Union Pacific RR v. TRONA VALLEY FCU

• Decision Date: 04 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-263.,01-263.
• Citation: 57 P.3d 1203,2002 WY 165
• Parties: UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, Appellant (Garnishee), v. TRONA VALLEY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Appellee (Judgment Creditor).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

57 P.3d 1203

2002 WY 165

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, Appellant (Garnishee), v. TRONA VALLEY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Appellee (Judgment Creditor).

No. 01-263.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

November 4, 2002.

Stan Decker Cannon of Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich & Stith, Rock Springs, Representing Appellant.

Stephen K. Palmer of Palmer & LaBuda, P.C., Rock Springs, Representing Appellee.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN¹, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

HILL, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Union Pacific Railroad (Union Pacific) appeals a district court judgment that it improperly calculated the amount to be withheld from an employee's paycheck to satisfy a judgment debt by failing to deduct a child support garnishment when determining disposable earnings. Union Pacific contends that deducting the child support garnishment would result in a violation of the Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671 through 1677, and Wyoming law. We agree and reverse.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Union Pacific sets forth the following statement of the issues:

1. Whether a person who is garnished for both child support and a consumer judgment debt may have more than twenty-five (25%) percent of his or her disposable income garnished from his or her wages.

2. Whether the district court erred by making its ruling based upon what it believed was an official form, "Garnishee's Answer to Writ of Continuing Garnishment" sanctioned and approved by the Supreme Court, when it was not.

The judgment creditor, Trona Valley Federal Credit Union (Trona Valley FCU), sets forth the matter under review as a single issue:

Whether court ordered child support payments properly qualify as an item "that is required by law to be withheld" in calculating disposable earnings pursuant to W.S. § 1-15-501.

After filing its brief in this appeal, Trona Valley FCU raised the question of Union Pacific's standing in a motion to dismiss. We will consider this issue in our discussion below.

FACTS

[¶ 3] The dispute in this case centers on the proper treatment of child support garnishment payments when calculating the amount to be withheld from an employee to satisfy a judgment debt. When presented with a request for a garnishment, an employer fills out a form entitled, "Garnishee's Answer to Writ of Continuing Garnishment." The form is a standardized document that resides in a database managed by this Court. A committee of county judges (now circuit judges) developed the form, and this Court facilitated its placement in the database, which is available to the circuit courts for use in an electronic format. The form contains a section that allows the garnishee to calculate the disposable earnings of an employee from which the amount of garnishment to be withheld can be determined. To calculate disposable earnings, an employee's gross earnings are reduced by certain exemptions. On the form the following exemptions are listed: (1) federal income tax withheld; (2) FICA taxes withheld (or in this case railroad taxes because Union Pacific is the employer); (3) mandatory retirement exempted by federal law; (4) disability contributions exempted by federal law; (5) other amounts exempted by federal law; (6) court ordered child support payments withheld; and (7) other amounts withheld. The total of these exemptions are deducted from the employee's gross earnings to arrive at his disposable earnings. The form sets forth a chart for determining how much of the employee's disposable income should be withheld each pay period to satisfy the garnishment. The chart indicates the maximum amount that may be withheld from an employee. When the employee's disposable earnings exceed a certain minimum level, then a maximum of 25% of his disposable earnings may be withheld.

[¶ 4] In this case, Trona Valley FCU obtained a judgment against a Union Pacific employee for $8,919.06. In May 2000, Trona Valley FCU filed a Request for Writ of Continuing Garnishment. Union Pacific responded by filing the Garnishee's Answer to Writ of Continuing Garnishment form. The employee already had a child support garnishment against him. In filling out the form, however, Union Pacific specifically omitted the child support garnishment when calculating exemptions. Union Pacific's rationale was that including the child support garnishment with the exemptions would result in the total amount being withheld from the employee's paycheck, exceeding the 25% maximum set forth in the form which was based on federal and Wyoming law. Instead, Union Pacific calculated what 25% of the employee's disposable earnings would be and then subtracted the child support garnishment leaving the remainder as the amount garnished to go towards satisfying Trona Valley FCU's judgment.

[¶ 5] Trona Valley FCU objected to Union Pacific's methodology. The district court held a hearing and agreed with Trona Valley. Specifically, the court concluded that any child support garnishments should be deducted from gross earnings because a deduction from disposable earnings could result in a judgment creditor being unable to recover if the child support garnishment exceeded 25% of the debtor's disposable earnings.² Union Pacific now brings this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 6] When a matter has been the subject of a bench trial before the district court, we review the factual determinations under a clearly erroneous standard and the legal conclusions de novo. Kenyon v. Abel, 2001 WY 135, ¶ 6, 36 P.3d 1161, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Wyo.1999)).

[¶ 7] The issues raised in this appeal require application of rules relating to statutory interpretation, which is a question of law that is reviewed by this Court de novo.

As we have noted: "In interpreting statutes, we primarily determine the legislature's intent. If the language is sufficiently clear, we do not resort to rules of construction. We apply our general rule that we look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous." Kirbens v. Wyoming State Board of Medicine, 992 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Wyo.1999) (citations omitted). We construe together all parts of the statutes in pari materia, and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, we consider and construe in harmony all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose. Thunderbasin Land, Livestock & Investment Co. v. County of Laramie County, 5 P.3d 774, 779 (Wyo. 2000).

When the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and consistent.

State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo.1983). When the legislature adopts a statute, we presume it does so with full knowledge of the existing state of the law with reference to the statute's subject matter. Thunderbasin Land, Livestock & Investment Co., 5 P.3d at 780.

All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to the decisions of the courts.

Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 1976); see also Fosler v. Collins, 13 P.3d 686, 689 (Wyo.2000).

Albertson's, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 2001 WY 98, ¶ 7, 33 P.3d 161, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 8] We begin our review with the question of standing. Trona Valley filed a Motion to Dismiss in this case raising Union Pacific's standing to maintain this action for the first time in these proceedings. Standing "is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude." Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 154 (Wyo.1996) (quoting Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo.1992)).

At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating. * * * A litigant is said to have standing when he has a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." This personal stake requirement has been described in Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at stake.

Id. Trona Valley FCU contends that Union Pacific has no interest or stake in its employee's loss of income and has no injury that could be remedied by this Court. Initially, Union Pacific complains about the timeliness of Trona Valley's motion to dismiss: The question of standing was not an issue before the trial court, nor was it raised in the parties' appellate briefs. On the merits of the issue, Union Pacific insists that it has standing because, as garnishee, it is accountable to the court issuing the garnishment order and, under certain circumstances, may be held liable for its reply to the writ of garnishment.

[¶ 9] Historically, we have addressed the question of when standing may be raised in only a handful of cases. Generally, we have stated that since standing "goes to the existence of a claim for relief and is jurisdictional in nature, it can be raised at any point in the procedure." Matter of Various Water Rights in Lake DeSmet Reservoir, 623 P.2d 764, 767 (Wyo.1981) (citing Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal.2d 344, 254 P.2d 6 (1953)); see also Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' School, 813 P.2d 185, 205 (Wyo.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032, 112 S.Ct. 872, 116 L.Ed.2d 777 (1992). On at least one occasion, however, we have refused to address the issue of standing because of the plaintiff's failure to raise it in the district court. Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 154 (Wyo.1996). In this case, it is readily...