Bowers v. Battles, 77-1017

• Decision Date: 22 December 1977
• Docket Number: No. 77-1017,77-1017
• Citation: 568 F.2d 1
• Parties: William Gregory BOWERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Donald BATTLES, Camp Supervisor, Harlan County Forestry Camp, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1

568 F.2d 1

William Gregory BOWERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Donald BATTLES, Camp Supervisor, Harlan County Forestry

Camp, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 77-1017.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 19, 1977.

Decided Dec. 22, 1977.

William M. Radigan, Frankfort (Court appointed), for petitioner-appellant.

Robert F. Stephens, Atty. Gen. of Kentucky, William W. Pollard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for respondent-appellee.

Before EDWARDS, CELEBREZZE and LIVELY, Circuit Judges.

LIVELY, Circuit Judge.

This appeal from denial of the writ of habeas corpus concerns the adequacy of a retrospective hearing on the issue of the petitioner's mental competence to stand trial. On May 17, 1971 Bowers pled guilty to a charge of murder in the Fayette County, Kentucky, Circuit Court. On recommendation of the Commonwealth's Attorney he was sentenced to life imprisonment by a jury. He was represented by retained counsel prior to, and at the time of his plea. After a pro se attempt at postconviction relief had been denied Bowers filed a second motion to vacate judgment with the assistance of the public defender. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 14, 1975 by the state judge who had accepted the guilty plea, and the motion was denied in an order entered March 18, 1975. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed. Bowers v. Commonwealth, --- S.W.2d ---- (Ky.1976).

The district court denied habeas corpus relief upon consideration of the entire record of the state proceedings. On appeal the respondent concedes "that there were sufficient grounds for doubting the appellant's competency to stand trial to make it incumbent upon the trial court to order a due process competency hearing." It is argued, however, that the evidentiary hearing held on March 14, 1975 cured this defect. The petitioner-appellant, on the other hand, contends that the evidence which the trial judge heard at the postconviction hearing raised sufficient doubt concerning his competence at the time of his plea to require that the conviction be set aside.

Petitioner had a history of emotional problems and had been under the care of a psychiatrist several times between April 1968 and January 1970. The homicide which led to the charge against Bowers occurred on October 30, 1970. On November 9, 1970 the psychiatrist who had previously treated petitioner visited him in jail. This visit was arranged by petitioner's attorney who also requested the court to order an examination for the purpose of determining whether petitioner was competent to stand trial. In response to this motion the petitioner was sent to a state mental hospital for examination and evaluation. In a report to the committing court a psychologist at the state hospital who examined petitioner wrote, "Although Mr. Bowers is limited intellectually, he is capable of understanding the charges against him and of following the proceedings of a trial." The psychiatrist who discharged petitioner from the hospital for return to the court found that he was competent and could face his charges and stand trial. This report was made in January 1971.

A short time before the scheduled trial date in May 1971 petitioner was again interviewed in jail by his psychiatrist, Dr. Knepper, and his attorney. The psychiatrist and an associated psychologist then wrote a report in which they recited their belief that petitioner had experienced emotional and mental problems from early childhood and that he was still suffering from them. Describing petitioner's condition as "schizo-affective reaction," they recommended that he be "institutionalized or incarcerated for public safety and his own" and stressed the need for vocational rehabilitation. This report did not address the question of whether petitioner was able to comprehend court proceedings or assist in the conduct of his defense. The prosecuting attorney read this report to the jury after the guilty plea had been received to support his recommendation of life imprisonment rather than death, the other punishment then possible for willful murder in Kentucky.

At the March 1975 hearing Dr. Knepper testified concerning the petitioner's history of emotional problems and related his periods of erratic and irresponsible behavior to excessive use of alcohol. She again stressed the need for vocational rehabilitation. The witness testified that petitioner suffered from no organic brain disorder and diagnosed his condition as schizo-affective with paranoidal tendencies. Referring to her examination of petitioner in May 1971, the witness was asked whether or not she felt petitioner "was able to aid and assist his attorney in the defense of his case on May 17, 1971 . . . ." She answered, "I think he probably was by that time. He had been in a protected environment." This inquiry and answer followed testimony by the witness that shortly after his arrest the petitioner did not appear to comprehend the seriousness of his situation. Dr. Knepper further testified when she saw Bowers in May 1971 he realized that if he pled guilty he would receive either a life sentence or the death penalty.

The deposition of petitioner's former retained counsel was then read. The witness stated that he believed the best possible defense for petitioner was a plea of insanity and that he had worked toward establishing the basis for such a plea from the time he was employed. He testified to numerous meetings with Bowers and stated that he went to Dr. Knepper's office on at least three occasions to discuss the Bowers case. He had a total of eight or nine conversations with Dr. Knepper and twice took her to the jail for meetings with petitioner. At Dr. Knepper's suggestion he arranged to have petitioner removed to a Lexington hospital for an electroencephalogram to determine if there was organic brain damage. The witness stated that he concluded that the evidence of insanity was not strong enough to risk a trial and, consequently, he entered into plea bargaining which resulted in the guilty plea with a recommendation of life imprisonment. The prosecution declined to consider a reduced charge of manslaughter with a recommendation of twenty-one years. The witness further testified that he and Dr. Knepper discussed the decision to enter a guilty plea with Bowers at the jail the day before the trial. He again went over a form used in guilty plea cases with petitioner the next morning and felt that he understood what he was doing.

The former Commonwealth's Attorney who had approved the plea bargain and made the recommendation to the jury testified that nothing at the May 1971 proceedings during which petitioner pled guilty indicated to him that Bowers was not competent to stand trial. This witness, who is now a state court judge, testified that petitioner appeared to understand the proceedings and that his answers to the court's questions all indicated that he was "perfectly competent."

In denying the motion to vacate judgment the trial judge recalled petitioner's responses and demeanor when the guilty plea was taken. It was the court's conclusion that on the day of the plea petitioner had the mental capacity "to completely understand the nature of the charges against him, to assist the attorneys, and to understand the nature and consequences of his act."

In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), the Supreme Court adopted language suggested by the Solicitor General in defining competence to stand trial: "The test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him." It is obvious that this is a...