Welch v. Laney

Citation57 F.3d 1004
Decision Date07 July 1995
Docket NumberNo. 93-6427,93-6427
Parties130 Lab.Cas. P 33,252 Tobbie L. WELCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David LANEY, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cullman County, Michael Pruett, individually and in his official capacity as Chief Deputy Sheriff of Cullman County, Roy Gamble, in his official capacity as Cullman County Commissioner, Steve Hanson, in his official capacity as Commissioner, William Andrews, in his official capacity as Commissioner, a/k/a Bill Andrews, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Ann K. Norton, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, Birmingham, AL, for appellant.

George W. Royer, Jr., Samuel T. Russell, Sirote & Permutt, Huntsville, AL for appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and SMITH *, Senior Circuit Judge.

EDWARD S. SMITH, Senior Circuit Judge:

On July 20, 1992 Tobbie Welch filed suit against Cullman County Sheriff David Laney and Cullman County Deputy Sheriff Michael Pruett, in both their individual and official capacities, and against Cullman County Commissioners Gamble, Hanson, and Andrews in their official capacities only, alleging illegal sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206 (Equal Pay Act). In response to the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed with prejudice all claims except for the Sec. 1983 claims against Laney and Pruett in their individual capacities and the Equal Pay Act claim against Laney in his official capacity. As to these remaining claims, which were dismissed without prejudice, the court granted Welch leave to amend her complaint to properly allege a maintainable action. Welch filed a second amended complaint, which added Title VII claims against Laney. The district court determined that Welch's second amended complaint was defective, granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to Welch's second amended complaint and denied Welch's motion to amend the second amended complaint.

We reverse the dismissal of Welch's Sec. 1983 claims against the commissioners but affirm the dismissal of her Equal Pay Act claims against the commissioners. We reverse the dismissal of Welch's Sec. 1983 claims against Laney and Pruett in their official capacities to the extent she seeks prospective injunctive relief and reverse the dismissal of Welch's Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims against Laney in his official capacity. We affirm the dismissal of Welch's Equal Pay Act claims against Laney and Pruett in their individual capacities and affirm the dismissal of Welch's Sec. 1983 claim against Laney in his individual capacity.

Facts and Procedural History

At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Tobbie Welch was employed as a dispatcher for the Cullman County Sheriff's Department and reported directly to Cullman County Sheriff David Laney. Welch alleges that in October of 1991 Sheriff Laney hired a male employee into the position of dispatcher at an initial salary greater than the salary being paid to Welch. Welch further alleges that when she approached Laney to ask why the new dispatcher was being paid a higher salary than she, she was told to "mind her own business." When Welch complained to the County Commissioners, Sheriff Laney and Chief Deputy Pruett about the higher salary being paid to the new male employee, she allegedly was criticized and subjected to adverse treatment because of her complaints.

Welch filed her original complaint on July 20, 1992 and filed a substantially identical amended complaint on July 21. The amended complaint named Sheriff Laney and Deputy Sheriff Pruett as defendants in their individual and official capacities, and named the commissioners as defendants in their official capacities only.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The court dismissed Welch's complaint without prejudice to filing an amended complaint to more specifically plead facts with regard to Sheriff Laney and Deputy Pruett's liability in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and with regard to Sheriff Laney's liability in his official capacity under the Equal Pay Act. The court dismissed the balance of Welch's claims with prejudice. The claims dismissed with prejudice consisted of: 1) Sec. 1983 and Equal Pay Act claims against the Commissioners; 2) Sec. 1983 claim against Deputy Pruett in his official capacity; 3) Equal Pay Act claims against Deputy Pruett in his individual and official capacity; 4) Sec. 1983 claim against Sheriff Laney in his official capacity; and 5) Equal Pay Act claim against Sheriff Laney in his individual capacity.

Welch timely filed a second amended complaint on September 3, 1992. The caption of the second amended complaint stated that the defendant Sheriff Laney was being sued "in his individual capacity as an agent for the Cullman County Sheriff's Department." The body of the complaint detailed Sheriff Laney's status as a defendant as "an employer under the Equal Pay Act, ... as an individual under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and as an agent/employer pursuant [to] Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991."

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Welch's complaint, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim, that by suing Laney in his capacity as the agent of the Cullman County Sheriff's Department Welch had failed to assert a claim against an entity legally capable of being sued, and that if Welch's claims against Laney were construed to constitute claims against him in his official capacity, her claims for money damages were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Welch subsequently filed a motion to amend once again her second amended complaint. The district court denied Welch's motion to amend and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing the entirety of Welch's complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

Where the district court dismisses the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim, "[w]e must determine whether, considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[ ], it appears beyond doubt that [she] can prove no set of facts that would entitle [her] to relief." Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

Section 1983

We first consider Welch's Sec. 1983 claims. Welch's first amended complaint alleged that Sheriff Laney, Deputy Pruett and Commissioners Gamble, Hanson, and Andrews were liable to Welch for illegal sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The complaint alleged that Sheriff Laney and Deputy Sheriff Pruett were liable in both their official and individual capacities, and that the three commissioners were liable in their official capacities only.

The district court dismissed Welch's Sec. 1983 claims against Sheriff Laney and Deputy Pruett in their official capacities with prejudice, but dismissed the Sec. 1983 claims against Laney and Pruett in their individual capacities without prejudice. In her second amended complaint, Welch renewed her Sec. 1983 claim against Laney in his individual capacity. 1 The district court dismissed the entire second amended complaint with prejudice.

We reverse the dismissal of Welch's Sec. 1983 claims against Laney and Pruett in their official capacities to the extent that she may seek prospective injunctive relief but not retroactive money damages. We affirm the dismissal of Welch's Sec. 1983 claim against Laney in his individual capacity.

The district court erred in dismissing Welch's Sec. 1983 claims against Laney and Pruett in their official capacities to the extent that she may seek prospective injunctive relief. Welch's action against the Sheriff and Chief Deputy Sheriff in their official capacities imposes liability on the entity they represent, and not on them as individuals. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 873, 877-78, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985). The determination of the entity represented by Sheriff Laney and Deputy Pruett for purposes of determining immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is determined by reference to state law. Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.1990). Alabama law holds that a sheriff is a state, rather than a county, official for purposes of immunity from suit. Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442 (Ala.1987). Alabama law also holds that a sheriff's deputy is legally an extension of the sheriff and likewise is immune from suit. Carr, 916 F.2d at 1526. Laney and Pruett are thus state officials for purposes of immunity from suit.

Based on the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Amerson, this court stated in Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1475 (11th Cir.1989) that although the Eleventh Amendment insulates states from suit in Federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not insulate state officials acting in their official capacities from suit in federal court, at least to the extent the complainant seeks prospective injunctive relief. Because Laney and Pruett are state officials for purposes of immunity from suit, to the extent Welch's complaint sought prospective injunctive relief under Sec. 1983 against Sheriff Laney and Deputy Pruett in their official capacities, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint.

The district court did not err in dismissing Welch's Sec. 1983 claim against Sheriff Laney in his individual capacity. Welch had three opportunities to properly plead a Sec. 1983 claim against Sheriff Laney in his individual capacity: the original complaint, first...

To continue reading

Request your trial
157 cases
  • Wallace v. City of Montgomery
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • 30 Julio 1996
    ... ... that "official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading action against an entity of which an officer is an agent"); Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1007 (11th Cir.1995); Farred v. Hicks, 915 F.2d 1530, 1532 (11th Cir.1990). The Supreme Court of the United States has ... ...
  • Macintyre v. Moore
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • 28 Septiembre 2018
    ... ... on the plain language of the statute." Fletcher , 618 F.Supp.2d at 721 ; Wisniewski , 2009 WL 10701744, at *7 (finding Mitchell and Welch v. Laney , 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995) unpersuasive "primarily because they do not account for the FLSA's plain language"); see also Teasdell ... ...
  • Attwood v. Clemons
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida
    • 17 Marzo 2021
    ... ... "[T]he complaint itself ... controls the identification of the parties and the capacity in which they are sued." Welch v. Laney , 57 F.3d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1995). But this Court "may not simply rely on the characterization of the parties in the complaint, but ... ...
  • Galbreath v. Hale Cnty., CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00308-CG-N
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama
    • 15 Septiembre 2015
    ... ... capacity is the same as a suit against the entity of which the officer is an agent.' (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Welch v ... Laney , 57 F.3d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that 'where a plaintiff brings an action against Page 16 a public official in his official ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
8 books & journal articles
  • Family and Medical Leave Act
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Employment Law. Volume 2 - 2016 Part V. Discrimination In Employment
    • 27 Julio 2016
    ...no control over [a female dispatcher’s] employment and [therefore did] not qualify as [an] employer under the act” Citing Welch v. Laney , 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995). Because the FLSA’s definition is almost identical to that used in the FMLA, the court found that the prior case law was c......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Employment Law. Volume 2 - 2016 Part VIII. Selected Litigation Issues
    • 27 Julio 2016
    ...33:4.A.4 Welch v. Doss Aviation, Inc. , 978 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, no pet.), §§3:3.A.4, 3:5.B.3, 28:3.C.2 Welch v. Laney , 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995), App. 25-2 Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas , 84 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1996), §20:4.A.5.c Wellman v. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc ., 20......
  • Family and Medical Leave Act
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Employment Law. Volume 2 - 2014 Part V. Discrimination in employment
    • 16 Agosto 2014
    ...her FMLA claim. On appeal, the 25-213 The Family anD meDiCal leave aCT A pp . 25-2 as [an] employer under the act” Citing Welch v. Laney , 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995). Because the FLSA’s definition is almost identical to that used in the FMLA, the court found that the prior case law was c......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Employment Law. Volume 2 - 2014 Part VIII. Selected litigation issues
    • 16 Agosto 2014
    ...33:4.A.4 Welch v. Doss Aviation, Inc. , 978 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, no pet.), §§3:3.A.4, 3:5.B.3, 28:3.C.2 Welch v. Laney , 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995), App. 25-2 Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas , 84 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1996), §20:4.A.5.c Wellpoint Health Networks v. Superior Cou......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT