Medina v. State
| Decision Date | 21 November 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 73856,73856 |
| Citation | 573 So.2d 293 |
| Parties | Pedro MEDINA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Larry Helm Spalding, Capital Collateral Representative, Billy H. Nolas, Chief Asst. CCR and Julie D. Naylor, Asst. CCR, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Barbara C. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
Pedro Medina, a prisoner on death row, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. We affirm the trial court's denial of relief.
A jury convicted Medina of first-degree murder and automobile theft and recommended that he be sentenced to death, which the trial court did. This Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence. Medina v. State, 466 So.2d 1046 (Fla.1985). Two years later Medina filed a rule 3.850 motion raising seven issues and subsequently amended the motion to include seven additional issues: 1) whether his statements of April 9, 1982 should have been allowed into evidence; 2) whether his involuntary absence from the shackling hearing violated his rights; 3) whether shackling and handcuffing him violated his rights; 4) whether a Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), violation occurred; 5) whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by acquiescing to excusing a juror; 6) whether the court erred in limiting cross-examination of the victim's daughter; 7) whether the state's closing argument was improper; 8) whether the state violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and counsel rendered ineffective assistance; 9) whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance and the state violated Brady regarding the victim's ex-boyfriend; 10) whether events raised doubts about Medina's competency to stand trial; 11) whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate Medina's mental health and whether he received incompetent mental health assistance 12) whether Medina was competent at sentencing; 13) whether counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence; and 14) whether the charges against Medina should have been severed for trial. 1
The trial court found twelve of the issues procedurally barred because they could have been, should have been, or were raised on direct appeal. 2 After a five-day evidentiary hearing 3 on the remaining issues, whether the state violated Brady and counsel rendered ineffective assistance (issue 8) and whether counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence (issue 13), the trial court denied relief. Medina now disputes the court's findings and rulings on the two issues considered at the evidentiary hearing, claims that the court's actions at that hearing restricted his presentation, and argues that the court erred in finding the remaining issues procedurally barred.
Proceedings under rule 3.850 are not to be used as a second appeal. State v. Bolender, 503 So.2d 1247 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 209, 98 L.Ed.2d 161 (1987). Moreover, it is inappropriate to use a different argument to relitigate the same issue. Quince v. State, 477 So.2d 535 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1132, 106 S.Ct. 1662, 90 L.Ed.2d 204 (1986). Therefore, the trial court correctly found the claims regarding admissibility of Medina's statements (issue 1), his being shackled (issue 3), and his competency (issues 10 and 12) procedurally barred because they, or variations of them, had been raised on direct appeal. Allegations of ineffective assistance cannot be used to circumvent the rule that postconviction proceedings cannot serve as a second appeal. Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So.2d 1377 (Fla.1987); Sireci v. State, 469 So.2d 119 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3308, 92 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). Thus, the court properly found barred claims 5 (excusing a juror), 6 and 9 (regarding cross-examination and the victim's boyfriend), and 11 (Medina's competency). Claims 2 (shackling hearing), 4 (Caldwell ), and 7 (prosecutorial argument) do not involve fundamental error and should have been raised, if at all, on appeal, e.g., Blanco, and the court correctly found them to be barred.
This Court has long held that trial courts have "wide latitude" to regulate proceedings before them "in order that the administration of justice be speedily and fairly achieved in an orderly, dignified manner" and that "[i]n this function the trial Judge exercises the sound discretion with which he is vested." Hahn v. State, 58 So.2d 188, 191 (Fla.1952). Medina has shown no abuse of discretion in the way the trial judge conducted this hearing.
The first issue considered at the evidentiary hearing contains several parts: Brady violation regarding a second knife; Brady violation as to a state witness' possession of drugs; and counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to discover, develop, and present that witness' criminal activity. Two attorneys represented Medina at trial, with Warren Edwards handling the guilt phase and Ana Rodriguez handling the penalty phase. Edwards, however, died before the evidentiary hearing took place. Regarding the knife, Rodriguez testified that she had never received any information about the knife from anyone, including Edwards. The prosecutor testified that he had no knowledge of the knife. The medical examiner testified that someone brought the knife to him at the end of the autopsy on the victim, that he photographed the knife and kept the photograph in his official file on the case, and that both sides, as a matter of policy, had the right to inspect his file. The court ruled as follows:
No evidence was presented by defendant as to when this "second" knife was found, where it was found, by whom it was found, who presented it to the medical examiner or whether it had any connection with a suspect in this case other than defendant Medina. It was not shown that this "second" knife would have been admissible at the trial. Further, because of Edwards' untimely death, we do not know whether he was aware of the existence of this knife.
Consequently, I am unable to find that the "second" knife was evidence favorable to Medina, that is to say, that if it had been disclosed, it might have made the difference between Medina's conviction and acquittal. This claim is without merit.
(Citation omitted.)
"The test for measuring the effect of the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, regardless of whether such failure constitutes a discovery violation, is whether there is a reasonable probability that 'had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " Duest v. Dugger, 555 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla.1990) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). Medina has shown no error in the court's ruling.
The same holds true for the second part of this issue. Medina tried to sell the victim's car in Tampa to Michael White. White testified against Medina at trial that, instead of giving him the car, Medina stabbed White, took his money, and drove away. Current counsel claims that, when found by police after being stabbed, White had marijuana on him but was never charged or prosecuted for that offense in exchange for his testimony against Medina. According to current counsel, the state's failure to disclose all the facts surrounding White violated Brady, and Edwards' failure to discover those facts constituted ineffective assistance. The court found as follows:
Neither White nor any law enforcement officer from Hillsborough or Orange Counties was called at the hearing to testify that White had been found in possession of marijuana at the time of the stabbing incident. Certified copies of Hillsborough County Circuit Court records were introduced. There was no criminal complaint or information charging a Michael White with possession of marijuana on the date of the incident. The records did show, however, that a person by the name of Michael White was on felony probation on that date and up through the date of...
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