Hagan v. Rogers
| Decision Date | 19 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 07-1412.,07-1412. |
| Citation | 570 F.3d 146 |
| Parties | Lewis Ira HAGAN; James Hemphill; Efraim Esquilin; Christopher Mark; William Weiss; Christos Papacristos; Louis George Johnston, Jr.; Tymil Mason; Claude Franklin; Peter Braun; Oliver Mason; Toboris Wright; Ronald Young; Allan Lovenson, Appellants v. Grace ROGERS, Administrator; George Hayman, Commissioner New Jersey State Prisons; Dr. Hochberg, Doctor Employed By Correctional Medical Services; Correctional Medical Services, Inc.; Bernard Goodwin, Asst. Administrator. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Lewis Ira Hagan, James Hemphill, Efraim Esquilin, William Weiss, Christos Papacristos, Louis George Johnston, Jr., Tymil Mason, Claude Franklin, Peter Braun, Toboris Wright, Allan Lovenson, Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center, Avenel, NJ, pro se.
Christopher Mark, Rockview SCI, Bellefonte, PA, pro se.
Oliver Mason, Newark, NJ, pro se.
Ronald Young, Ledgewood, NJ, pro se.
Joel McHugh, Esq. [Argued], Nancy Winkelman, Esq., Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, PA, for Amicus Counsel on behalf of Appellants Lewis Ira Hagan; James Hemphill; Efraim Esquilin; Christopher Mark; William Weiss; Christos Papacristos; Louis George Johnston, Jr.; Tymil Mason; Claude Franklin; Peter Braun; Oliver Mason; Toboris Wright; Ronald Young; Allan Lovenson.
Larry R. Etzweiler, Esq., [Argued], Keith S. Massey, Jr., Esq., Office of Attorney General of New Jersey, Division of Law, Richard J. Hughes, Trenton, NJ, for Defendant-Amicus Curiae State of New Jersey.
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
The central question before this Court is whether it is clear and manifest that Congress, through the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, intended to remove prisoners from the definition of "Persons" permitted to join claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20. We answer this question in the negative.
Appellants are fourteen state inmates of the Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center in Avenel, New Jersey ("ADTC"). The prisoners jointly filed a single complaint, on behalf of themselves and a purported class, alleging that officials associated with the facility violated their constitutional rights by failing to contain and treat a serious and contagious skin condition. The prisoners requested in forma pauperis ("IFP") status and the appointment of counsel. Before the Defendants had been served, the District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed thirteen of the prisoners sua sponte, with leave to file amended individual complaints, after concluding that prisoners were barred from permissive joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 ("Rule 20") The Court also denied class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"). Appellants challenge both decisions on appeal.
This appeal presents several issues. First, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to review the District Court's order denying joinder, and if so, whether IFP prisoners are barred from Rule 20 joinder as a matter of law. We are also asked to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over the District Court's denial of class certification, and if so, whether the denial was proper.
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the District Court's order denying joinder, and that IFP prisoners are not categorically barred from joining as plaintiffs under Rule 20. Furthermore, filing fees should be assessed against any plaintiff permitted to join under Rule 20 as though each prisoner was proceeding individually. Finally, we elect to exercise jurisdiction over the class certification question, and conclude that the District Court's explanation for denying certification was inadequate. We will accordingly remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellants filed a single pro se complaint on October 20, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, against officials associated with the ADTC, a state facility for the detention and treatment of convicted sex offenders. The prisoners allege that the Defendants violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to address the threat of a serious and undiagnosed contagious skin disease, possibly scabies, spreading through the facility. Appellants also moved to certify a class of all persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). The prisoners requested IFP status and applied for the appointment of counsel.
Before Defendants had been served, the District Court issued an order sua sponte on January 25, 2007, dismissing without prejudice all Plaintiffs, except Lewis Hagan, upon concluding that permissive joinder was unavailable to IFP prisoner litigants. The Court suggested that Rule 20 joinder may be preempted by certain provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"). Pub.L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (Apr. 26, 1996). The Court was also persuaded by the reasoning of other district courts that had determined that general circumstances of incarceration render joint prisoner litigation impractical. The Court did not discuss whether the Plaintiffs satisfied the basic requirements of joinder under the Rule, nor did it identify any circumstances of incarceration that rendered Plaintiffs' joinder impractical. The Court ordered a new case to be opened for each dismissed Plaintiff, and gave each prisoner 30 days to file an amended complaint in order to proceed individually. The Court deferred consideration of the requests for IFP status and for the appointment of counsel pending the filing of the amended complaints.
In the same sua sponte order, the District Court also denied Appellants' motion to proceed as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). The Court identified concerns regarding the typicality of the named Plaintiffs' claims and the prisoners' disparate factual circumstances, particularly with regard to medical needs and injury. The Court also reasoned that a pro se prisoner litigant could not represent a class of fellow inmates.
None of the Plaintiffs filed amended complaints within the requisite 30 days, but all joined in appealing to this Court for review of both the joinder and class certification rulings. On February 1, 2007, Appellants also filed a motion to stay all action relating to the District Court's January 25 order, and asserted their belief that the Court's applications of Rules 20 and 23 were incorrect. On May 4, 2007, after the original 30-day period for amendment had expired, the District Court granted a stay and stated in its order that Appellants would have 30 days to file amended complaints after we completed our review of their appeal.
We assigned counsel as amicus curiae on behalf of Appellants and asked counsel to address the following questions: (1) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the District Court's order denying joinder; (2) if so, whether prisoners are barred from Rule 20 joinder as a matter of law; (3) if prisoners are not barred from permissive joinder, how court fees should be assessed among the joint plaintiffs; and (4) whether the District Court improperly denied class certification. Although Defendants have not yet been served, we invited the Attorney General of New Jersey to similarly respond to these questions through an amicus brief, and she has done so. We address each of the questions presented below.
Appellants seek review of the District Court's order denying joinder and dismissing all claimants except Hagan without prejudice, and with leave to amend. The only arguable basis for this Court to review the decision is 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which authorizes appellate jurisdiction over final orders of the district courts. Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 667 (3d Cir.1991). "A final order is one that `ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.'" Id. at 668 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)).
While an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is normally not final within the meaning of § 1291, "a dismissal with leave to amend will be treated as a final order if the plaintiff has elected to stand upon the original complaint." Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir.2007) (internal quotation omitted). Appellants argue that the order was final because the prisoners chose to stand on their initial complaint, rather than filing amended complaints to proceed individually. Respondents counter that the prisoners did not stand on their complaint because they requested and received a stay of the District Court's order pending the resolution of this appeal.
We cannot discern from our prior cases a clear rule for determining when a party has elected to stand on his or her complaint. In Frederico, we determined that a plaintiff elected to stand on her complaint where at no time during the proceedings did she seek to correct the purported pleading deficiencies, but instead repeatedly asserted that her complaint was sufficient as filed. Id. at 192. In Batoff v. State Farm Insurance Co., 977 F.2d 848 (3d Cir.1992), we determined that we had jurisdiction when a plaintiff did not amend his dismissed complaint within the 30 days allotted by the district court. Id. at 851 n. 5. We were also satisfied that certain plaintiffs in Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024 (3d Cir.1991), elected to stand on their dismissed claims after they renounced, by letter briefs filed with this Court, any intention to reinstitute proceedings against the defendants at issue. Id. at 1031.
There is no question that none of the prisoners amended their complaints within the 30 days ordered by the District Court. All of the Plaintiffs joined the instant appeal, and there is no evidence that any ever wavered from their argument that th...
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