Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 77-1870
Citation | 569 F.2d 431 |
Decision Date | 29 December 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 77-1870,77-1870 |
Parties | YESTERDAY'S CHILDREN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Margaret KENNEDY et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Patrick T. Murphy, Douglas C. Nohlgren, Chicago, Ill., amicus curiae.
John A. Dienner, III, Asst. State's Atty., Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Herbert Lee Caplan, Asst. Atty. Gen., William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before CUMMINGS and BAUER, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. **
Plaintiffs are eight adults who were adopted as infants and Yesterday's Children, which is a not-for-profit Illinois corporation consisting of approximately 6,000 adults who were also adopted as infants. Their civil rights complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four Illinois officials 1 and the presiding judge, County Division, of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that two Illinois statutes 2 violate the First, Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments because they prevent the individual plaintiffs from ascertaining their natural parents' identity. They also sought a declaratory judgment that defendant officials and officials of private agencies acting under color of state law violate those amendments by preventing plaintiffs from ascertaining the identity of their natural parents. The individual plaintiffs claim that they were denied access by defendants to the names of their natural parents or, in one instance, the name of her natural brother. 3 Seven of the named plaintiffs are members of Yesterday's Children. None of the plaintiffs sought any relief in the Illinois courts.
According to plaintiffs, Illinois has maintained a statutory and "actual policy" of preventing adopted children from discovering the names and circumstances of their natural parents and blood relatives. Similarly, adoption agencies formalized by Illinois statute and licensed by the employees of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services have denied adoptees this information. Adoptees have been able to review their adoption records "only if they can demonstrate critical medical reasons to justify their request" (Complaint par. 27). Plaintiffs claim that their constitutional rights have been violated by the two statutes in question, 4 by a General Order entered by the presiding judge of the County Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County on February 21, 1974, which provides that " * * * all adoption files in the offices of the Clerk of the Circuit Court shall be impounded and shall be released only upon an order issued from the County Division of the Circuit Court," and "by the action of state officials and private child adoption agencies acting under the color of state law" (Complaint par. 32).
The constitutional violations are alleged as follows (Complaint pars. 33-35):
In June 1975, the district judge to whom the case was originally assigned declined to convene a three-judge court on the ground that this General Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County "lies at the heart of the matter" and should be reviewed before any statutory question need be reached. In October 1975, he dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of abstention because "the complaint involves a basic question of State public policy which has not been passed upon by the State courts, i. e., whether the plaintiffs should generally be deprived of access to the record of their personal origins."
The dismissal was appealed and in May 1976 this Court handed down an order holding that a three-judge court was required to hear plaintiffs' constitutional challenge because the complaint "presented a substantial federal question." By dictum, 5 the panel considered abstention to be inappropriate.
In August 1977, a three-judge district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the action without prejudice on the grounds of abstention. 6 The opinion reasoned that the Illinois courts could "apply the (two) statutes in such a way as to withstand constitutional attack" (mem.op. 6). To support abstention, the opinion relied principally on Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 52 L.Ed.2d 513; Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844; and Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376. 7 We have jurisdiction of this appeal from that decision because the three-judge district court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' constitutional arguments (MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 95 S.Ct. 1278, 43 L.Ed.2d 636), nor do we. Our affirmation is based solely on abstention.
After this appeal was filed, the Circuit Court of Cook County, County Division, County Department, handed down an unreported opinion dealing with the above statutory provisions in In the Matter of Daniel Doe, 76 Co 2436 (November 22, 1977). In that case, an emotionally disturbed adoptee, represented by the same counsel as these plaintiffs, sought knowledge of his familial background at the suggestion of his psychiatrist, and the court decided that the adoption record should be released on the following conditions:
In the well-reasoned opinion, the state court judge noted that no Illinois appellate court had yet interpreted the statutory provisions in question but that most states requiring the sealing of adoption records permit the unsealing of those records upon a showing of good cause. Judge Schneider observed that in Scotland adoption records have been open to any adoptee who has reached the age of 17, and that Parliament recently enacted a similar law for England and Wales. After noting the arguments that the Illinois statutes might violate the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, be inconsistent with the penumbra of rights emanating from the Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution or be unconstitutionally vague, the court concluded that under the Illinois statutes, the rights of adoptees, their biological parents, and their adoptive parents have to be weighed against "possible detrimental effects." Consequently, the court adopted the above procedure "to balance those rights, and on the basis of the unique facts in each case, arrive at an equitable and just solution."
It is thus apparent that the Daniel Doe court would not limit the unsealing of adoption records to cases where adoptees can show "a probable and serious hereditary problem" or "critical medical reasons," as claimed by plaintiffs (Br. 3, 5) or where "genetic, medical, psychological or other problems manifest themselves as requiring such information or where neither party objects to the disclosure." 8 Instead in Daniel Doe the following standard has seemingly been read into the statutes and General Order: the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, as an adult, he or she has a real and immediate need for such records, and if such a showing is made, the biological and adoptive parents in order to avoid unsealing must show by a preponderance of the evidence that substantial harm will transpire if the relief requested is granted.
Despite this construction by one state trial court, it appears that abstention to allow more expanded consideration by the Illinois courts may "materially alter the constitutional issue presented" (Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 481, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 1905, 52 L.Ed.2d 513), and that the benefits of such abstention are not "too speculative to...
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