U.S. v. Burnette-Carter Co., BURNETTE-CARTER

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
Citation23 UCC Rep.Serv. 1320,575 F.2d 587
Docket NumberNo. 76-2109,BURNETTE-CARTER,76-2109
Parties23 UCC Rep.Serv. 1320 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
Decision Date15 May 1978

W. J. Michael Cody, U.S. Atty., Devon L. Gosnell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Memphis, Tenn., Ronald R. Glancz, Frederic Cohen, Appellate Sect., Civil Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellant.

James E. Threlkeld, G. Keith Rogers, Jr., Threlkeld & Howard, P. A., Memphis, Tenn., for defendant-appellee.

Before EDWARDS, CELEBREZZE and LIVELY, Circuit Judges.

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by the United States from a summary judgment granted to defendant-appellee Burnette-Carter Company. The complaint was filed on behalf of the Farmer's Home Administration of the United States Department of Agriculture (FmHA) and alleged that Burnette-Carter converted certain livestock subject to an FmHA security interest. 1 The primary issue on appeal is the validity of the security interest vis-a-vis Burnette-Carter under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 9-103(3) (1962 Official Text). 2 We hold that the security interest was valid and reverse the judgment below.

Both parties moved the district court for summary judgment and the relevant facts are not in dispute. The FmHA made a loan to a Mississippi farmer, not a party to this action, pursuant to the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1941 et seq. A financing statement was filed and all other steps were taken to properly perfect a security interest in Mississippi covering all of the farmer's livestock. Without the knowledge or approval of the FmHA, the farmer shipped the livestock from Mississippi to Tennessee (the "removal state") to be sold. The livestock were sold to bona fide purchasers at auction by Burnette-Carter, a Memphis commission livestock broker. There were several sales in this manner over two years, each sale occurring within four months of removal into Tennessee. The farmer did not apply any of the sale proceeds to the loan and defaulted on his loan repayments. The FmHA took no action to perfect its security interest in Tennessee.

The district court held that the FmHA could not recover in conversion since it had not filed a financing statement in Tennessee within four months of the collateral's removal. The court reasoned that UCC § 9-103(3), as codified in Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-9-103(3), required a secured party to file a financing statement in the removal state within the four month period and that absent such filing the security interest was deemed unperfected in the removal state retroactive to the date of the collateral's removal. Under this reasoning, the security interest was not perfected as to Burnette-Carter, and it could not be held liable for conversion. The FmHA argues that UCC § 9-103(3) gives four months of absolute protection to the secured party upon removal of the collateral, even without refiling in the removal state, and that its security interest was therefore valid at the time of the sales in question.

There is no dispute that the FmHA is entitled to recover if it had a valid security interest at the time and place of sale. This court has held, on almost identical facts, that a livestock auctioneer who unauthorizedly sells property subject to a third party's security interest is liable in conversion to that third party even if the auctioneer has no knowledge of the security interest. United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 1967). The appropriate measure of damages is the fair market value of the collateral at the time of the conversion. Id. Other circuits have uniformly reached the same conclusion on similar facts. 3 United States v. E. W. Savage & Son, Inc., 475 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973); Cassidy Commission Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. den. 376 U.S. 909, 84 S.Ct. 663, 11 L.Ed.2d 608 (1964); United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Matthews, 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957). See also United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F.Supp. 944 (N.D.Ind.1975). This is also the clear majority rule among the states. Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 208, §§ 3 & 7; 3 C.J.S. Agency § 383.

We must now focus on whether the FmHA's security interest was valid vis-a-vis Burnette-Carter. There is a split among the circuits as to whether the federal courts should look to state law in making this determination or fashion a uniform federal rule. Following the dictates of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943), this court has held that a uniform federal rule is appropriate in FmHA security interest cases. 4 United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 431-35 (6th Cir. 1967). Accord, United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971); Cassidy Commission Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. den. 376 U.S. 909, 84 S.Ct. 663, 11 L.Ed.2d 608 (1964); United States v. Matthews,244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957). Contra, United States v. Chappel Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Kramel,234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956). This does not mean that this court should ignore relevant state law; it simply means that we are not bound by state law as we are in diversity of citizenship cases under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Indeed, in Carson we followed the substantive rule adopted in two other circuits but added:

We also take note of the fact that this rule is followed in nearly all the states. The formulation of a uniform federal rule does not require that the wisdom of the states be disregarded, and the federal rule may correspond to the rule applied in many states.

372 F.2d at 435.

The Fifth Circuit, which also opts for a uniform federal rule in FmHA cases, employed the following analysis in determining the applicable federal rule:

Having decided that federal law must apply to the litigation at bar, we nevertheless see no reason nor necessity for fashioning a specialized, esoteric body of federal law, confined in terms to suits by the United States seeking to impose conversion liability on persons who deal with property mortgaged under the FHA loan program. An FHA loan is nothing more nor less than a secured transaction, with the United States as the secured party holding a security interest in property of the debtor in order to insure repayment of the loan . . .. We perceive no reason why the rights of the United States arising out of secured transactions pursuant to the FHA loan program should be any different than those of other financers of farming operations under the Uniform Commercial Code. We have therefore determined that in fashioning the federal law that is applicable to suits arising from the FHA loan program we shall be guided by the principles set forth in Article 9 and other relevant portions of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Such a course meets the principal reason advanced for requiring a federal rule of decision in these cases, that of uniformity, while at the same time assuring that an individual state's modifications of the Code's scheme cannot be employed to defeat federal rights . . . . The Code has now been adopted in every state save Louisiana. By evaluating the issues involved in suits concerning FHA secured transactions in light of Article 9, the federal courts will have a coherent, unified body of law with which to deal and can benefit from the general body of precedent developed by the state courts under the Code. This is not to say, of course, that the interpretation of the Code made by any particular state court will be controlling nor that any modification of the Code enacted by a particular state legislature need be followed. Such interpretations and modifications may be followed only if the federal courts deem them reflective of the weight of authority, consistent with the operation to the FHA program, or desirable as precedent.

On this basis it is our judgment that the Code itself and the general body of precedent developed by the Code states provide the most logical source material supplying the content of federal common law to govern suits arising from FHA secured transactions. In this fashion the federal law governing FHA loans and the state law of secured transactions will coalesce to reinforce each other.

United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 809-11 (5th Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted but commended to the reader) (FHA is the same as FmHA).

See also Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State Bank, 458 F.2d 700, 703 n.1 (10th Cir. 1972) and United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F.Supp. 944 (N.D.Ind.1975).

We agree with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit that the UCC should be adopted as the relevant federal common law. It would be particularly anomalous not to apply the UCC when the FmHA, whose interests are meant to be protected by a uniform federal rule, does not object to its application. The FmHA perfects its security interests pursuant to the UCC as adopted in the respective states. 5 The agency does not even suggest that we look to other sources of law. Congress has expressed approval of the principles of the UCC in adopting it for the District of Columbia. 6

Our task in deciding this and like cases is thus simply to apply the rules found in "the Code itself and the general body of precedent developed by the Code states." Hext, 444 F.2d at 811. If there is lack of uniformity on a particular issue, either by virtue of non-uniform changes in the UCC or differing interpretations of a uniform provision, we will normally follow the "weight of authority." Id. It is essential that federal courts not follow aberrational UCC interpretations...

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