Swain v. Estate of Tyre

Decision Date13 December 2012
Docket NumberNo. 2009–297–Appeal.,2009–297–Appeal.
Citation57 A.3d 283
PartiesJennifer SWAIN et al. v. ESTATE OF Shelley A. TYRE by and through James H. REILLY as Administrator d.b.n, c.t.a.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Bernard A. Jackvony, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiffs.

Martin K. DeMagistris, Esq., Warwick, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA, for the Court.

Before this Court is a question of first impression. We are called upon to determine whether the Rhode Island Slayer's Act, G.L.1956 chapter 1.1 of title 33 (Slayer's Act, or Act), prohibits the testatrix's stepchildren, Jennifer and Jeremy Swain (plaintiffs), from inheriting as named contingent testamentary beneficiaries (contingent beneficiaries) because this inheritance would confer a benefit on their father, David Swain (David). David, a slayer pursuant to the Act, has been adjudicated responsible for intentionally causing the death of the testatrix, Shelley Arden Tyre (Shelley).1

The plaintiffs appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, Estate of Shelley A. Tyre (Estate or defendant), holding that they were barred as a matter of law from inheriting under the Slayer's Act. This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on September 20, 2012,2 pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After reviewing the record and considering the written and oral submissions of the parties, we are satisfied that this appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

The essential facts of this case are not in dispute. Shelley executed the will in question on October 5, 1993, in contemplation of her marriage to David. 3 She married David shortly thereafter. Her will named David as the sole beneficiary of her estate. She also specifically named both Jennifer and Jeremy Swain as the only contingent beneficiaries under her will. They stood to inherit in the event that David predeceased her.4

Shelley's untimely death by drowning in 1999 triggered the administration of her estate.5 Pursuant to her will, David was named as the executor. However, this role was short-lived. On May 1, 2002, after first bringing a wrongful-death claim against David in the Newport County Superior Court, Shelley's parents filed a petition in the Jamestown Probate Court to remove David as executor. The probate judge granted the petition on July 3, 2002, removed David as executor, and then appointed James H. Reilly (Reilly or administrator) 6 as the administrator d.b.n., c.t.a., of Shelley's estate. Additionally, the probate judge ordered David to return the sum of $152,568.19, which the probate court deemed he had wrongfully taken from the estate.7

As noted above, on March 5, 2002, Shelley's parents brought a wrongful-death action against David alleging that he (1) was a slayer pursuant to § 33–1.1–1(3); (2) caused Shelley's wrongful death; and (3) should be subject to civil liability for a criminal act, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9–1–2. After a trial, held in February of 2006, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Shelley's parents on all three counts, finding that David “intentionally * * * killed Shelley with malice aforethought” and that he therefore met the definition of slayer set forth in the Slayer's Act.8 Shelley's parents were awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $2,815,085.46, as well as punitive damages totaling $2 million. After the trial justice denied his motion for a new trial, David appealed to this Court. On May 13, 2008, we affirmed the lower court ruling, holding that “once the Superior Court has made a declaration * * * with respect to whether a defendant is a slayer it is then within the province of the probate court to determine what effect, if any, that declaration has on the distribution of the decedent's assets under a will or other instrument.” Tyre v. Swain, 946 A.2d 1189, 1198 (R.I.2008).

Thereafter, on May 20, 2008, Reilly filed a petition in the Jamestown Probate Court to construe the will in light of this Court's decision.9 On June 27, 2008, the probate judge issued a written order declaring that [n]either David A. Swain, nor his heirs at law, shall receive directly or indirectly from the Estate of Shelley Arden Tyre.” Accordingly, based on that order, Jennifer and Jeremy were precluded from inheritingunder Shelley's will as contingent beneficiaries.

The plaintiffs timely appealed the probate order to the Newport County Superior Court, arguing that the Slayer's Act did not bar them from taking their share under Shelley's will. They contended that since they were specifically named as contingent beneficiaries, they therefore were not inheriting “through” their father, as would otherwise be prohibited by the Slayer's Act. In opposition, the Estate maintained that allowing Jennifer and Jeremy to inherit would, in fact be, a benefit to David, in direct violation of the Slayer's Act.10 According to the Estate, the Legislature “intended both a broad interpretation and discretion to determine when a slayer will benefit by either taking directly or indirectly as a result of the death of the decedent.”

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the hearing justice found in favor of the Estate, holding that the Slayer's Act barred Jennifer and Jeremy from inheriting under Shelley's will. Referring to § 33–1.1–15, which prescribes that the Slayer's Act be interpreted “broadly to effectuate the policy of this State that no person shall be allowed to profit from his or her wrongs,” the hearing justice determined that “allow[ing] Jennifer and Jeremy to take [under Shelley's will] would directly violate the Act because their inheritance would improperly allow “the slayer David Swain [to] profit from his wrongdoing.” Of import, the hearing justice noted that Jennifer and Jeremy were not minors, and therefore “ha[d] the ability to control the distribution of the property that * * * they would be entitled to if permitted by this action.” With that in mind, the hearing justice based his decision to bar plaintiffs' taking under Shelley's will on the undisputed facts that: (1) Jeremy had personally contributed and raised money to finance his father's defense; 11 and (2) Jennifer and Jeremy had both stated that they would use any proceeds they inherited from Shelley's estate for their father's criminal defense, if necessary.

The plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal to this Court.12 On appeal, they contend that the trial justice erred in determining that the bequest to Jennifer and Jeremy under Shelley's will violated the Slayer's Act. Furthermore, they maintain that the Slayer's Act does not bar them from taking under Shelley's will since they were specifically named as contingent beneficiaries and are therefore not “claiming through” David.

At the oral argument held on October 3, 2011, issues concerning mootness emerged. This Court deferred consideration of the merits of the appeal and issued an order directing the parties to file a joint statement as to whether the judgment of the Jamestown Probate Court (holding David responsible for paying the Estate $152,568.19) had been discharged in bankruptcy.Pursuant to our order, the parties submitted a joint statement confirming that the entire judgment had, in fact, been discharged in bankruptcy by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Island. In this joint statement, the parties also indicated that approximately $5,571.99 remained in the estate for distribution.

Thereafter, on October 21, 2011, we issued an order referring this matter to the Supreme Court Appellate Mediation Program for resolution. In the event that mediation failed, the order directed the parties to file additional briefs with this Court as to whether a justiciable controversy remained.

After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve this case through mediation, the parties submitted additional briefs addressing the issue of mootness, pursuant to our order. On May 2, 2012, we issued a subsequent order assigning the case to the show-cause calendar, and we indicated that the parties “may file additional memoranda, if so desired, in order to address any supplementary issues that may have arisen since the date of their last appearance before this Court.” 13 (Emphasis added.)

IIStandard of Review

“It is well established that this Court reviews a trial justice's grant of summary judgment de novo. Beacon Mutual Insurance Co. v. Spino Brothers, Inc., 11 A.3d 645, 648 (R.I.2011) (citing Sansone v. Morton Machine Works, Inc., 957 A.2d 386, 393 (R.I.2008)). “Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact is evident from ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any,’ and the motion justice finds that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America, 947 A.2d 906, 909 (R.I.2008)); see also Rule 56(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

Additionally, this Court conducts a de novo review of a trial justice's ruling concerning the interpretation of a statute. State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435, 440 (R.I.2010) (citing State v. Burke, 811 A.2d 1158, 1167 (R.I.2002)). “It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Waterman v. Caprio, 983 A.2d 841, 844 (R.I.2009) (quoting Iselin v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I.2008)). As such, [t]he Legislature is presumed to have intended each word or provision of a statute to express a significant meaning, and the ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
202 cases
  • State v. Hazard
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • June 19, 2013
    ...a significant meaning, and the [C]ourt will give effect to every word, clause, or sentence, whenever possible,” Swain v. Estate of Tyre, 57 A.3d 283, 288 (R.I.2012) (quoting State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I.2009)), we cannot ignore its decision to include the term “blank gun” and the ......
  • Harrop v. R.I. Div. of Lotteries
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • December 5, 2019
    ...that he or she suffered an injury in fact resulting from the challenged action. See Key, 163 A.3d at 1169; Swain v. Estate of Tyre ex rel. Reilly, 57 A.3d 283, 289 (R.I. 2012); DePetrillo v. Belo Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 485, 492 (R.I. 2012); Watson v. Fox, 44 A.3d 130, 135 (R.I. 2012); In r......
  • Rose v. State
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • February 24, 2014
    ...(R.I.2012)). “[O]ur ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.” Swain v. Estate of Tyre ex rel. Reilly, 57 A.3d 283, 289 (R.I.2012) (quoting Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I.2001)).IIIDiscussion On appeal, Rose argues that the hearing ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT