Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 03 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | Slip Op. 08-73. Court No. 07-00001. |
| Citation | 569 F.Supp.2d 1315 |
| Parties | TOTES-ISOTONER CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of International Trade |
Neville Peterson, LLP (John M. Peterson, Curtis W. Knauss, Matthew G. Shaw, and Michael T. Cone), New York City, for Plaintiff.
Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Aimee Lee, David S. Silverbrand and Gardner B. Miller) and, of counsel, Yelena Slepak, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Elizabeth Baltzan, Office of General Counsel, United States Trade Representative, for Defendant United States.
Before: The Honorable JANE A. RESTANI, Chief Judge, The Honorable DONALD C. POGUE, Judge, The Honorable JUDITH M. BARZILAY, Judge.
In this action, Plaintiff, Totes-Isotoner Corporation ("Totes"), a U.S. importer of men's gloves, challenges the constitutionality of the tariff rate imposed on its imports. Totes claims that by setting out different tariff rates for certain "Men's" gloves and other gloves, the Tariff Schedule violates Totes' right to equal protection under the law because it discriminates on the basis of gender and/or age.
The Defendant United States asks the Court to dismiss Totes' complaint, claiming that the Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter for two reasons: (1)the Complaint presents a non-justiciable political question; and (2)the Plaintiff does not have a sufficient stake in the matter so as to possess standing to bring this equal protection claim. USCIT Rule 12(b)(1). In the alternative, the government also seeks dismissal under USCIT Rule 12(b)(5), asserting that Totes' pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Because the Court concludes that Totes' equal protection claims properly invoke the Court's traditional role of—and standards for—constitutional review, and that Totes has standing to bring its claims, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. However, because Plaintiff's Complaint does not plead sufficient facts to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination, the Court dismisses this matter, without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5).
The Court exercises jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1), which grants to the court exclusive jurisdiction over actions arising out of a law of the United States which provides for "revenue from imports."
The Court will discuss, in turn, each of the stated bases for the government's motion to dismiss: 1. The Political Question Doctrine; 2. The Alleged Lack of Constitutional and Prudential Standing; and 3. Totes' Failure to State a Claim.
In its Complaint, which the government would have us dismiss, Totes pleads that the government classifies "Men's" leather gloves in subheading 4203.2930, of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS"),1 at a duty rate of 14 percent ad valorem, whereas gloves "[f]or other persons" are classified under subheading 4203.2940, HTSUS,2 at the lower duty rate of 12.6 percent ad valorem.3 Totes alleges that these provisions of the HTSUS "discriminate on the basis of gender or age," Complaint at 1, in violation of the Constitution's Equal Protection guarantee. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 ().4 Accordingly, the Complaint challenges the extent to which the government may use gender in the classification of goods for importation.
Nonetheless, the government argues that this Complaint raises a nonjusticiable political question. As noted above, however, in the Court's view, the Complaint seeks review of specific statutory provisions using traditional constitutional equal protection standards that have long been interpreted and applied by the judicial branch. As such, Totes' claim does not intrude into the non-judicial domain.
The political question doctrine, recognizing our constitutional separation of powers principle, does exclude some disputes from judicial determination. Under this doctrine, a subject matter is not appropriate for judicial resolution where it is exclusively assigned to the political branches or where such branches are better-suited than the judicial branch to determine the matter. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962);5 Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) ( .
Invoking this doctrine, the government asserts that the subject matter of Plaintiffs Complaint—the use of gender in tariff classifications—is not appropriate for judicial resolution because it involves issues of trade policy reserved to the political branches. Specifically, the government argues that the formation and adoption of the tariff provisions at issue here involve the negotiation of agreements with foreign governments and that Plaintiffs claim challenges the substance of those international trade agreements. The government argues that there are no judicially manageable standards for reviewing the results of these international trade agreements. To the government, "[w]hether the rates provided in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule should be equalized with regard to products classified based upon gender or age related characteristics is a political question that the Court should decline to adjudicate." Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, at 14.
Plaintiff properly replies that the specific provisions of the HTSUS constitute statutes enacted by Congress pursuant to Section 1204(c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.6 19 U.S.C. § 3004(c). Citing this statutory structure, Plaintiff reasons that its Complaint is a garden-variety equal protection claim challenging the statute imposing tariffs and in no way implicates the negotiation of international agreements that may precede statutory enactment. Rather than intrude in areas delegated to the executive or legislative branch, Plaintiff claims that its Complaint invokes traditional constitutional equal protection standards readily subject to judicial administration.
In support of its argument, Plaintiff invokes the Supreme Court's analysis in Japan Whaling, which explains that:
[N]ot every matter touching on politics is a political question ... and more specifically, that it is "error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." As Baker plainly held, [ ] the courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements, and it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts.... We are cognizant of the interplay between these Amendments and the conduct of this Nation's foreign relations, and we recognize the premier role which both Congress and the Executive play in this field. But under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones.
Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 229-30, 106 S.Ct. 2860 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691).7
The Supreme Court's admonition in Japan Whaling is directly applicable here. In the case before us, even if the challenged statutory provisions originated in international negotiations, those provisions have since been enacted into law as the HTSUS. Thus, this Complaint does not challenge the actions of the President or Congress in their respective spheres of responsibility for foreign commerce or foreign relations. Rather, it involves constitutional review of a domestic statute. It has long been the role of the court to adjudicate legislative classifications in view of the importance of the governmental interests involved. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938) . In the light of this history and precedent, it is clear that review of statutory provisions, using constitutional standards, is manifestly within the judicial realm. Such review is, if anything, more appropriate here than in Japan Whaling, which involved evaluation of the Japanese whaling industry, a matter even more removed from the domestic realm than that at issue here.
Thus, Totes' challenge to the discriminatory operation of the HTSUS properly invokes the Court's traditional role of—and standards for—constitutional review. Therefore, the Court denies the government's request that Totes' Complaint be dismissed under the political question doctrine.8
Because federal judicial...
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