Parker v. Allen

• Decision Date: 20 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 05-16907.,05-16907.
• Citation: 565 F.3d 1258
• Parties: John Forrest PARKER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Richard F. ALLEN, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

565 F.3d 1258

John Forrest PARKER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Richard F. ALLEN, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-16907.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 20, 2009.

Thomas J. Saunders (Court-Appointed), Law Office of Thomas J. Saunders, Baltimore, MD, for Parker.

Corey Landon Maze, J. Clayton Crenshaw, Montgomery, AL, for Allen.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, and BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner-appellant John Forrest Parker appeals the district court's judgment dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and denying him relief. Parker sought a vacation of his 1988 conviction for capital murder and his death sentence. After the district court denied Parker's Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 motion for reconsideration, Parker appealed and the district court issued a certificate of appealability on five issues. We conclude that the district court correctly denied habeas relief and AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 1988, Charles Sennett contracted with one of his tenants, Billy Gray Williams, to murder his wife, Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett ("Dorlene"), for $3000. Parker v. State, 587 So.2d 1072, 1078 (Ala. Crim.App.1991) ("Parker I").¹ Williams, in turn, hired John Parker and Kenneth Eugene Smith for $1000 each to commit the murder. Williams gave Parker $100 to purchase a weapon on 17 March 1988, and promised to pay him the balance when the job was completed. Instead of buying a weapon, Parker used the $100 for drugs and injected 3 cubic centimeters of Talwin, a narcotic analgesic (painkiller), while en route to the Sennetts' residence on 18 March. Parker drove his vehicle to the Sennetts' residence while Smith, who was in the passenger seat, sharpened Parker's survival knife. Parker parked his car behind the Sennetts' home, told Dorlene that her husband had given them permission to look at the property as a hunting site and, upon receiving Dorlene's approval, walked into a wooded area with Smith. They later returned to the house and received permission from Dorlene to use her bathroom. While in the bathroom, Parker put cotton socks onto his hands. He then exited the bathroom, jumped Dorlene, and began hitting her. Parker and Smith hit Dorlene with a galvanized pipe and stabbed her while she pled with them not to hurt her. Consistent with their plan, they broke the glass in the medicine cabinet and took a stereo and video cassette recorder (VCR) to make the assault look like it was done during a burglary. Parker later burned his clothes and threw the stereo off a bridge, and he and Smith threw away the knife that they used. Parker subsequently received the additional $900 for the murder. Parker v. State, 610 So.2d 1171, App. II at 1178-79 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) ("Parker II"); In re Parker, 610 So.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Ala.1992) ("Parker III").

When Sennett arrived home, he found his house ransacked and Dorlene close to death, and called Colbert County Sheriff's Investigator Ronnie May at 11:44 A.M. May dispatched a rescue squad and sheriff's deputies to the Sennetts' home. May and another deputy arrived at the Sennetts' home about 12:05 P.M., and the rescue squad arrived soon thereafter. Dorlene was transported to the hospital, and seen by Dr. David Parks McKinley. Resuscitation efforts failed and Dorlene was declared dead as a result of cardiac arrest and exsanguination. An examination of her body revealed multiple stab wounds to the right side of her chest, the right side of her neck, the base of her neck, forehead, nose, and scalp, and contusions on her nose and forehead. Hairs found at the crime scene in a cap located near Dorlene's body were consistent with Smith's known hair sample, and on an afghan that had been wrapped around Dorlene's body were consistent with fibers later taken from Parker's knife. Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1089. The VCR taken from the Sennetts' house was found inside Smith's residence. Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1090.

In April 1988, Parker was indicted for the capital murder of Dorlene by beating and stabbing her with a knife for the pecuniary consideration of $1000 in violation Ala.Code 13A-5-40.² At trial, he was found guilty by a jury; the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The sentencing judge, however, overrode the jury and sentenced Parker to death on 21 June 1989.³ See Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1076, 1100. On appeal, the case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Parker's Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) claim and for the district court to reweigh and make new findings regarding the mitigating and aggravating circumstances.⁴ Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1100. Following an evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial judge found that the prosecution had not violated Batson by using its peremptory strikes to remove eight black venire members. Parker II, 610 So.2d at 1172, 1177. The trial judge also found that the aggravating circumstance of murder for pecuniary gain outweighed the mitigating circumstances, including Parker's lack of a prior significant criminal history, age at the time of the offense, demonstration of remorse, and the jury's recommendation of life without parole. Id. at 1172, 1179-81. Parker's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the appellate court and the Alabama Supreme Court. See id. at 1173; In re Parker, 610 So.2d 1181, 1187 (1992) ("Parker III"). Parker's petition for writ of certiorari was denied. See Parker v. Alabama, 509 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 3053, 125 L.Ed.2d 737 (1993) ("Parker IV").

Parker moved for post-conviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 in 1994, and filed an amended petition in 1996.⁵ Following an evidentiary hearing, the state trial court denied the petition. The denial was affirmed on appeal, Parker v. State, 768 So.2d 1020 (Ala. Crim.App.1999) ("Parker V"), and Parker's petition for writ of certiorari was denied, Ex Parte Parker, 780 So.2d 811 (Ala.1999) ("Parker VI").

Parker filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in 2000 and amended the petition in 2001.⁶ The district court denied the petition and denied reconsideration. Following Parker's notice of appeal, the district court granted a certificate of appealability on the following issues: (1) whether jurors were excluded by the prosecutor on the basis of race, contrary to clearly established federal law and in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) whether the prosecutor's improper closing arguments denied Parker due process, a fair trial, and a reliable sentencing proceeding in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) whether the state's failure to disclose information relevant to a witness's testimony was a violation of Brady and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) whether Parker received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and (5) whether Parker's statement and other evidence were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus de novo, but are limited in our review of every issue decided in the state courts by a "`general framework of substantial deference.'" Crowe v. Hall, 490 F.3d 840, 844 (11th Cir.2007) (quoting Diaz v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Corr., 402 F.3d 1136, 1141 (11th Cir.2005)). We will not, therefore, disturb the decisions of the Alabama courts unless those decisions are "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," or were "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court either (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law as set forth by the Supreme Court or (2) arrived at a different result from the Supreme Court when presented with "materially indistinguishable facts." Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir.2001). A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law if the law is "applied ... to the facts ... in an objectively unreasonable manner." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S.Ct. 357, 360, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002).

A. Juror Exclusion Based on Race

Parker argues that, over his objection, the prosecution struck eight of nine qualified black venire members. He contends that the trial court's finding on remand that the prosecutor struck the jurors on facially-neutral grounds is not supported by the record because eight of the seated jurors had exactly the same characteristics that the prosecution identified as the bases for excluding four black venire members. He contends that the prosecution's explanations for striking the venire members and for failing to strike other similarly situated white venire members are inconsistent with its failure to question the white venire members about their traffic violations and personal and family criminal histories.

The prosecution exercised peremptory strikes against eight of the nine black venire members. The stricken black venire members included Juror 3, Sheila Armstead; Juror 21, Thykle L. Coman; Juror 25, Jeffrey S. Davis; Juror 67, Willie M. Mayes; Juror 77, Cynthia Montgomery; Juror 83, Annie O. Owes; Juror 120, Eugene L. Watkins; and Juror 121, Mary A. Webb. Black venire member Carter Triplett, Juror 113, was selected for the jury.

During voir dire, none of the black jurors responded positively when asked whether they believed that the death penalty should be applied in the case of a murder. The prosecution then used 26 of its 28 strikes to strike individuals who did not answer favorably...