569 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1978), 76-3405, E.E.O.C. v. Packard Elec. Div., General Motors Corp.

Docket Nº:76-3405, 76-3406.
Citation:569 F.2d 315
Party Name:EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PACKARD ELECTRIC DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Case Date:March 10, 1978
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
 
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Page 315

569 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1978)

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PACKARD ELECTRIC DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 76-3405, 76-3406.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

March 10, 1978

Page 316

Abner W. Sibal, Gen. Counsel, Marleigh Dover Lang, Atty., Joseph T. Eddins, Jr., Associate Gen. Counsel, Beatrice Rosenberg, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Washington, D. C., for E.E.O.C.

E. Grady Jolly, Jackson, Miss., James R. Wheatley, Atty., Legal Dept. General Motors Corp., Detroit, Mich., for defendants-appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before INGRAHAM, GEE and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

GEE, Circuit Judge:

At issue in the present cases is the scope of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's subpoena powers in investigations of individual instances of race and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In both cases individuals complained to the EEOC's Jackson, Mississippi, office about relatively narrow factual situations. The EEOC, in its attempts to investigate these complaints, issued subpoenas for broad statistical information as to the respective employers' entire work force. In each case the district court granted only partial enforcement of these sweeping requests, and the propriety of these partial denials of enforcement is now drawn before us.

Both cases turn on the EEOC's wish to obtain data in the form known to it as "workforce breakouts." Along with its requests for the personnel files of the individual complainants and general hire and fire data, the EEOC subpoenaed facility-wide "workforce breakouts" the entire current personnel lists of the complained-of facilities, showing each employee's race and sex, job classification, labor grade, date of hire, and pay rate. Although GMAC and Packard supplied some materials about the individual complainants and GMAC also supplied some limited plant-wide data about other job applicants, both employers refused to supply the plant-wide workforce breakouts.

When the EEOC sought to enforce its subpoenas, the district court refused to require facility-wide workforce breakouts; instead, the district court granted partial enforcement in each case, tailoring disclosure

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to the character of the particular charges made. Thus, in the GMAC case, where the complainant charged that his application to be a collection agent in the Jackson plant's "field department" had been rejected on grounds of race, the district court granted a workforce breakout of the field department (but not of the entire plant) and also granted disclosure of hire and fire data for all collection agents, as well as all personnel records of the charging party. In the Packard Electric case the court again tailored disclosure to the character of the charges. Here there were three...

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