568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977), 75-2056, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle
|Docket Nº:||75-2056, 75-2066, 75-2067 and 75-2235.|
|Citation:||568 F.2d 1369|
|Party Name:||Envtl. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. [*] v. Douglas M. COSTLE, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al., National Forest Products Association, Appellant. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., etc. v. Douglas M. COSTLE, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al., National Milk Producers Federation, Appellant. N|
|Case Date:||November 16, 1977|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit|
Argued Dec. 3, 1976.
Syllabus by the Court
The National Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) challenged the authority of the EPA Administrator to exempt categories of point sources from the permit requirements of § 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1975). On appeal from a grant of summary judgment to NRDC, held:
1. The legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to be the only means by which a discharger may escape the total prohibition of discharges from point sources found in FWPCA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (Supp. V 1975).
2. It is not necessary that national effluent limitations be uniform as a precondition for the NPDES program to include pollution from agricultural, silvicultural, and storm water runoff point sources. The technological or administrative infeasibility
of such limitations may warrant adjustments in the permit program, but it does not authorize the Administrator to exclude the relevant point source from the NPDES program.
3. Where numeric effluent limitations are infeasible, permit conditions may proscribe industry practices that aggravate the problems of point source pollution as well as require monitoring and reporting of effluent levels.
4. A number of administrative devices, including general or area permits, are available to aid EPA in the practical administration of the NPDES program. The FWPCA, however tight in some respects, leaves some leeway to EPA in the interpretation of that statute and, in that regard, affords the agency some means to consider matters of feasibility.
Irvin B. Nathan, Washington, D. C., with whom Burton J. Mallinger, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant in No. 75-2056.
Charles W. Bills, Washington, D. C., with whom James R. Murphy, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellant in No. 75-2066.
G. William Frick, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Kansas City, Mo., of the bar of the Supreme Court of Missouri, pro hac vice by special leave of court for appellants in No. 75-2067. Peter R. Taft, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert V. Zener, Gen. Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, Edmund B. Clark, Lloyd S. Guerci, Larry A. Boggs, Attys., Dept. of Justice and Pamela P. Quinn, Atty., Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellants in No. 75-2067.
Christopher D. Williams, Washington D. C., with whom Kenneth Balcomb and Robert L. McCarty, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellant in No. 75-2235.
J. G. Speth, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Theodore O. Torve, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Washington, Olympia, Wash., filed a brief on behalf of the State of Washington as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 75-2056.
Richard E. Schwartz, Jefferson City, Mo., filed a brief on behalf of Iron and Steel Institute, as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 75-2067.
John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., State of Texas, and David M. Kendall, Jr., First Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Texas, Austin, Tex., filed a brief on behalf of State of Texas as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 75-2067.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and LEVENTHAL and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge.
Concurring Opinion filed by MacKINNON, Circuit Judge.
LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:
In 1972 Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (hereafter referred to as the "FWPCA" or the "Act" 1. It was a dramatic response to accelerating environmental degradation of rivers, lakes and streams in this country. The Act's stated goal is to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the Nation's waters by 1985. This goal is to be achieved through the enforcement of the strict timetables and technology-based effluent limitations established by the Act.
The FWPCA sets up a permit program, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), as the primary means of enforcing the Act's effluent limitations. 2 At issue in this case is the authority
of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to make exemptions from this permit component of the FWPCA.
Section 402 of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1975), provides that under certain circumstances the EPA Administrator "may . . . issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant" notwithstanding the general proscription of pollutant discharges found in § 301 of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V 1975). The discharge of a pollutant is defined in the FWPCA as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source" or "any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or floating craft." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (Supp. V 1975). In 1973 the EPA Administrator issued regulations that exempted certain categories of "point sources" of pollution from the permit requirements of § 402. 3 The Administrator's purported authority to make such exemptions turns on the proper interpretation of § 402.
A "point source" is defined in § 502(14) as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 4
The 1973 regulations exempted discharges from a number of classes of point sources from the permit requirements of § 402, including all silvicultural point sources; all confined animal feeding operations below a certain size; all irrigation return flows from areas of less than 3,000 contiguous acres or 3,000 noncontiguous acres that use the same drainage system; all nonfeedlot, nonirrigation agricultural point sources; and separate storm sewers containing only storm runoff uncontaminated by any industrial or commercial activity. 5 The EPA's
rationale for these exemptions is that in order to conserve the Agency's enforcement resources for more significant point sources of pollution, it is necessary to exclude these smaller sources of pollutant discharges from the permit program.
The National Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) sought a declaratory judgment that the regulations are unlawful under the FWPCA. Specifically, NRDC contended that the Administrator does not have authority to exempt any class of point source from the permit requirements of § 402. It argued that Congress in enacting §§ 301, 402 of the FWPCA intended to prohibit the discharge of pollutants from all point sources unless a permit had been issued to the discharger under § 402 or unless the point source was explicitly exempted from the permit requirements by statute. The District Court granted NRDC's motion for summary judgment. It held that the FWPCA does not authorize the Administrator to exclude any class of point sources from the permit program. NRDC v. Train, 396 F.Supp. 1393 (D.D.C.1975). The EPA has appealed to this court. It is joined on appeal by a number of defendant-intervenors, National Forest Products Association (NFPA), National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF), and the Colorado River Conservation District. 6
This case thus presents principally a question of statutory interpretation. EPA also argues that even if Congress intended to include the pertinent categories in the permit program, the regulations exempting them should be upheld on a doctrine of administrative infeasibility, i. e., the regulations should be upheld as a deviation from the literal terms of the FWPCA that is necessary to permit the Agency to realize the principal objectives of the Act.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The principal purpose of the FWPCA is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 7 The Act's ultimate objective, to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985, is to be achieved by means of two intermediate steps. As of July 1, 1977, all point sources other than publicly owned treatment works were to have achieved effluent limitations that require application of the "best practicable control technology." 8 These same point sources must reduce their effluent discharges by July 1, 1983, to meet limitations determined by application of the "best available technology economically achievable" for each category of point source. 9
The technique for enforcing these effluent limitations is straightforward. Section 301(a) of the FWPCA provides:
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful. 10
Appellants concede that if the regulations are valid, it must be...
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