Millar v. C. I. R., Docket No. 5884-72

• Citation: 577 F.2d 212
• Decision Date: 12 June 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-1926,Docket No. 5892-72,Docket No. 5884-72,Docket No. 5888-72,Docket No. 5893-72,77-1926
• Parties: 78-2 USTC P 9514 Gavin S. MILLAR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. (Tax Court) Philip D. RODGERS and Elizabeth C. Rodgers, his wife, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. (Tax Court) James L. TENLEY and Betty J. Tenley, his wife, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. (Tax Court) Robert K. CONRAD and Jane H. Conrad, his wife, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. (Tax Court)
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Page 212

577 F.2d 212

78-2 USTC P 9514

Gavin S. MILLAR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. (Tax Court Docket No. 5884-72)

Philip D. RODGERS and Elizabeth C. Rodgers, his wife, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. (Tax Court Docket No. 5888-72)

James L. TENLEY and Betty J. Tenley, his wife, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. (Tax Court Docket No. 5892-72)

Robert K. CONRAD and Jane H. Conrad, his wife, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. (Tax Court Docket No. 5893-72)

No. 77-1926.

United States Court of Appeals,

Third Circuit.

Argued Feb. 23, 1978.

Decided June 12, 1978.

Godfrey Hammel, Jr., Raymond A. Regner, St. Clair Shores, Mich., for petitioners-appellants.

M. Carr Ferguson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gilbert E. Andrews, Michael L. Paup, Libero Marinelli, Jr., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before ADAMS and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges, and BECHTLE, District Judge. ^*

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECHTLE, District Judge.

In this appeal from a redetermination by the Tax Court, the issues presented are: (1) whether funds received by the taxpayers ¹ from R. H. Jamison, Jr. ("Jamison"), were loans rather than gifts; and, (2) whether the taxpayers realized taxable gain in the form of cancellation of indebtedness upon surrender of their stock in the Grant County Coal Corporation ("Grant County") in complete satisfaction of their nonrecourse obligations, which were secured solely by the stock, even though at the time of surrender the stock had a value less than the value of the nonrecourse obligations. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the funds received by the taxpayers from Jamison were loans rather than gifts and that the taxpayers realized taxable gain when their Grant County stock was surrendered to Jamison in complete satisfaction of their nonrecourse obligations. However, we agree with taxpayers Robert K. and Jane H. Conrad ("Conrads") that no penalty should be imposed for failure to recapture previously claimed investment credits. Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the Tax Court on all issues, except the imposition of a penalty pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6653(a), which shall be stricken.

The facts of this case are reported fully in Millar v. Commissioner, 540 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1976), wherein we remanded to the Tax Court for an initial determination of the issues presented in this appeal. Upon remand, the Tax Court decided that the funds were received in the form of a loan and that the taxpayers had realized taxable gain. The taxpayers appeal both of those determinations.

We find no reason to disturb the Tax Court's determinations. First, upon receipt of the funds from Jamison, the taxpayers executed nonrecourse demand notes which bore an interest rate of five and one-half percent and which were secured solely by the taxpayers' Grant County stock. The taxpayers claimed their pro rata share of the interest payments on these notes when calculating their federal income taxes for the years 1964 through 1966. The taxpayers then executed an assignment of their stock to Jamison, who in turn assigned the shareholders' notes and stock assignments to the Mellon National Bank and Trust Company of Pittsburgh ("Mellon Bank") as additional security on a $500,000 loan previously secured by Jamison. Finally, on January 27, 1967, after Grant County had filed a petition to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, each taxpayer signed an acknowledgment that Jamison had demanded payment on the notes and, no payments having been received, had foreclosed upon their Grant County stock. The formalities undertaken by the taxpayers upon receipt of the funds from Jamison and the activities engaged in by them in connection with the funds clearly support the Tax Court's determination that the funds received from Jamison by the taxpayers were loans rather than gifts.

Second, in finding that the taxpayers realized taxable income when their Grant County stock was surrendered to Jamison in complete satisfaction of their nonrecourse obligations, the Tax Court relied upon the Supreme Court's holding in Crane v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 331 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 1047, 91 L.Ed. 1301 (1947), that: (1) the basis of property subject to a mortgage includes the amount of the mortgage, even though the owner of the property assumes no liability on the mortgage debt; and (2) when such property is sold, the "amount realized" includes the amount of the unassumed mortgage. The taxpayers, on this appeal, argue that the Tax Court erred when it determined that they had realized taxable gain as a result of the foreclosure and surrender of the stock, because the value of the stock surrendered was less than the value of the note foreclosed upon. In support of their arguments, the taxpayers rely exclusively upon footnote 37 of the Crane opinion, wherein the Supreme Court said:

Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is not this case.

Crane v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, 331 U.S. at 14, n.37, 67 S.Ct. at 1054. We must determine, therefore, whether footnote 37 of Crane creates an exception to the principal holding of Crane which would relieve the taxpayers of the otherwise taxable consequences of this exchange. We find that it does not and that the reasoning and analysis of the Crane opinion squarely sustain the imposition of tax liability in this case.

In Crane v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, the taxpayer, as the sole beneficiary of her deceased husband, acquired depreciable property in the form of an apartment building and lot which, at the time of acquisition, was subject to a mortgage upon which the taxpayer was not personally liable. As of the date of the inheritance, the property was appraised for federal estate tax purposes at a value exactly equal to the total amount of this encumbrance. During the time that the taxpayer owned the property, she reported the gross rentals as income and claimed deductions for taxes, operating expenses, interest paid on the mortgage and for the physical exhaustion of the building. Seven years after acquiring the property, the taxpayer sold the property to a third party for $3,000 cash, subject to the mortgage and paid $500 expenses of sale. She thereafter reported a taxable gain of $1,250.

In calculating the tax liabilities resulting to the taxpayer as a result of this sale, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the amount of the mortgage was properly included in the amount realized for purposes of computing the gain or loss resulting therefrom. §§ 111(a), (b) of the Revenue Act of 1938, as amended, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a), (b) (1954). ² Thus, in Crane, the gain realized by the taxpayer as a result of the sale was not only the cash receipts, but also the principal amount of the mortgage subject to which the property was sold, less the adjusted basis of the property. Crane v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra 331 U.S. at 11, 13-14, 67 S.Ct. 1047, §...