Wycoff v. Brewer, 77-1586

Decision Date12 April 1978
Docket NumberNo. 77-1586,77-1586
Citation572 F.2d 1260
PartiesSteven WYCOFF, Appellant, v. Lou V. BREWER, Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary, Norman Ellandson, Director of the Iowa Bureau of Adult Corrections, and Kevin Burns, Commissioner of the Iowa Department of Social Services, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Prisoner Assistance Clinic, Iowa City, Iowa, on briefs for appellant.

Stephen C. Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, argued for appellees; Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, on brief.

Before BRIGHT, STEPHENSON and HENLEY, Circuit Judges.

HENLEY, Circuit Judge.

This is an action for injunctive relief and damages brought by Steven Wycoff in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against Lou V. Brewer, Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary (hereinafter at times called simply the Penitentiary), and against Warden Brewer's superiors, Norman Ellandson, Director of the Iowa Bureau of Adult Corrections, and Kevin Burns, Commissioner of the Iowa Department of Social Services. 1 The plaintiff claims that during 1973 and 1974 while he was an inmate of the Penitentiary prison authorities acting under color of state law deprived him of rights guaranteed to him by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which amendment incorporates by judicial construction certain of the first ten amendments to the Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff complains that between July 2, 1973 and August 22, 1974 he was unconstitutionally confined in "administrative segregation," and that part of that time was spent under extremely rigorous conditions in "strip cells." Jurisdiction was properly predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The complaint in the case represented a consolidation of five previous complaints filed by or on behalf of plaintiff. It was filed in 1975 on plaintiff's behalf by personnel of the College of Law of the University of Iowa and was assigned to the docket of Chief (now Senior) District Judge William C. Hanson. The defendants answered in due course and denied that plaintiff was entitled to relief.

Judge Hanson held an evidentiary hearing in the case in February, 1976. Thereafter full post-trial briefs were filed and on April 21, 1977 Judge Hanson filed extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. He found that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief either by way of injunction or by way of damages and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.

The suit was filed and prosecuted as an individual and not as a class action. In the course of the argument before us it developed that plaintiff is no longer an inmate of the Penitentiary, having been transferred to the Missouri State Penitentiary. In view of that development, his claim for injunctive relief has become moot. It is necessary, however, for us to consider whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as to all of the defendants to the extent that plaintiff sought pecuniary damages. 2

I.

By way of introduction we will make some general statements about the Penitentiary and about conditions and practices that prevailed therein during 1973 and 1974. Hopefully, not all of those conditions and practices prevail today. 3

The Penitentiary is located at or near Fort Madison in Lee County, Iowa, which is in the extreme southeastern part of the State. It has maximum security facilities in which certain classifications of inmates are confined, including two facilities referred to in the record as Cellhouse 19 and Cellhouse 20.

If an inmate of the Penitentiary behaves himself and presents no problems, he resides in the general prison population. In that status he is required to observe prison rules and regulations and to perform certain work. However, he is entitled to certain privileges and opportunities and he receives some monetary compensation for the work that he performs.

On the other hand, an inmate who violates prison rules or who is a security risk may find himself removed from general population and placed in administrative segregation or some other type of solitary confinement. In his findings in this case the district judge defined administrative segregation as follows:

During the pertinent period, the term 'administrative segregation' meant confinement to an individual cell 24 hours a day, except for showers and visitation. Prisoners in administrative segregation were not permitted to work and visitation periods and canteen access were restricted. The administrative segregation cells were similar to those of cells in the general population; that is, personal possessions were allowed and prisoners received library privileges and regular meals. Finally, inmates in administrative segregation received $6.50 per month 'idle pay.' 4

In 1973 and 1974 an inmate confined in administrative segregation was not as well off as an inmate in general population, but his situation was infinitely to be preferred to that of an inmate whose conduct caused him to be confined in a strip cell. In such a cell the inmate was confined completely nude; the cell was or could be darkened; the inmate had no bedding or cover. While the cell contained a sink and a commode, in some circumstances the inmate was not provided with toilet articles or toilet paper. He did receive three meals a day and could help himself to water from the sink in the cell. An extremely recalcitrant convict might be confined in such a cell and under such conditions for a prolonged or substantial period of time. 5

During the relevant period Iowa prison authorities seem to have recognized at least in a general way that convicts are entitled to communicate with the courts and with attorneys. That recognition, however, was characterized by substantial restrictions on the exercise of the right just mentioned.

Prior to July, 1974 inmates were not permitted to send sealed letters addressed to anyone, including judges and lawyers, outside the prison. Outgoing letters had to be submitted unsealed and were subject to inspection and reading by prison personnel. In July, 1974, following the opinion of the Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), the rule was changed to the extent that inmates were permitted to correspond with courts and counsel without interference or inspection by prison staff.

As to incoming mail, if a letter to an inmate from a lawyer or a judge was not marked "attorney-client" or "court-client," it would be opened in the absence of the addressee, checked for contraband and read. If a letter was marked as indicated, it would be opened by prison personnel only in the presence of the addressee and checked for contraband; presumably, it would not be read.

There was also a restriction on the ability of an inmate to confer with an attorney by telephone. If an inmate desired to make a call to his attorney, he first had to obtain the permission of his "counselor," and if permission was granted the duration of the call might be limited by prison authorities to what they considered to be a reasonable length of time.

II.

Plaintiff's complaint contained three counts.

In the first count plaintiff complained that on July 2, 1973 he was removed summarily from general population and placed in administrative segregation in Cellhouse 19 without any prior or subsequent hearing with respect to the episode of July 2 that caused him to be placed in segregation, and that thereafter misconduct reports against him were filed with respect to which he received no hearings.

Plaintiff alleged that the denials of hearings deprived him of procedural due process of law. He prayed for an injunction against being placed again in administrative segregation without an appropriate hearing, and he also prayed that the defendants be enjoined from using the misconduct reports for any purpose and from placing them in plaintiff's parole file. Plaintiff also asked that he be awarded "back pay," apparently measured by the difference between the "idle time" for which he was paid and what he would have earned had he been in general population.

Count II relates to the period of time between October 22 and December 7, 1973 during which plaintiff was confined in a strip cell in Cellhouse 20. He alleges that the conditions of confinement there amounted to a constitutionally prohibited cruel and unusual punishment, and he also alleges that during this period of time he was unconstitutionally denied the means of communicating with counsel or with the courts.

Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, actual damages in the sum of $2700.00 and punitive damages in the sum of $5,000.00.

In Count III plaintiff complained of official interferences with his correspondence with counsel and with the courts and with the interruption of a particular telephone call with an attorney. He sought injunctive relief, actual damages amounting to $12,700.00 and punitive damages in the sum of $25,000.00.

III.

As has been said, the district court made detailed findings of fact in the case, which findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous. Indeed, there is little dispute about the facts themselves.

From the record as a whole it is clear that plaintiff is a sociopathic criminal who is violent and dangerous and who is a strong man physically. Prior to July 2, 1973 he was confined in the Penitentiary as a member of general population. However, on that date he ran amuck, engaged in assaultive conduct and destroyed or damaged state property. When finally subdued, plaintiff was summarily placed in administrative segregation pending further investigation of his conduct, including a determination by the County Attorney of Lee County as to whether plaintiff should be charged with substantive offenses under the criminal laws of Iowa. Plaintiff...

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