Catlin v. City of Wheaton

• Decision Date: 21 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-3903.,07-3903.
• Citation: 574 F.3d 361
• Parties: Jonathan A. CATLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF WHEATON, a municipal corporation of the State of Illinois, Bill Cooley, Andrew Uhlir, Edward Fanning, Matthew Hale & Mark Field, employees and agents of the City of Wheaton, Defendants-Appellees, and County of Dupage, a political subdivision of the State of Illinois, John Zaruba, Sheriff of DuPage County, Illinois, Dupage County Major Crimes Task Force, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

574 F.3d 361

Jonathan A. CATLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF WHEATON, a municipal corporation of the State of Illinois, Bill Cooley, Andrew Uhlir, Edward Fanning, Matthew Hale & Mark Field, employees and agents of the City of Wheaton, Defendants-Appellees, and County of Dupage, a political subdivision of the State of Illinois, John Zaruba, Sheriff of DuPage County, Illinois, Dupage County Major Crimes Task Force, Defendants.

No. 07-3903.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 11, 2009.

Decided July 21, 2009.

Walter P. Maksym, Jr. (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

James H. Knippen, II (argued), Walsh, Knippen, Knight & Pollock, Wheaton, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before CUDAHY, POSNER, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

Jonathan Catlin was arrested and briefly detained when members of the Wheaton Police Department mistook him for the ringleader of a local drug operation. Catlin subsequently sued for false arrest and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 20, 2003, the DuPage County Sheriff's Narcotics Unit conducted a major operation to arrest numerous members of a drug conspiracy in Wheaton, Illinois. The operation involved over seventy-five officers from neighboring jurisdictions, including the defendants in this case, who are members of the Wheaton Police Department. The DuPage Narcotics Unit assigned the defendants the task of executing an arrest warrant for Robert Ptak, the kingpin of the drug conspiracy. The defendants were told that Ptak's arrest warrant was for Class X felonies—the highest class of felony under Illinois law—that Ptak was armed and dangerous, that he had resisted arrest on several prior occasions and that he had threatened violent resistance if the police attempted to re-arrest him.

At about 12:30 in the afternoon, the defendants were dispatched to the Red Roof Inn in Downers Grove, Illinois, where Ptak was believed to be staying. They were given a photograph and physical description of Ptak, and told that he had recently been seen riding a yellow, "crotch rocket" style motorcycle.¹ Upon arriving at the scene, the defendants observed a person matching Ptak's physical description who was operating a yellow sport-motorcycle in the parking lot adjacent to the Red Roof Inn. As it happened, however, this person was not Ptak. Rather, it was the plaintiff, Jonathan Catlin. Further, Catlin was not actually leaving the Red Roof Inn. Instead, he was leaving his workplace, which was located about 100 yards from the Red Roof Inn. Nevertheless, thinking that they had located Ptak, the defendants drove past Catlin in their unmarked S.U.V., Catlin pulled out behind them and the parties drove a short way until they both came to a stop at a traffic light.

For the purposes of this appeal, we credit Catlin's version of what happened next. According to Catlin, while the parties were stopped in traffic, defendants Uhlir and Fanning jumped out of the S.U.V. and ran toward Catlin. Uhlir and Fanning were dressed in plain clothes and did not identify themselves as police officers.² (A third defendant, Hale, was unable to exit from the car with the other two as planned because the child safety locks were activated on the back door.) Uhlir and Fanning approached Catlin from either side, grabbed him and threw him onto the grass by the side of the road. While the defendants were attempting to restrain him, Catlin admits that he began to struggle "really, really hard" and managed to break free. Subsequently, Fanning tackled him and Uhlir held him in place by placing his knee on Catlin's lower back. The defendants told Catlin to "stop struggling," but they still did not identify themselves as police officers. By then, Hale had managed to unlock the back door of the S.U.V. and join the other officers. Hale handcuffed Catlin while Uhlir and Fanning held him down.

Almost immediately, the defendants realized their mistake. While he was being restrained, Catlin protested that the defendants "have the wrong guy." After successfully restraining him, the defendants checked Catlin's identification, confirmed their mistake and released him. Catlin estimates that he was detained for approximately 20 minutes. Although there was some damage to his motorcycle, he was able to drive himself home.

Catlin commenced this Section 1983 action, alleging that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully seizing him and using excessive force in the course of restraining him. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to both Catlin's false arrest claim and his excessive force claims.³

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the decision granting summary judgment for the defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. Phelan v. Vill. of Lyons, 531 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir.2008). Qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for damages if their actions did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707, 709 (7th Cir.2008). The purpose of the doctrine is "to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that (1) the facts make out a violation of the plaintiff's federal rights, and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); see also Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir.2009). We may address these issues in the order we deem most expedient. See Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818. Thus, where it is apparent that the alleged right at issue is not clearly established, we may decide the case on these grounds without first deciding if there was an underlying constitutional violation. Id.

Catlin argues that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because they did not take reasonable steps to verify his identity prior to the arrest, and because there are triable issues of fact as to whether the force they used in effecting the arrest was reasonable. We are unpersuaded by either of these arguments. However, the second argument presents a closer question.

A. False Arrest

When police officers mistake a person for someone they seek to arrest, the arrest is constitutional if the officers (1) have probable cause to arrest the person sought, and (2) reasonably believe that the person arrested is the person sought. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971); United States v. Marshall, 79 F.3d 68, 69 (7th Cir.1996).

In the present case, the arrest warrant gave the officers a basis for arresting Robert Ptak. The only issue, therefore, is whether they were reasonable in thinking that Catlin was Ptak. We think that they were. Catlin physically resembled Ptak,⁴ was observed in the precise area where the defendants expected to find Ptak and was driving the same distinctive sort of motorcycle as Ptak.

Catlin's argument that the defendants should have checked his license plates prior to arresting him is unavailing for two reasons. The defendants believed that they were confronting a dangerous felon on a racing motorcycle in an area adjacent to a state highway. The defendants were under no constitutional obligation to dither, especially since additional efforts to verify Catlin's identity could have given him an opportunity to flee. E.g., Marshall, 79 F.3d at 69 ("Requiring a higher level of verification or corroboration at this point risked allowing a golden moment to pass—[the suspect] could have fled while more evidence was gathered.").

Further, the defendants are required to show only the reasonableness of their belief that the person they arrested was the person they were seeking; they are not required to show that they knew with certainty that the person they arrested was the person they were seeking. Often, there will have been more that an officer could have done to confirm a suspect's identity. This will not render an arrest unconstitutional so long as the officer's actions were reasonable under the circumstances.

B. Excessive Force

Catlin also argues that the defendants used excessive force when they arrested him. Because the arrest was valid, the defendants were allowed to use some force in the course of effecting the arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ("[T]he right to make an arrest ... carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it."). Our assessment of whether the defendants' use of force in the present case comports with the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement requires us to balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Id.; Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir.2005). Particular factors we consider include "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865; Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 768.

In the present case, Catlin alleges that the defendants confronted him without identifying themselves as police officers, forced him off his motorcycle and "tossed him" to the side of the road.⁵ He alleges that subsequently—and still without identifying themselves as officers—the defendants tackled him, held him...