Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores, 69539

Citation142 Ill.2d 152,568 N.E.2d 827,154 Ill.Dec. 606
Decision Date20 December 1990
Docket NumberNo. 69539,69539
Parties, 154 Ill.Dec. 606, 119 Lab.Cas. P 56,662, 6 IER Cases 244 James MITCHELL, Appellant, v. JEWEL FOOD STORES, Division of Jewel Food Companies, Inc., Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

Rehearing Denied April 1, 1991.

Lonny Ben Ogus, Chicago, for appellant.

Marcia E. Goodman, of Kovar, Nelson, Brittain, Sledz & Morris, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice CALVO delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, James Mitchell, was employed by defendant, Jewel Food Stores, as a security guard from November 1976 until August 1983 in defendant's southeast Chicago stores. Plaintiff worked one of three different shifts, at one of three different stores. Plaintiff was required to keep track of all hours worked, and the location of each store at which he worked, on a timecard which he would turn in at the end of each workweek. Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment because plaintiff submitted an incorrect timecard.

Plaintiff brought a breach of contract action against defendant in the circuit court of Cook County. Both plaintiff and defendant moved for summary judgment. After a hearing on both motions, the circuit court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and allowed defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed. (189 Ill.App.3d 450, 136 Ill.Dec. 813, 545 N.E.2d 337.) This court allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal on January 31, 1990 (107 Ill.2d R. 315).

The workweek for security officers at defendant's stores was from Sunday to Saturday. Defendant provided its security officers with timecards on which to record the number of hours worked. Security officers were required to submit their timecards at the end of each workweek. Sign-in log sheets were located at each store. Security officers were required to write the time they began work and the time they finished work in the sign-in log sheet.

Plaintiff received his work schedule, which was subject to change, on the Friday or Saturday preceding the workweek. Plaintiff then wrote down his schedule on the timecard. On August 2, plaintiff was scheduled to work from 7 a.m. until 3 p.m. Plaintiff submitted a timecard which reflected that he began work on August 2 at 7 a.m., when he actually started work at 7:25 or 7:30 a.m. The sign-in log sheet reflected plaintiff started work on August 2 at 7 a.m., instead of 7:25 or 7:30 a.m. Plaintiff was suspended pending an investigation on August 8. Sometime later, defendant discharged plaintiff for "falsifying time records."

During his employment, defendant distributed to its security officers an employment manual entitled "Benefits and Policies for Security Officers." Part of the manual was entitled "Major Security Operating Policies." The Major Security Operating Policies section contained sections "A" through "J." Immediately preceding section A, the manual stated that "[v]iolation of any of the following policies will lead to disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal." Section E, entitled "Time Cards and Sign-In Log Book," provided: "All time cards and sign-in log books must reflect correct dates and times worked."

Section J, entitled "Discipline," provided:

"During an employee's probationary period, that is, during his first ninety (90) days of employment, an employee may be discharged for any reason at the sole discretion of the employer. After an employee has completed the probationary period, such employee shall not be suspended, discharged or otherwise disciplined without just cause, just cause to include but not be limited to the following: continuing poor performance on the job, whether due to inefficiency, loafing, carelessness or incompetency; dishonesty or other misconduct in connection with work; incivility; insubordination, and serious or persistant [sic ] infraction of reasonable rules promulgated by management relating to the operation of the store or the health or safety of employees."

It was plaintiff's contention, based on Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center (1987), 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 505 N.E.2d 314, that the employment manual created an enforceable contractual right that plaintiff could only be discharged for just cause. In Duldulao, this court held that when traditional requirements for contract formation are present, "an employee handbook or other policy statement creates enforceable contractual rights." (Duldulao, 115 Ill.2d at 490, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 505 N.E.2d 314.) Defendant argued that the handbook did not constitute a contract. Defendant also argued that if the manual were found to constitute a contract, then the termination of plaintiff's employment complied with the terms of the contract.

At the time plaintiff's employment was terminated, defendant paid plaintiff an hourly wage of $8.95. Had the defendant not discovered the incorrect timecard, plaintiff would have been paid approximately $4.48 for time not actually worked. At the hearing, defendant argued that in submitting inaccurate time information, plaintiff had "committed dishonesty, misconduct in connection with work, and a serious infraction of reasonable rules under the terms of the document."

Defendant did not provide its security officers with anything on which to record work schedules other than timecards. Defendant acknowledged that plaintiff filled out his timecard in advance of each workweek to enable plaintiff to remember his schedule. It was defendant's position that plaintiff had the responsibility to ensure all time records were correct. According to defendant, it had total discretion to determine what, if any, discipline was appropriate for the submission of inaccurate time records. Defendant argued at the hearing that unless plaintiff had been led to reasonably believe otherwise, the definition of "other misconduct" within the meaning of the manual "means what we have always taken it to mean, what we have always enforced it to mean, what we say it means." According to defendant, there is not a single piece of competent evidence which could create an issue of fact as to whether or not just cause for termination existed.

On the Friday or Saturday prior to each workweek, plaintiff received his work assignments from various security officer supervisors or various security employees. At times, security guards might have to call each store they worked at to be informed of their schedule. Plaintiff worked at several of defendant's stores each week, and his shifts varied from day to day. The work assignments were given to plaintiff verbally and were subject to change. Plaintiff was required to keep track of the number of hours he worked, and the location of the various stores at which he worked, on his timecard. Plaintiff would turn in his timecard at the end of each week, and plaintiff would be paid for the hours reflected on the timecard. Plaintiff would fill out his timecard in advance as a reminder of where and when he was to work.

On August 1, 1983, plaintiff worked from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. On August 2, 1983, plaintiff was to work from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. Plaintiff arrived home after working the late shift on August 1, and took medication for his heart (Parafon Forte tablets and Feldene capsules). According to plaintiff, the combination of working late and taking medication caused him to oversleep on August 2. Plaintiff missed his 6 a.m. bus, caught the next one, and arrived at work at 7:25 or 7:30 a.m. According to plaintiff, he talked to Bob Davis, defendant's store manager, upon his late arrival. Plaintiff told Mr. Davis why he was late.

At the hearing, plaintiff argued he did not falsify his timecard; rather, he mistakenly failed to correct the time which he had written on the card the previous week when he received his schedule. Plaintiff's explanation for having written 7 a.m. on the sign-in log sheet, instead of 7:25 or 7:30 a.m., appears to be that he did not sign the sign-in log sheet upon his arrival at the store, but sometime later that day. When plaintiff did sign the sign-in log sheet, he referred to his timecard and mistakenly entered 7 a.m., the time which appeared on his timecard, instead of 7:25 or 7:30 a.m.

At the hearing, the circuit court noted that "absent an enforceable contract, [the employer] has a right to fire an employee for good reason, [or] no reason at all." Further, "if the employer has not given up the right to exercise [its] discretion as to what the penalty will be for a given transgression, then if that transgression occurs * * * the * * * employer is in no different position that [it] was in had there been no contract at all."

The circuit court found, as a matter of law, that the language of the manual was unambiguous. According to the circuit court, defendant reserved to itself the right under the manual to exercise its discretion in determining the appropriate penalty for the submission of an inaccurate timecard and an inaccurate notation on a sign-in log sheet. The penalty could range from no discipline to termination of employment. The circuit court found that the exercise of defendant's discretion need not be measured against an objective standard, or any standard, because defendant did not set forth a standard by which its actions would be measured in the manual. According to the circuit court, defendant "had virtually, by the way this contract has been written, retained [its] unbridled discretion as to what penalty will be handed out if there is a violation." The circuit court stated:

"[The contract] says such employee shall not be suspended, discharged, or otherwise disciplined without just cause. Just cause to include but not be limited to the following. And then they list all of the things. Not too difficult for me to find as a matter of law that the improper noting of time on the time record, the sign-in sheet, and then submitting that timecard to the employer for...

To continue reading

Request your trial
65 cases
  • Golla v. General Motors Corp.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 19, 1995
    ... ... (Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores (1990), 142 Ill.2d 152, 154 Ill.Dec. 606, 568 N.E.2d ... ...
  • Finnane v. Pentel of America, Ltd.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • March 22, 1999
    ...v. Petry Television, Inc., No. 95 C 5899, 1996 WL 388416, at *4 (N.D.Ill. July 9, 1996) (citing Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores, 142 Ill.2d 152, 154 Ill.Dec. 606, 568 N.E.2d 827, 831 (1990); Harden v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 261 Ill.App.3d 443, 198 Ill.Dec. 923, 633 N.E.2d 764 (1st Dist.19......
  • Rupcich v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union Local 881
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • September 29, 2014
    ...that viewing it would have resulted in a different outcome).Rupcich's reliance upon the case of Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores, 142 Ill.2d 152, 154 Ill.Dec. 606, 568 N.E.2d 827 (1991), also is unavailing. Rupcich claims that the Union acted in bad faith because it was bound by Mitchell to pu......
  • Crane v. Triangle Plaza, Inc., 2-91-0872
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 30, 1992
    ... ... (Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores (1990), 142 Ill.2d 152, 165, 154 Ill.Dec. 606, 568 ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT