Balthazar v. Superior Court of Com. of Massachusetts, No. 77-1159

Citation573 F.2d 698
Decision Date04 April 1978
Docket NumberNo. 77-1159
PartiesRichard L. BALTHAZAR, Petitioner, Appellee, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF the COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Respondent, Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Barbara A. H. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Crim. Appellate Section, Boston, Mass., with whom Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., and Stephen R. Delinsky, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Crim. Bureau, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellant.

Susan J. Baronoff, Boston, Mass., for appellee.

Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, WOLLENBERG, * District Judge.

WOLLENBERG, District Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issuing a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petitioner's challenge to his conviction under Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 272, § 35 for having committed the "unnatural and lascivious acts" of fellatio and oral-anal contact was sustained on the basis that the statute as applied was unconstitutionally vague. The court held further that petitioner had exhausted state remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on his alternative claim that he was entitled to a new trial to raise the defense of consent created by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in its decision affirming his conviction. 1

Both of these issues are presented again on appeal. We affirm the District Court as to the unconstitutional vagueness of the statute as applied to petitioner's conduct. Therefore, we need not decide the second issue. Whether state remedies had been exhausted on the claim of a right to a new trial does not affect the power of the court in deciding a claim on which exhaustion has been achieved. Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1976).

The pertinent facts of the case are undisputed. The principal witness herself testified that she performed an act of fellatio and put her tongue on petitioner's backside. The question we must determine is whether the statute, as applied to these acts, was unconstitutionally vague.

The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in notions of due process. Criminal statutes must be sufficiently specific to give fair notice of what conduct is proscribed. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 92 S.Ct. 993, 31 L.Ed.2d 258 (1972); reh. denied, 406 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 1604, 31 L.Ed.2d 822; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). A criminal statute that "leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case," Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03, 86 S.Ct. 518, 520, 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966), is also repugnant to the Due Process Clause. The vice of such a law is that it "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974).

The general rule is that constitutional challenges of vagueness must be based on a statute's application to the particular case, the major exception being where the exercise of First Amendment rights is involved. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). We so limit our decision today to the question of whether Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 272, § 35, as applied to petitioner, gave him fair notice as required by due process standards that his conduct, i.e., fellatio and oral-anal contact, constituted an "unnatural and lascivious act" proscribed by criminal statute.

The issue before us is not whether fair notice was given that these acts, if forced, were prohibited. The statute was limited to nonconsensual acts only in this case. Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974). Therefore, force was not an element of the indictment, nor was it an issue at trial. 2 Moreover, even if petitioner did have fair notice that a forced "unnatural and lascivious act" was illegal, the question as to what forced acts were within the statutory sweep would remain. If the set of all unnatural and lascivious acts is unconstitutionally vague, so will be the subset of forced acts no matter how clear the dividing line between forced and consensual acts.

In determining whether a given statute provides "a person of ordinary intelligence with fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden," United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617, 74 S.Ct. at 812, or gives "sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden," Rose v. Lock, 423 U.S. at 50, 96 S.Ct. at 244, courts traditionally have relied on the common usage of statutory language, judicial explanations of its meaning, and previous applications of the statute to the same or similar conduct. See id. In Rose v. Locke the Supreme Court considered and rejected a charge of vagueness aimed at a Tennessee statute proscribing "crimes against nature" as applied to cunnilingus. The Courts relied on previous pronouncements by the Tennessee courts that the statute would be given a broad interpretation and emphasized that there was a recognized common law meaning of the phrase "crimes against nature." The Court considered the continued use of the phrase in many jurisdictions and stated that "anyone who cared to do so could certainly determine what particular acts have been considered crimes against nature, and there can be no contention that the respondent's acts were ones never before considered as such." Id. This is the framework of analysis that we will use.

The District Court in the case at hand considered whether one who cared to could determine what § 35 was meant to proscribe. It concluded that the common usage of "lascivious" was "tending to arouse sexual desire," and the common usage of "unnatural acts" was "crimes against nature," which is covered by another statute, Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 272, § 34. 3 This fundamental ambiguity was not cured by judicial limitation. In Commonwealth v. Dill, 160 Mass. 536, 36 N.E. 472 (1894), a precursor statute to § 35 was construed to include "any mode of unnatural copulation" not coming within the definition of sodomy as usually understood. But the court never explained what "unnatural copulation" was nor applied the term to the conduct in question. Even if it can be said with certainty that the legislature intended to retain this distinction between the narrow meaning of sodomy, to be proscribed by § 34, and all other forms of unnatural copulation, to come within the rubric of § 35, it cannot be said that the conduct in question falls squarely within one of those categories. "Unnatural copulation," like "unnatural acts," at the time of petitioner's conviction remained without a commonly accepted meaning. The leading case to follow Dill stated that the words "unnatural and lascivious" signify "irregular indulgence in sexual behavior, illicit sexual relations, and infamous conduct which is lustful, obscene, and in deviation of accepted customs and manners." Jaquith v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 439, 120 N.E.2d 189, 192 (1954). This definition does not cure the ambiguity and the cases in other jurisdictions cited by respondent do not clarify the internal ambiguity of the Massachusetts statutory scheme. 4 The District Court was rightly concerned that the use of constantly shifting community standards, as the test of what conduct falls within the terms of a criminal statute, places the public "at its peril to anticipate a judicial pronouncement that public standards of morality have changed." Balthazar v. Superior Ct. of Comm. of Mass., 428 F.Supp. 425 (D.C.1977).

It cannot be said that references to similar statutes and judicial determinations in other jurisdictions make it fairly ascertainable that the Massachusetts statute was applicable to petitioner's conduct. 5 In Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969), the language "unnatural carnal copulation" was held to be too vague as applied to homosexual anal intercourse. State v. Sharpe, 1 Ohio App.2d 425, 205 N.E.2d 113 (1965), held "unnatural sex act" vague as applied to sodomy. Such statutes have also been applied to widely dissimilar forms of conduct. See, e. g., Jellum v. Cupp, 475 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding "unnatural conduct contrary to the course of nature" vague as applied to forcing a woman to the ground and urinating on her); Koa Gora v. Territory of Hawaii, 152 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1946) (deciding that "lascivious conduct" was properly applied to laying "hands on private parts" of another). In light of the diversity of conduct that could conceivably be covered by the terms "unnatural" and "lascivious" and the fact that there are certainly acts that are less natural and more universally condemned than Balthazar's conduct (for instance a range of sado-masochistic behavior), Balthazar could reasonably believe that the statute was aimed at other acts than his.

Criminal statutes involving morals legislation often give rise to difficulties in the description of proscribed conduct. This is caused by the common practice of including subjective terminology, such as "offensive," "indecent," and "unnatural" rather than explicit descriptions of the prohibited...

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