57 A.3d 366 (Conn.App. 2012), 32930, State v. James

• Judge: ROBINSON, BEAR and DUPONT, Js.
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Joy P. JAMES.
• Docket Number: 32930.
• Citation: 139 Conn.App. 308,57 A.3d 366
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Date: 27 November 2012

Page 366

57 A.3d 366 (Conn.App. 2012)

139 Conn.App. 308

STATE of Connecticut

v.

Joy P. JAMES.

No. 32930.

Court of Appeals of Connecticut.

November 27, 2012

Argued Sept. 14, 2012.

Page 367

Carlton L. Hume, Hartord, with whom, on the brief, was Tina Georgiades, for the appellant (defendant).

Marjorie Allen Dauster, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin D. Lawlor, state's attorney, and John E. Barney, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROBINSON, BEAR and DUPONT, Js.

BEAR, J.

[139 Conn.App. 310] The defendant, Joy P. James, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to withdraw and vacate her guilty plea. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to withdraw and vacate her guilty plea because (1) its decision was based on an erroneous and overly narrow interpretation of General Statutes § 54-1j and (2) there is no evidence in the record that defense counsel or the court complied with the requirements of § 54-1j when the court conducted her plea canvass. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the present appeal. On November 16, 2009, the defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge that, on September 4, 2009, she committed larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124. The court canvassed the defendant regarding her plea and, after accepting the defendant's plea, sentenced her to three years incarceration, execution suspended, and three years of probation. Some time thereafter, the defendant obtained new defense counsel, who, on October 21, 2010, filed a motion to withdraw and vacate the defendant's guilty plea on the ground that her guilty plea was accepted in contravention of § 54-1j. On November 5, 2010, the court heard oral argument on the defendant's motion. At the conclusion of argument, the court denied the motion, concluding that the record contained no facts to demonstrate that the court's plea canvass did not comply with the requirements of § 54-1j. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

[139 Conn.App. 311] I

On appeal, the defendant first claims that the court erred in denying her motion to withdraw and vacate her guilty plea because the court's decision was based on an erroneous and overly narrow interpretation of § 54-1j. The defendant argues that § 54-1j sets forth three requirements: (1) the court must warn the defendant that there are possible immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea; (2) defense counsel must discuss with and advise the defendant regarding the possible immigration consequences; and (3) the court must canvass defense counsel as to whether defense counsel advised the defendant regarding the possible immigration consequences. The state argues that § 54-1j sets forth two requirements: (1) the court must address the defendant personally and (2) the court must determine that the defendant fully understands that immigration consequences may flow from entering a plea if the defendant is a noncitizen. We agree with the state.

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To address the defendant's first claim, that the court's decision was based on an erroneous and overly narrow interpretation of § 54-1j, we must examine the statutory language of § 54-1j. We begin by setting forth our well settled standard of review regarding statutory interpretation. " Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.... The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply....

" When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually [139 Conn.App. 312] does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 847, 937 A.2d 39 (2008).

Section 54-1j provides:

" (a) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from any defendant in any criminal proceeding unless the court first addresses the defendant personally and determines that the defendant fully understands that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States, conviction of the offense for which the defendant has been charged may have the consequences of deportation or removal from the United States, exclusion from readmission to the United States or denial of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United States. If the defendant has not discussed these possible consequences with the defendant's attorney, the court shall permit the defendant to do so prior to accepting the defendant's plea.

" (b) The defendant shall not be required at the time of the plea to disclose the defendant's legal status in the United States to the court.

" (c) If the court fails to address the defendant personally and determine that the defendant fully understands the possible consequences of the defendant's plea, as required in subsection (a) of this section, and the defendant not later than three years after the acceptance of [139 Conn.App. 313] the plea shows that the defendant's plea and conviction may have one of the enumerated consequences, the court, on the defendant's motion, shall vacate the judgment, and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and enter a plea of not guilty."

We conclude that the language of § 54-1j is plain and unambiguous. Section 54-1j (a) permits a court to accept a defendant's plea only if the court conducts a plea canvass during which: (1) the court personally addresses the defendant and (2) the court determines that the defendant understands fully the possible immigration consequences that may result from entering a plea.

The defendant also seems to argue that the statute contains the requirements that defense counsel advise the defendant of

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the possible immigration consequences of entering a plea and that the court inquire as to whether this advisement occurred. This argument is based on the following language of the statute: " If the defendant has not discussed these possible consequences with the defendant's attorney, the court shall permit the defendant to do so prior to accepting the defendant's plea." General Statutes § 54-1j (a). We do not read this language, however, as...