U.S. v. Canipe

• Decision Date: 30 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-5534.,08-5534.
• Citation: 569 F.3d 597
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ernest W. CANIPE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

569 F.3d 597

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ernest W. CANIPE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-5534.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted: June 11, 2009.

Decided and Filed: June 30, 2009.

ON BRIEF: Clifton L. Corker, Johnson City, Tennessee, for Appellant. Robert M. Reeves, Assistant United States Attorney, Greeneville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before SUTTON and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; LIOI, District Judge.^*

OPINION

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Ernest Canipe appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress firearm and ammunition evidence seized from his vehicle and his resulting inculpatory statement. He contends that the evidence, which led to his conditional guilty plea and 192-month prison sentence for felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures because his detention was unreasonable, he did not consent to the search of his vehicle, the search exceeded the scope of his alleged consent, and his subsequent statement was tainted by these unconstitutional acts. We disagree and affirm.

I.

Herman Hagie, an investigator with the Washington County (Tennessee) Sheriff's Department, was the sole witness at the evidentiary hearing before a magistrate judge on Canipe's motion to suppress. Hagie testified that on June 25, 2007, his supervisor told him that Canipe might be in possession of a firearm.¹ Hagie knew Canipe, having previously met him when Canipe was in prison and having later arrested him in an unrelated incident. Hagie was also aware that Canipe had been previously convicted of arson and of attempting to stab a law enforcement officer.

Upon learning that Canipe was expected to check in that day at the probation office in Johnson City but had not yet done so, Hagie attempted to intercept him at the office. Arriving in his unmarked police vehicle, Hagie saw Canipe in the parking lot and called for backup. After observing Canipe leave the parking lot without wearing his seatbelt, a violation of Tennessee law, Hagie performed a traffic stop. The government concedes that Hagie's motive for the traffic stop was to assess whether Canipe possessed a firearm.

Hagie cited Canipe for failing to wear a seatbelt. The time it took Hagie to write the citation and present it to Canipe was normal, which for that time of day was "[m]aybe even longer" than ten to fifteen minutes. Sometime during this time, Officer Bevins arrived. Shortly thereafter, two other officers arrived, totaling four officers at the scene of the traffic stop.

After Canipe signed the citation, Hagie returned his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Immediately thereafter, Hagie asked Canipe whether he had "anything" in his vehicle that might be unlawful or about which Hagie needed to know. Canipe responded, "No, he didn't think so." Hagie then inquired whether "it would be all right if I looked in" the vehicle or "[y]ou care if I look?" to which Canipe answered that it "wouldn't be a problem." After performing a consented frisk, Hagie told Canipe "again that we were going to look through your vehicle, we're going to go through your vehicle, and [Canipe] never commented."

While an officer stood with Canipe between the rear of the truck and the front of Hagie's cruiser—a "short distance" of about ten feet between the two vehicles— Hagie and Officer Bevins searched the truck. Hagie found a closed metal box resembling a tackle box on the front floor of the passenger seat and observed the corner of a second plastic box protruding from beneath the seat. When he moved the seat forward, Hagie discovered that the top of the second box was inscribed with the word "Ruger," which he knew was a company that manufactured firearms. Hagie opened the Ruger box, observed a handgun inside of it, and placed Canipe under arrest.²

At the detention center, Canipe was read his Miranda warnings, signed a waiver of his rights, and gave an incriminating statement. He timely appeals the district court's order adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation to deny his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his truck, as well as his subsequent inculpatory statement.

II.

We review the district court's factual findings on a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Sanford, 476 F.3d 391, 394 (6th Cir.2007). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, although there may be evidence to support it, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Ellis, 497 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir.2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We view the evidence in the light most likely to support the district court's decision. Id. (citations omitted).

A.

First, Canipe challenges the reasonableness of his continued detention and Investigator Hagie's request for consent to search his vehicle following the issuance of the citation. He contends that Hagie's conduct, unaccompanied by evidence of any other criminal act, exceeded what was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying a typical stop for failure to wear a seatbelt. We disagree.

We begin by noting that Canipe does not dispute the lawfulness of the initial stop. Indeed, because Investigator Hagie possessed probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred when he observed Canipe not wearing a seatbelt, Hagie's motivation for making the stop (suspicion of unlawful possession of a firearm) did not undermine its constitutionality. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-19, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (holding that officers' temporary detention of defendants in a "high drug area" under the pretext that defendants were violating traffic laws was not unreasonable where officers had probable cause to believe that defendants committed traffic infractions); Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n. 6 (6th Cir.2004) ("[P]olice may make a stop when they have probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred, even if the defendant raises a claim that the stop was pretextual.").

Nevertheless, "a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). In particular, "[a] lawful traffic stop may become an impermissible seizure if it occurs over an unreasonable period of time or under unreasonable circumstances." Ellis, 497 F.3d at 612 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Whether the continued detention was unreasonable is not subject to a "bright-line rule," id. at 612; rather, the focus is on the "`totality of the circumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a `particularized and objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing." Id. at 613 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)). "The totality of the circumstances analysis permits police officers `to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.'" Ellis, 497 F.3d at 613 (quoting United States v. Martin, 289 F.3d 392, 398 (6th Cir.2002)).

Guiding this inquiry is our en banc holding in United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818 (6th Cir.1998) (en banc) that "the Constitution does not mandate that a driver, after being lawfully detained, must be released and sent on his way without further questioning" once the detaining officer has concluded the original purpose of the stop. Id. at 820, 823 (holding that officers' continued detention of defendant and request to search defendant's vehicle after determining that he was not an impaired driver did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights). Erwin's ruling comports with well-established precedent that "[a] law enforcement officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment merely by approaching an individual, even when there is no reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, and asking him whether he is willing to answer some questions," id. at 823 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)), or requests the individual's consent to search his vehicle, Erwin, 155 F.3d at 823 (citing United States v. Dunson, 940 F.2d 989, 994 (6th Cir. 1991)), and "this consent is not vitiated merely because the valid suspicion of wrongdoing for which an individual has been stopped proves to be unfounded or does not result in prosecution and the individual is free to go before being asked," Erwin, 155 F.3d at 823 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)). However, absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a law enforcement officer must allow an individual to leave if he so requests, and any consent obtained by the officer's refusal to permit him to do so is invalid. Erwin, 155 F.3d at 823. See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required. The encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Investigator Hagie's continued detention and questioning of Canipe after issuing him the traffic citation were reasonable. Hagie knew Canipe and received reliable information from his sister— through his supervisor—that Canipe was unlawfully possessing a firearm. The stop was not prolonged, Hagie testifying that it was of "normal" duration for a traffic violation at that time of day and much of it was consumed by the...