Asplundh Mfg. Div., a Div. of Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Benton Harbor Engineering

Decision Date20 June 1995
Docket Number94-1201,No. 94-1201,No. 94-1095,Nos. 94-1095,94-1095,s. 94-1095
Parties, 42 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 597 ASPLUNDH MANUFACTURING DIVISION, a DIVISION OF ASPLUNDH TREE EXPERT CO.; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA. Asplundh Manufacturing Division and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, Appellants inv. BENTON HARBOR ENGINEERING, Benton Harbor Engineering, Appellant in
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Basil A. DiSipio (argued), Thomas Finarelli, Lavin, Coleman, Finarelli & Gray, Philadelphia, PA, for Asplundh Mfg. Div., a Div. of Asplundh Tree Expert Co. and Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh.

John M. Corcoran (argued), Robert G. Kelly, Jr., Kelly, McLaughlin & Foster, Philadelphia, PA, for Benton Harbor Engineering.

Before: BECKER, ALITO, Circuit Judges, and GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. *

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECKER, Circuit Judge.

The defendant, Benton Harbor Engineering ("Benton Harbor"), appeals from an order of the district court denying its motion for a new trial, and also from a judgment against it on a contribution claim brought by Asplundh Tree Expert Co. ("Asplundh") and by National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh ("National Union"), Asplundh's liability insurance carrier. Asplundh and National Union sought to recover some or all of their costs in settling a wrongful death suit brought against Asplundh by the estate of Jeffrey Sackerson, who was killed when an Asplundh aerial lift in which he was working fractured (Benton Harbor having manufactured the component part of the aerial lift which allegedly failed). Benton Harbor's principal argument on appeal is that the district court erred in permitting Asplundh to adduce lay opinion testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701 regarding what appear to be complex technical issues concerning the cause of the metal failure.

Rule 701, which contemplates admission of lay opinions rationally based on personal knowledge so as to be helpful to the trier of fact, was primarily designed to allow lay individuals to express opinions that are in reality only a shorthand statement of fact. However, this court, like other courts, has commonly interpreted the rule to permit individuals not qualified as experts, but possessing experience or specialized knowledge about particular things, to testify about technical matters that might have been thought to lie within the exclusive province of experts. This flexible, arguably expansive, interpretation of Rule 701 appears to be consistent with its text. Where, however, a party proffers a witness expressing an opinion on matters such as the design of hydraulic cylinders or the cause of metal failure, the trial court must be rigorous in assuring that the lay witness satisfies the strictures of Rule 701. In particular, the proponent of technical lay opinion testimony must show that the testimony is based on sufficient experience or specialized knowledge and also show a sufficient connection between such knowledge or experience and the lay opinion such that the testimony may be fairly considered to be "rationally based on the perception of the witness" and truly "helpful" to the jury.

Given the standard we articulate today for the admission of lay opinion evidence of a technical nature, we conclude that the district court's ruling was based on an impermissible interpretation of Rule 701, because the court failed to examine with sufficient rigor whether the testimony in question was informed by sufficient experience or specialized knowledge. More particularly, in order to satisfy the rationally derived and helpfulness standards of Rule 701, Asplundh needed to demonstrate that the witness possessed sufficient experience or specialized knowledge which qualified him to offer a technical opinion regarding the cause of metal failure and the design of hydraulic cylinders. While a lay witness could acquire this additional insight either by formal education or practical experience, it appears the witness at issue simply possessed neither. Because the admission of the testimony was not harmless, we will reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

Although Asplundh and National Union cross appeal, arguing that the district court erred in failing to award prejudgment interest, we do not, in view of our result, reach this question.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Jeffrey Sackerson was killed while operating an aerial lift, manufactured by Asplundh, which was mounted onto a truck chassis and used in tree trimming operations. At the time, Sackerson was employed by the city of Portland, Oregon, which owned, operated, and maintained the aerial lift. When Sackerson's estate filed a wrongful death suit against Asplundh, Asplundh and its insurer, National Union, brought a third-party action seeking contribution and indemnity from Benton Harbor, the manufacturer of the lower boom cylinder containing the piston rod which allegedly fractured and caused the accident. The jury returned a verdict for Asplundh and National Union, finding Asplundh eighty percent responsible and Benton Harbor twenty percent responsible. The district court entered judgment for Asplundh and National Union in the amount of $185,881.60, twenty percent of the Sackerson settlement. Post-trial motions were filed by both parties. Asplundh and National Union sought prejudgment interest, and Benton Harbor sought a new trial based on alleged error in admitting the lay opinion testimony of Michael Jones. Both motions were denied by the district court. These appeals followed.

Jones, the witness whose testimony is at issue, had been fleet maintenance supervisor for the City of Portland for more than ten years at the time of the accident. Jones's responsibilities covered all city equipment, including the Asplundh aerial lift. He supervised between sixty and one hundred employees six or seven city repair shops, and the maintenance of 1385 pieces of equipment.

After the accident, Jones and his employees took apart and inspected the aerial lift's boom assembly in the City of Portland's shop. During this inspection, Jones observed the rod from a distance of about fifteen inches. In his deposition, Jones stated his opinion that a component of the lower boom assembly--the rod end--had fractured. The rod end was a threaded metal rod that was screwed into a threaded metal casing called the rod cylinder. A hole was drilled through both the casing and the rod end, and a metal pin was inserted through the hole. See App. at 315.

Jones expressed the opinion that the fracture was caused by metal fatigue and was attributable to the design of the rod end. Id. at 161, 167. Specifically, he stated that there was a "problem" because Benton Harbor's design called for a hole to be drilled through the rod end at a point where it was threaded. Id. Moreover, Jones noted that the cylinder rod had oxidized around a portion of the break which was a different, duller color than the rod's fresh break. From this, Jones concluded that the break occurred in stages. Jones also related that the break was in a threaded area where a hole had been drilled through the rod. Jones concluded that the rod fatigued inside the rod eye, causing the accident, stating that the stop block on the lower boom cylinder rods did not contribute to the accident. 1

In particular, Jones attributed the accident "to the way the rod was drilled through, and the fact that the rod eye was screwed on on a threaded--two threaded surfaces." App. at 167; App. at 160-61 ("The reasons [for the accident] are two: one, the hole through the pin caused ... the rod to be weakened and, two, the threads ... on the rod itself caused the breaking point. They were sharp, and it broke right at the point where all of those things intersected. That was the problem. There's no doubt in my mind about it...."). He questioned the appropriateness of this rod end design, stating that before his examination he "had no idea that this thing was threaded on and then drilled and pinned, up to that point," since he "had never seen a cylinder that size configured that way." Id. Jones reiterated that he "never saw other cylinders configured that way," and that he "kn[e]w how other cylinders were configured differently," since he was a production control manager for a company that produced hydraulic cylinders. Id. Moreover, Jones asserted expertise in this area, declaring, "I think I know how to make hydraulic cylinders." Id.

Key portions of Jones's deposition were read to the jury over Benton Harbor's objection. The district court overruled the objections to the reading of the deposition testimony, allowing Jones to testify as a lay witness expressing an opinion under Rule 701. FED.R.EVID. 701. Benton Harbor argues that Jones's technical deposition testimony is not the type of lay opinion evidence properly admissible under Rule 701.

Our review is plenary, since the district court's ruling turns on an interpretation of Rule 701, which would permit the admission of technical lay opinion evidence in this case. A determination regarding the scope of evidence properly admitted under a Federal Rule of Evidence is a question of law subject to plenary review. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm. 911 F.2d 941, 945 (3d Cir.1990); U.S. v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir.1989) ("To the extent that the district court's admission of [evidence] was based on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we exercise plenary review.").

II. The Rule 701 Jurisprudence
A.

In determining whether Jones's opinion testimony was properly admitted by the district court, we must determine the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which provides:

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)...

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