Bolding v. Holshouser

• Decision Date: 26 April 1978
• Docket Number: No. 76-2151,76-2151
• Citation: 575 F.2d 461
• Parties: Thomas BOLDING, Robert Fink, Samuel Bost, Raymond Creason, James Grant, Gerald R. Price, Perry W. Franklin, Norman Anthony, Wilburt Clemmons, Jimmy Covington, Erwin Zelms, Marjorie H. Marsh, Timothy P. Harding, William R. McCall, Fred T. Malick, Glenn Ford, Jodie V. Austin, John H. Stacks, Charles L. Edmondson, Donald Perkins, Jim Vickers, Anne C. Willett, Gonzales Jones, Anne Sheppard Turner, Michael McSwiggen, Sherman Jones, Strother Holder, James Sapp, and Dennis Cole, and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. James E. HOLSHOUSER, Jr., Individually and in his official capacity as Governor of North Carolina, David L. Jones, Individually, and in his official capacity as Secretary of Social Rehabilitation and Control, Ralph D. Edwards, Individually, and in his official capacity as Commissioner of the North Carolina Department of Correction, Jack Scism, Individually, and in his official capacity as Chairman of the North Carolina Parole Commission, the North Carolina Parole Commission, the North Carolina Commission of Correction, J. Richard Smith, Individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Craggy Subsidiary of the North Carolina Department of Correction, E. C. Watkins, Individually, and in his capacity as Superintendent of the Stanley County Subsidiary of the North Carolina Department of Correction, L. C. Stephenson, Individually, and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Caledonia Farms Subsidiary of the North Carolina Department of Correction, and Sam Garrison, Individually, and in his capacity as Warden of Central Prison, and Fred Briggs, Individually, and in his capacity as Chairman of the Central Classification Committee of the Department of Correction, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 461

575 F.2d 461

Thomas BOLDING, Robert Fink, Samuel Bost, Raymond Creason,

James Grant, Gerald R. Price, Perry W. Franklin, Norman

Anthony, Wilburt Clemmons, Jimmy Covington, Erwin Zelms,

Marjorie H. Marsh, Timothy P. Harding, William R. McCall,

Fred T. Malick, Glenn Ford, Jodie V. Austin, John H. Stacks,

Charles L. Edmondson, Donald Perkins, Jim Vickers, Anne C.

Willett, Gonzales Jones, Anne Sheppard Turner, Michael

McSwiggen, Sherman Jones, Strother Holder, James Sapp, and Dennis Cole, and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. James E. HOLSHOUSER, Jr., Individually and in his official

capacity as Governor of North Carolina, David L. Jones,

Individually, and in his official capacity as Secretary of

Social Rehabilitation and Control, Ralph D. Edwards,

Individually, and in his official capacity as Commissioner

of the North Carolina Department of Correction, Jack Scism,

Individually, and in his official capacity as Chairman of

the North Carolina Parole Commission, the North Carolina

Parole Commission, the North Carolina Commission of

Correction, J. Richard Smith, Individually and in his

official capacity as Superintendent of the Craggy Subsidiary

of the North Carolina Department of Correction, E. C.

Watkins, Individually, and in his capacity as Superintendent

of the Stanley County Subsidiary of the North Carolina

Department of Correction, L. C. Stephenson, Individually,

and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the

Caledonia Farms Subsidiary of the North Carolina Department

of Correction, and Sam Garrison, Individually, and in his

capacity as Warden of Central Prison, and Fred Briggs,

Individually, and in his capacity as Chairman of the Central

Classification Committee of the Department of Correction, Appellees.

No. 76-2151.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fourth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 5, 1977.

Decided April 26, 1978.

Allen H. Wellons, Asheville, N. C. (Russell P. Brannon, Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes, Hyde & Davis, Asheville, N. C., on brief), for appellants.

Jacob L. Safron, Special Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, N. C. (Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen., Raleigh, N. C., on brief), for appellees.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WINTER, Circuit Judge.

WINTER, Circuit Judge:

The district court granted a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), F.R.Civ.P., to dismiss a complaint brought by a group of North Carolina prisoners, both individually and as representatives of all prisoners similarly situated in North Carolina prisons. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that certain prison conditions and certain treatment of prisoners and their mail violated the constitutional rights of the prisoners under the Federal Constitution and the Constitution of North Carolina. The major premise for the district court's ruling was that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it set forth merely legal conclusions unsupported by adequate factual allegations. The district court also expressed its unwillingness "to take under its control and management the prison system (of North Carolina)" in this or any other case, and to that end stated that it would not grant class relief although it would grant individual relief to any plaintiff who would plead and prove an individual right to relief. We reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

Plaintiffs are twenty-nine prisoners incarcerated in thirteen penal institutions in various cities and towns in North Carolina. They sue the Governor of North Carolina, the Secretary of the Department of Social Rehabilitation and Control, the Director of Prisons and Commissioner of the Department of Correction, the persons constituting the North Carolina Parole Commission and those constituting the North Carolina Commission of Correction, the Chairman of the Central Classification Committee of the Department of Correction, and the various persons who are the Superintendents or Wardens of the various institutions in which plaintiffs are confined.

The plaintiffs' substantive allegations go to the charges of (1) overcrowding, (2) interference with prisoners' mail, (3) isolation, (4) denial of procedural due process at administrative hearings dealing with parole, transfer, disciplinary action and prisoner classification, and (5) general conditions. The task of summarizing them yet preserving their essential fullness is impossible, so we append as an appendix to this opinion the portion of the complaint dealing with each of these substantive complaints. The complaint charged that the acts and omissions of defendants amounted to (a) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article I, § 27 of the North Carolina Constitution, (b) denial of access to the courts and access to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and (c) denial of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiffs sought comprehensive declaratory and injunctive relief. They sought a declaration that each inmate was entitled to eighty square feet of living space, that conditions in the North Carolina prison system do not meet minimum constitutional standards, and that defendants violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights in the divers regards set forth in the substantive allegations. Both interim and permanent injunctive relief, albeit some of it conflicting, were sought, inter alia, to enjoin defendants from accepting new prisoners until

minimum constitutional standards were met, to require defendants to parole prisoners to reduce unconstitutional overcrowding, to enjoin the construction of new prison facilities until programs for education, recreation and work-release were funded and developed, to enjoin defendants from interference with prisoners' mail, to enjoin the denial of hygienic needs, medical services, sanitary food service and access to reading and writing materials, and to require defendants to afford prisoners procedural due process with regard to their future status. The relief prayed also included a request for protecting plaintiffs against retaliation for bringing the suit, the appointment of a Citizens Committee to monitor compliance with any order granting relief and a reservation of jurisdiction until full compliance with any order entered by the court

II.

Without expressing any view as to whether plaintiffs can prove all or any of the facts that they allege and, if so, whether they would be entitled to any or all of the exact relief that they pray, we disagree with the district court that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 marked the demise of common law pleading in the federal courts; in its place, the rules adopted the concept of notice pleading. Thus, Rule 8 requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 12(b)(6) must be given a construction consonant with this basic concept; detailed factual averments are no longer necessary to avoid dismissal of a claim. And in testing the sufficiency of compliance with Rule 8 when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion has been filed, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), teaches that

In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint, we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.

This test was repeated more recently in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). See also Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4 Cir., Decided March 6, 1978).

In application of these principles, we think it manifest that plaintiffs' complaint is immune to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) in at least four of the five separate causes of action which are asserted.

A. With respect to overcrowding, plaintiffs have alleged that the prison facilities in the State of North Carolina "do not provide adequate personal living space for each individual prisoner," and as a result they allege that plaintiffs "are victims of and are in constant danger of violent and deadly attack; . . . (they) are victims of and face the persistent danger of rape and other sexual attack or molestation; . . . (and they) suffer accumulating psychological damage from the high level of mental stress and fear." In addition, plaintiffs allege that as a result of the overcrowding they do not receive "adequate educational, recreational and work-release programs; . . . sanitary living conditions; . . . supplies for meeting basic personal hygiene; . . . adequate medical, psychological and dental care; . . . visitation rights; . . . (and) a functional classification system . . . (to) provide treatment for those individuals with emotional problems, safety for prisoners in general population, and means for prisoners to achieve personal improvement." These allegations are sufficiently factual to state a cognizable claim. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M.D.Ala.1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5 Cir. 1977).

B. With respect to interference with prisoners' mail, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants "unreasonably delayed the delivery of incoming mail and the posting of outgoing mail, and have . . . failed or refused to deliver incoming mail or post

outgoing mail." Moreover, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants have delayed the delivery and the posting of attorney-client mail and at times have failed or refused to deliver or post such mail. Again, the allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974)

C. As to isolation, plaintiffs have alleged that their cells "do not meet minimum...