P--- A--- S---, Matter of

Decision Date27 March 1978
Docket NumberS---,A---,P---,No. 8829,8829
Citation566 S.W.2d 14
PartiesIn the Matter of
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Brown & Harding, Mike Brown, Lubbock, for appellant.

Alton R. Griffin, Crim. Dist. Atty., Cindy L. Miller, Asst. Dist. Atty., Lubbock, for appellee.

ROBINSON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal pursuant to Tex. Family Code Ann. § 56.01 from a district court judgment that appellant-child engaged in delinquent conduct. The State's original petition alleged that the child had engaged in conduct in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03 (aggravated robbery). Appellant asserted the affirmative defense of duress. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.05. In addition to challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, the child appeals on the ground that Penal Code § 2.04(d) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it requires an accused to prove the affirmative defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence. The judgment of the district court is affirmed because the evidence supports a finding by the juvenile court that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act under duress.

Appellant and an adult accomplice robbed a convenience store in Lubbock. Appellant was identified at her adjudication hearing by the store clerk and a young customer who was in the store at the time of the robbery. Appellant testified that she committed the robbery because she was ordered to do so by one Loggins, who was living with appellant, her accomplice, and several other people in a communal arrangement. Appellant also testified, and her accomplice corroborated the fact, that Loggins had beaten appellant several days before the robbery and on the day of the robbery. Loggins drove the two women to and from the convenience store.

The State proved that appellant used Loggins' gun in the commission of the robbery, and that Loggins did not have another weapon. The State contends that appellant could have used the gun against Loggins, and therefore she was not under immediate duress. The evidence also showed that appellant received half of the money taken in the robbery. After hearing all of the evidence, the judge entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law. He found that the defendant failed to prove the affirmative defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence as required by Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 2.04(d). He further found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act under duress, and entered judgment that the appellant had engaged in delinquent conduct.

Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that the juvenile hearing conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial, it does require "the essentials of due process and fair treatment." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). The Due Process Clause protects an accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-65, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

The constitutionality of Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 2.04(d), which places the burden of proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence on the defendant, need not be considered to decide this case. The trial court expressly found that the State satisfied its burden of proving all of the facts necessary to constitute the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It is a well-settled proposition of law that courts should avoid constitutional issues which are not necessary to the disposition of a case. Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916, 95...

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4 cases
  • G.M.P., Matter of
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • September 21, 1995
    ...790 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1990, no writ); In re D.L.K., 690 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Tex.App.--Eastland 1985, no writ); In re P.A.S., 566 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1978, no writ). We choose to follow this second line of The afternoon of Monday, January 18, 1993, A.B. 1 pic......
  • H.R.A., Matter of
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 17, 1990
    ...its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the Matter of D.L.K., 690 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.App.--Eastland 1985, no writ); In the Matter of P.A.S., 566 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1978, no writ). After examining all of the victim's testimony, we feel the following is the key to deciding t......
  • D.L.K., Matter of
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 11, 1985
    ...is whether the evidence considered as a whole shows that the State sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the Matter of P.A.S., 566 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1978, no Max T. Warford, the owner of the used car lot, testified that the lot was totally enclosed by a......
  • Garza, In re
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • December 31, 1998
    ...sufficiency point, we must consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the findings of the juvenile court. In the Matter of PAS, 566 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1978, no writ). Under this test, evidence and inferences tending to contradict those findings are disre......

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