Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 02 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-5568.,08-5568.
• Citation: 569 F.3d 562
• Parties: Sherry K. MILHOLLAND, M. Ed., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUMNER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; Benny C. Bills, Individually, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

569 F.3d 562

Sherry K. MILHOLLAND, M. Ed., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUMNER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; Benny C. Bills, Individually, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 08-5568.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: April 28, 2009.

Decided and Filed: July 2, 2009.

ARGUED:

W. Gary Blackburn, Blackburn & McCune, PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Amber St. John, Law Office of Amber St. John, Smyrna, Tennessee, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF:

W. Gary Blackburn, Blackburn & McCune, PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Amber St. John, Law Office of Amber St. John, Smyrna, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Before GUY, ROGERS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

ROGERS, Circuit Judge.

Sherry Milholland appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on her Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim. Milholland has worked for the Sumner County Board of Education as a teacher and administrator for fourteen years. Milholland suffered from arthritis and alleged that the Board's Director of Schools regarded her as disabled, and therefore transferred her from an administrative position to a classroom teaching position. The recently-enacted ADA Amendments Act of 2008 does not apply to this case. Under the prior version of the statute, the facts construed in the light most favorable to Milholland do not show a genuine issue for trial that the defendants regarded Milholland as disabled. The district court therefore properly ruled for the defendants.

I.

Sherry Milholland has worked as a teacher and administrator for the Sumner County Board of Education since 1995. In 2001, Milholland was diagnosed with inflammatory arthritis. Milholland's doctor never gave her any work restrictions and her condition did not limit her ability to perform either as a classroom teacher or as a school administrator. Milholland did not inform the Board of her condition nor did she ask for any accommodation.

At the time of Milholland's diagnosis, Benny Bills was working as the principal of Gallatin High School, and Milholland's husband was a teacher at that school. Milholland's husband generally discussed Milholland's health problems with Bills, but Milholland's husband never told Bills about Milholland's specific diagnosis. Bills continued to inquire about Milholland's health at social occasions. Bills later became the Director of Schools for Sumner County.

In May 2004, Milholland became one of the two assistant principals at Knox Doss Middle School. Her principal, Mike Brown, was aware of her medical condition. Milholland had a difficult working relationship with the other assistant principal, Rufus Lowe. Milholland told Brown that Lowe did not carry his share of the workload.

On March 13, 2006, Milholland met with Bills to discuss the issues at the school. Milholland complained about Lowe's performance and noted that it was increasing her own workload. Bills brought up Milholland's own performance, and Milholland claims that Bills said something to the effect of "Don't you think it would be easier on your health if you would just go back to the classroom?" Milholland Dep., p. 92. Bills admitted that he discussed Milholland's return to teaching, but stated that his comment was not related to Milholland's health. Rather he was only discussing the fact that administrative positions involved more work and stress than teaching positions. After the meeting, Milholland sent Bills a follow-up letter stating that she "simply wanted [Bills] to be aware that [she] strongly felt that [she] was plenty healthy enough to continue as an administrator, because [Bills] had brought up that question about going back to the classroom." Milholland Dep., p. 94. The letter stated that her "illness, thanks to a tremendous rheumatologist and new medications, is well under control." Milholland Dep., p. 94. Milholland asked to stay in an administrative position.

In early 2006, Brown and Bills met to discuss the situation at Knox Doss Middle School and Milholland and Lowe's working relationship. Although both Brown and Bills had greater problems with Lowe's performance than with Milholland's, they noted that "teachers did not have that working relationship of respect with Mrs. Milholland because there was always fraction, discord between [her and Lowe]." Bills Dep., p. 45. Brown and Bills decided to solve the problem by transferring both Milholland and Lowe from the school.¹ Brown and Bills believed that transferring both employees would create a "clean slate with faculty, with parents, and with students." Bills Dep., p. 44-45. Brown filled out a request to transfer Milholland after the decision was made.

In April 2006, Milholland requested to be transferred to one of two positions: principal at Wessington Place Elementary School or Materials Center Supervisor at the Board's Central Office. Brown recommended transfer to the principal position. Bills could have approved the transfer without interviewing Milholland or offering the position to other applicants, but he chose not to do so. Milholland interviewed for the position, but was not chosen. Instead, Bills transferred Milholland to a teaching position at Station Camp High School. Bills told her she was being transferred because she was not "getting the job done" as vice principal. Milholland Dep., p. 99.

After learning of her transfer, Milholland and her husband set up meetings with Bills. The first meeting was between Bills and Milholland's husband. Milholland's husband alleged that, during the meeting, Bills told him the transfer was because Milholland had missed too many days of work, but that Bills did not specifically refer to Milholland's health. The second meeting included all three individuals, after Milholland retained counsel. Milholland unsuccessfully attempted to record the conversation on a hidden audio device. Milholland alleges that, during the meeting, her husband asked Bills if he discussed Milholland's health during the March 13, 2006 meeting and that Bills confirmed that he did.

In August 2006, Milholland filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC, and she received a right to sue letter in January 2007. On February 21, 2007, Milholland filed this suit in the Middle District of Tennessee against the Board of Education and against Bills, in his official and individual capacities, alleging violations of the ADA and the Tennessee Handicap Act and Human Rights Act. The district court dismissed the individual claims against Bills under the ADA and Tennessee Handicap Act for failure to state a claim. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. On April 8, 2008, the district court granted summary judgment as to the ADA claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The district court determined that the defendants' general statements regarding Milholland's health did not support a finding that the defendants regarded her as impaired. The district court also found that Milholland was still able to work in the same class of jobs, so that she was not substantially limited in the life activity of working. Milholland now appeals.

II.

The recently-enacted ADA Amendments Act of 2008 does not govern this case because its application would have the type of impermissibly retroactive effect that requires a clearly-stated congressional intent. Under the prior version of the statute, the facts construed in the light most favorable to Milholland do not support a finding that the defendants regarded Milholland as disabled. Nor do the facts support a conclusion that the defendants regarded any impairment of Milholland's as substantially limiting her in her life activity of working. Milholland cannot make a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA and the district court properly granted summary judgment.

The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which became effective on January 1, 2009, Pub.L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553, does not apply retroactively to govern conduct occurring before the Act became effective. Before January 1, 2009, the ADA defined a disability as:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). Under this definition, the impairment that a plaintiff was "regarded as having" under subpart (C) was an impairment as defined in subpart (A). In turn, under subpart (A), to limit the major life activity of working, a plaintiff had to show that she was regarded as having an impairment that substantially limited her life activity of working in the same "broad class of jobs." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999).

The amended version of the ADA no longer requires the plaintiff bringing a claim under subpart (C) to show that the impairment limited her life activity, including working in a broad class of jobs. The ADA now defines a disability as:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).

42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1) (2009) (added language italicized). Paragraph (3) states that

An individual meets the requirement of "being regarded as having such an impairment" if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.

Id. § 12102(3)(A). Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act in order to "reinstat[e] a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA," and to overrule Sutton. Pub.L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554. We assume, for the...