International Sea Food Ltd. v. M/V Campeche, 76-2254

• Citation: 566 F.2d 482
• Decision Date: 17 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 76-2254,76-2254
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL SEA FOOD LTD., a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M/V CAMPECHE, her engines, etc. in rem, et al., Defendants, Foremost Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 482

566 F.2d 482

INTERNATIONAL SEA FOOD LTD., a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M/V CAMPECHE, her engines, etc. in rem, et al., Defendants, Foremost Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 76-2254.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 17, 1978.

G. Hamp Uzzelle, III, Mobile, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.

Rae M. Crowe, Grover E. Asmus, II, Mobile, Ala., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before TUTTLE, CLARK and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge:

The single issue presented in this appeal is whether a United States district court has subject matter jurisdiction in admiralty to enforce a foreign maritime decree which awarded money damages to the plaintiff on a claim for collision.

International Sea Food Ltd., a Barbados corporation, seeks to enforce a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Judicature, High Court (in Admiralty), of the Isle of Barbados against three shipowners in personam and against their ship, M/V Campeche, in rem. The Barbados court awarded damages of $142,211.34 and costs of $14,582 (Barbados exchange) following a maritime collision off the coast of Surinam. Alleging that the Barbados judgment remained unsatisfied, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Alabama, Southern Division against the four defendants in the original action plus Foremost Insurance Company, a Michigan corporation licensed to do business in Alabama. The complaint alleged that the four original defendants were insured under an insurance policy issued by Foremost and further alleged that the policy was in effect at the time of the collision and provided coverage for the Barbados judgment. Alleging that the insurance proceeds were "credits and effects" of the original defendants within that district, International Sea Food prayed for a writ of foreign attachment to garnish the insurance proceeds pursuant to Admiralty Supplemental Rule B of the Fed.R.Civ.P.

Foremost moved to quash the writ of foreign attachment on the ground that the complaint presented simply a suit on a foreign money judgment and, as such, was not within the court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The district court agreed and vacated the writ, stating that its jurisdiction to enforce foreign admiralty judgments was limited to judgments involving special prize or other peculiarly maritime remedies and did not include enforcement of a "common law 'money' judgment." We disagree with the district court's characterization of the nature of this case and reverse.

In urging this Court to reverse the judgment of the district court, International Sea Food relies principally upon the early case of Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 1 L.Ed. 507 (1795). The judgment sought to be enforced in that case was a decree ordering that the shipowner's vessel be returned by the parties who claimed it as prize. Because the ship had already been sold, the enforcing court converted the judgment into money value and awarded a specific sum to the shipowner's administrator. In an appeal to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the enforcing court was challenged upon a basis which is the converse of that presented here. In Penhallow the admiralty nature of the action was not disputed. Rather, the question was whether the enforcing court was empowered to act as an admiralty court. In deciding that it was, the Supreme Court spoke in broad terms of the jurisdiction of admiralty courts to enforce the decrees of foreign maritime courts. For example, Justice Iredell stated:

It was clearly shown at the bar, that a Court of Admiralty, in one nation, can carry into effect the determination of the Court of Admiralty of another.

3 U.S. at 97.

Justice Cushing also recognized the power of admiralty courts to enforce the judgments of other admiralty courts. He stated:

The 8th exception is, that the district and circuit court possessed not admiralty jurisdiction, and that the circuit court had no right to carry the decree into execution. If courts of admiralty can carry into execution decrees of foreign admiralties, as seems to be settled law and usage; and if the district and circuit courts have admiralty powers by the law and constitution, as was adjudged and determined by this court, last February, I think, there can be no doubt upon this point.

Id. at 117. See also Jennings v. Carson, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 2 L.Ed. 531 (1807).

Similar language in other cases tends to support the existence of a general principle that admiralty courts of this nation are empowered to carry into effect the maritime decrees of foreign admiralty courts. In Otis v. The Rio Grande, 18 F.Cas. No. 10,613, pp. 902, 903 (C.C.D.La.1872), aff'd, 90 U.S. 458, 23 L.Ed. 158 (1887), the court enforced an in rem maritime judgment of another district court which had awarded a sum of money and placed a lien upon the defendant ship with these words: "This court is in duty bound to carry into effect the sentences and decrees, not only of other federal courts, but even of the admiralty courts of foreign countries . . . ." See also Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Gilhooley, 9 F. 618 (E.D.Pa.1881). Again, in The Jerusalem, 13 F.Cas. No. 7,293, pp. 559, 563 (C.C.D.Mass.1814), there is dictum to the effect that an admiralty court "will enforce a foreign maritime judgment between foreigners, where either the...