U.S. v. Scott

Decision Date21 May 2009
Docket NumberNo. 08-1205.,08-1205.
Citation566 F.3d 242
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Stephen SCOTT, Defendant, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

John M. Thompson, for appellant.

Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

Before BOUDIN and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges, and SINGAL,* District Judge.

SINGAL, District Judge.

In this appeal from a criminal conviction following a jury trial, appellant Stephen Scott asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized following the execution of a state parole warrant for temporary custody ("WTC"). Specifically, Scott contends that the parole action, prompted by information received from law enforcement and executed with law enforcement officers, impermissibly circumvented the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

We recount the relevant facts as the district court found them, consistent with record support. United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir.2009).

In 2004, Scott was paroled from a Massachusetts prison sentence imposed following his conviction for drug trafficking and unlawful possession of a firearm. Massachusetts Parole Officer ("MPO") Lori Correia supervised Scott. As of October 2005, Scott was employed by Walmart and reporting as required; Correia believed him to be in compliance with the conditions of his parole.

In October 2005, a confidential informant told Martin O'Malley, a Worcester Police Department officer assigned to a joint federal-state Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force, that Scott wanted to purchase guns with obliterated serial numbers in exchange for crack cocaine. O'Malley determined that Scott had previously been incarcerated, and the Task Force began an investigation.

On November 17, 2005, the Task Force arranged a controlled drug buy between the confidential informant and Scott, during which Scott allegedly sold the informant crack cocaine. Within days, O'Malley learned that a warrant had been issued for the informant's arrest on an unrelated charge. Consequently, the Task Force suspended its investigation of Scott.

During a monthly meeting of law enforcement agencies at Worcester Police Department headquarters on November 28, 2005, O'Malley confirmed with MPO John Deignan that Scott was on parole. He then asked Deignan whether the information obtained during the Task Force investigation could justify revocation of Scott's parole. Deignan suggested that it could, and requested copies of the Task Force's report regarding the controlled buy. He later conveyed the substance of this conversation to Correia.

On December 6, 2005, Correia received a faxed copy of the report. She then discussed the matter with her supervisor Felix Claxton, who authorized the WTC.1 The district court characterized this decision as "essentially routine" under the circumstances. The WTC issued within two days.

On December 8, 2005, Correia, Deignan, and Claxton went to the Worcester Police Department headquarters to coordinate execution of the WTC with law enforcement. Four or five law enforcement officers, including O'Malley, planned to accompany the three parole officers to Scott's apartment. The district court later concluded that O'Malley's involvement was "not a coincidence."

That morning, the officers went to Scott's apartment. Correia knocked several times. After Scott did not respond, the officers forcibly breached the door and found Scott lying in bed; they also discovered marijuana in plain view. O'Malley advised Scott of his Miranda rights and asked if there were additional weapons or drugs in the apartment. Scott responded that crack cocaine and a firearm were present. After the apartment was secured, O'Malley sought and procured a judicial search warrant, the execution of which revealed crack cocaine and a firearm with an obliterated serial number.

On February 15, 2006, a federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts returned a four-count indictment against Scott.2 On September 28, 2006, Scott filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence discovered, as well as any statements made, during the December 8th search of his apartment. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, after which it denied the motion orally. With regard to Scott's allegation of improper coordination between the parole officers and law enforcement, the district court concluded that the Massachusetts Parole Board "initiated the warrant and arrest process." Furthermore:

The fact that the police had initiated the investigation and supplied the information to the Mass[achusetts] Parole Board up to that point was not improper. To the contrary, it was routine and normal.... In other words, the Parole Board was not acting as agents [sic] of the police; to the contrary, the parole board was making the decisions, was in charge, and had what was in effect a police escort, even if that escort included an officer, who was the most knowledgeable about the activities of the defendant.

Scott filed a renewed motion to suppress, which the district court denied orally after hearing additional argument.

On October 19, 2007, a jury convicted Scott on Counts One, Three, and Four, and acquitted him on Count Two. On February 8, 2008, the district court sentenced Scott to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 240 months followed by ten years of supervised release. This appeal of the court's suppression ruling followed.

II.

When assessing the disposition of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its ultimate legal conclusions de novo. Graham, 553 F.3d at 12. We will overturn those factual findings "only if, after reviewing all of the evidence, we have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). Ultimately, we will affirm the denial of a suppression motion "if any reasonable view of the evidence supports it." United States v. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d 277, 283 (1st Cir.2009).

Because Scott did not renew his suppression motion at trial, our review is limited to the evidence presented during the suppression hearing. United States v. de Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672, 675 n. 2 (1st Cir.1993).

III.

The sole issue on appeal concerns the propriety of the law enforcement officers' participation in the parole action. Scott asserts that the Task Force officers impermissibly influenced both the acquisition and the execution of the WTC, in order to gain access to his apartment without first satisfying the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. In response, the government maintains that the parole officers independently decided to seek the warrant and determined how to execute it; the Task Force officers served in a strictly auxiliary role. Challenges to the "integrity of a [parole] action" are necessarily "determinable as a question of fact on a case-by-case basis." United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 65 (1st Cir.1990).

In United States v. Cardona, we articulated various principles governing the participation of law enforcement officers in parole functions. Because such cooperation raises the possibility of subterfuge designed to evade the Fourth Amendment, we warned that the police may not use parole officers "as a cat's paw." Id. However, where "police officers function merely as instruments of the parole system, not as law enforcers per se," we determined that "they should be accorded the same privileges available to other operatives in the system." Id. at 69.

The core question on appeal, then, is narrow and inherently fact-specific: did the law enforcement officers' involvement in the parole action exceed the strictly instrumental role contemplated in Cardona?3 As mentioned, Scott's evidence pertains to both the acquisition and the execution of the WTC. Regarding the preliminary decision to seek the warrant, Scott points to Officer O'Malley's instigation of the parole investigation, and subsequent transmittal of the Task Force report. Regarding the warrant's execution, Scott observes that a majority of the officers who executed the WTC, including O'Malley, were law enforcement officers. He also characterizes the officers' decision to execute the WTC at his apartment, as opposed to the parole office, as motivated by a desire to create a search opportunity for law enforcement. Scott insists that these facts, taken together, compel the conclusion that the parole action "was a law enforcement decision carried out by law enforcement means for law enforcement purposes."

We disagree. Considering first Scott's objection to the initial phase of the parole action,4 we have long endorsed "mutually beneficial cooperation" between law enforcement and probation officers. United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 581 (1st Cir.1990). Likewise, law enforcement officers may share relevant intelligence about a parolee's criminal activity with those parole officers responsible for his supervision. See Cardona, 903 F.2d at 63 (noting that "parolees enjoy even less of the average citizen's absolute liberty than do probationers"). Abiding these precepts, courts have routinely upheld probationary and parole searches initiated on the basis of information provided by law enforcement. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 871, 879-80, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987); United States v. Grimes, 225 F.3d 254, 256, 259 (2d Cir. 2000); Giannetta, 909 F.2d at 573; see also Graham, 553 F.3d at 10 (information shared between probation officer and police); United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 375 (3d Cir.2005) (information shared between parole officer and police); United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 464-65 (2d Cir.2002) (observing that "probation officers are quite...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Cole
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 11 juin 2014
    ... ... Cf. United States v. Scott, 566 F.3d 242, 244 n. 1, 246–248 (1st Cir.2009) (parole and police officer collaboration in sharing intelligence about parolee's criminal activity ... ...
  • US v. Fernandez, 09-1058.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 1 avril 2010
    ... ... Thus, he argues, the request for identification violated his Fourth Amendment rights ...         When reviewing a district court's suppression ruling, we examine its findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Scott, 566 F.3d 242, 245 (1st Cir.2009). We will "affirm the denial of a suppression motion `if any reasonable view of the evidence supports it.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d 277, 283 (1st Cir. 2009)). We find it unnecessary in this case to delve into the mechanics of ... ...
  • U.S. v. Hood
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 3 avril 2019
    ... ... See United States v. Scott, 566 F.3d 242, 245 (1st Cir. 2009). The Fourth Amendment generally requires that the government obtain a warrant based on probable cause before ... But, we agree with the government that our decision in United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2004), requires us to reject this facial challenge to the condition of supervised release at issue.The condition that Hood challenges requires that he "submit to ... ...
  • Scott v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 18 mars 2013
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT