and the building. When the police apprehended the defendant with some of the stolen property in his possession, he led them to more of the stolen property and to several locations where the crimes were committed. He also made statements to the police implicating himself in the crimes.
Thereafter, the Putnam County Grand Jury returned four indictments charging the defendant with a total of forty-two offenses.2 On May 10, 2016, the defendant pleaded guilty to twenty of the charged offenses, including two counts of theft over $10,000, both Class C felonies;3 one count of theft over $1,000, and one count of burglary of a building other than a habitation, both Class D felonies;4 and sixteen counts of automobile burglary, all Class E felonies.5 The remaining twenty-two counts, many of them misdemeanors, were dismissed. The guilty pleas were entered pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B), frequently referred to as "open pleas," meaning that the plea did not include any agreement on the length and manner of service of the sentences.6
At the July 19, 2016 sentencing hearing, the State introduced a presentence report and certified copies of judgments showing the defendant’s nine prior felony convictions. Five of the defendant’s prior felony convictions—a conviction for theft of property between $1,000 and $10,000, three forgery convictions, and a conviction for passing a forged instrument—were based on conduct that occurred in 2007. The remaining four prior felony convictions—burglary, two convictions of theft of property over $1,000, and aggravated burglary—were based on conduct that occurred in 2010. The presentence report also reflected a number of misdemeanor convictions and multiple probation revocations. The State offered no additional evidence.
The defendant’s sister testified on his behalf. She said that the defendant had a drug problem, had been using drugs when he committed these crimes, and had "made bad decisions." She asked the trial court to exercise leniency in sentencing. She emphasized that, although the defendant had committed crimes in the past, the defendant had never hurt anyone, and she declared that he "would never hurt anyone." She believed that if the trial court granted the defendant "leniency," he would "make a change and move forward."
The thirty-four-year-old defendant exercised his right of allocution.7 The defendant apologized to the victims and to his own family for his "acts of stupidity." He admitted being "on drugs" and expressed his deep regret for the "very irresponsible decisions" he had made. The defendant emphasized that he could not change the past but again apologized for his conduct and expressed a desire to "accept responsibility for [his] actions, repay [his] debt to society, and make sure this never happens again." The defendant explained that he had pleaded guilty "out of respect for the victims, taxpayers and this [trial] court." He told the trial court that he would "appreciate any leniency possible in sentencing." The defendant offered no further proof.
As for the appropriate sentences, the State and the defendant agreed that the defendant should be classified as a Career Offender on the two Class D felonies and on the sixteen Class E felonies to which he had pleaded guilty.8 They also agreed that his classification as a Career Offender mandated the maximum Range III sentence of twelve years for each Class D felony and six years for each Class E felony with sixty percent release eligibility applicable to these felonies.9 As for the two Class C felonies, the State and the defendant agreed that the defendant should be classified as a Range III Persistent Offender based on his prior convictions and that this classification carried a ten-to-fifteen-year sentencing range with forty-five percent release eligibility.10 Concerning the appropriate sentence within that applicable sentencing range, the State asked the trial court to apply two enhancement factors, specifically: (1) the defendant’s previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior, and (2) the defendant’s failure to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community.11 The State also asked the trial court to order consecutive service of the sentences, pointing to the defendant’s "extensive" record of criminal activity. The State acknowledged, however, that the defendant had no prior convictions of violent crimes, sexual offenses, or offenses against children. The State also agreed that the defendant had admitted his involvement in the crimes, cooperated with the police, helped recover much of the property taken so that it could be restored to the victims, and spared the State the expense of trials by pleading guilty to multiple offenses, even though he had no agreement as to sentencing. The State refused to "recommend a specific number to the court" because the defendant’s record was "so bad" and the felonies he committed were "so numerous."
The defendant agreed that he had numerous prior convictions but also emphasized that none were for "violent crimes." The defendant urged the trial court to consider favorably his cooperation with and assistance to the police and the fact that it had resulted in almost all of the stolen property being restored to the victims. He pointed out that not a single victim had appeared to testify at the sentencing hearing and that none had submitted an impact statement to the court. The defendant asked the trial court to consider three mitigating factors, specifically: (1) that he had not threatened or caused any serious bodily injury, (2) that he had assisted the authorities, and (3) that he had expressed remorse for his actions.12
As required by the defendant’s classification as a Career Offender, the trial court imposed six-year sentences for each of the Class E felonies and twelve-year sentences for each of the Class D felonies, all with sixty percent release eligibility. As for the Class C felonies, the trial court considered the two enhancement factors the State identified, attributing "great weight" to the defendant’s history of criminal convictions. It also considered the mitigating factors the defendant identified. Ultimately, the trial court imposed a thirteen-year sentence with forty-five percent release eligibility for each Class C felony.
As to the manner of service of the sentences, the trial court agreed with the State that the defendant’s extensive record of criminal activity warranted consecutive service of at least some of the sentences. The trial court ordered the sentences in each felony classification served concurrently with the other convictions of the same classification. The trial court ordered consecutive service of the sentences imposed for each felony classification—thirteen, twelve, and six—for an aggregate sentence of thirty-one years.
The defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b)(2) (); Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) (). Later, the defendant timely filed in the trial court a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35 ().
The defendant alleged in his Rule 35 motion that his aggregate sentence was "excessive in light of the facts present." He asked the trial court to order concurrent service of all sentences and to provide "any other relief" the trial court deemed appropriate. The State opposed the Rule 35 motion and asked the trial court to deny it without a hearing based on the defendant’s failure to present "post-sentencing information or developments" warranting a reduction of the sentences initially imposed.
The trial court held a hearing, but the defense offered no proof in support of the motion. The trial court descri...
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