State v. Cross

• Decision Date: 23 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. C6-97-254,C6-97-254
• Citation: 577 N.W.2d 721
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. David Lee CROSS, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 721

577 N.W.2d 721

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. David Lee CROSS, Appellant.

No. C6-97-254.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 23, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In a prosecution under Minnesota's first-degree domestic abuse homicide statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6) (1996), evidence of prior acts of domestic violence, introduced to prove the existence of a "past pattern of domestic abuse," is not "other crimes" evidence governed by Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).

2. In a prosecution under Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6), only the "past pattern of domestic abuse," not the acts constituting the pattern, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, by Susan J. Andrews, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, St. Paul, Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, by Gayle C. Hendley, Asst. County Attorney, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

GARDEBRING, Justice.

David Lee Cross appeals from a conviction for murder in the death of his girlfriend Heidi Rae Haines on June 28, 1996 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Cross was convicted of first-degree domestic abuse homicide in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6) (1996) and second-degree intentional homicide in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (1996) after a jury trial in Hennepin County in December 1996. On appeal from his conviction, Cross raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erroneously admitted the evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence, and (2) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that it must find each individual incident of prior domestic violence, offered as evidence of a "past pattern of domestic abuse," was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ¹ We affirm.

Shortly before midnight on June 28, 1996, two witnesses drove by a car in which Cross and Haines were seated. The car was pulled over to the side of the road. The witnesses observed Cross vigorously slapping Haines, who was seated in the driver's seat. Concerned by what they had seen, the witnesses drove past a second time, and saw Cross standing outside the car, leaning into the driver's window while his arms and upper body moved back and forth in a jerking motion. The witnesses stopped and called 911. When the police arrived, Haines was outside the car and bystanders were attempting to administer CPR to her. She was taken to Hennepin County Medical Center, where she was pronounced dead. The medical examiner determined that manual strangulation was the cause of death, and Cross was charged in Haines' death.

Minnesota's domestic abuse homicide statute punishes as first-degree murder conduct that

causes the death of a human being while committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.

Minn.Stat. § 609.185(6). The statute defines the term "domestic abuse" as an act that "constitutes a violation of section 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.224, 609.2242, 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, [or] 609.713." Id. Sections 609.221-2242 prohibit assault in the first, second, third, and fifth degree, and domestic assault. Sections 609.342-.345 prohibit criminal sexual conduct in the first, second, third, and fourth degree. Section 609.713 prohibits terroristic threats. The domestic abuse homicide statute further specifies that the acts of domestic abuse must be "committed against the victim who is a family or household member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2, paragraph (b)." Id. Section 518B.01, the Domestic Abuse Act, defines "family or household members" as

(1) spouses and former spouses;

(2) parents and children;

(3) persons related by blood;

(4) persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past;

(5) persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time;

(6) a man and woman if the woman is pregnant and the man is alleged to be the father, regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time; and

(7) persons involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship.

Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b) (1996).

We have reviewed the domestic abuse homicide statute on three prior occasions: in State v. Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808 (Minn.1995); State v. Robinson, 539 N.W.2d 231 (Minn.1995); and State v. Grube, 531 N.W.2d 484 (Minn.1995). Our prior cases have held that section 609.185(6) is not unconstitutionally vague. Further, we have declined to define "pattern" more restrictively than the words of the statute. See Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d at 819; Robinson, 539 N.W.2d at 238.

I. Evidence of Prior Domestic Abuse

We begin with the question of whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior domestic abuse without first requiring the state to demonstrate to the court the occurrence of each instance by "clear and convincing evidence."

Evidence at trial showed that Cross met Haines in December 1995, and they became romantically involved. By January of 1996, they were living together in the apartment of their mutual friend Letitia (Tanya) Whitehead and her children. Their relationship, however, was troubled. The state offered the following evidence to show that Cross had engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse against Haines:

(1) Whitehead testified that she saw bruises on Haines' upper chest and body in February 1996. When she asked the victim about the source of the bruises, Haines responded that Cross had caused them.

(2) Both Whitehead and Kristine Haines, the victim's sister, testified that they were present in March 1996 during an argument between Cross and Haines, in which Cross, without provocation, punched Haines in the nose with a closed fist and gave her a bloody nose.

(3) Kristine Haines testified that, on another occasion, she overheard Cross threaten to beat Haines because Kristine and the victim were late picking him up after work.

(4) Kristine Haines, who worked with her sister several days a week at Camp Snoopy, also testified that the victim came to work with a black eye "everyday" during the summer of 1996.

(5) Whitehead testified that throughout March, April and May of 1996, she overheard arguing between Haines and Cross through the walls of the apartment where all three lived. The arguments were accompanied by noises that sounded like someone being slammed against the wall or somebody hitting the wall. Whitehead stated that on these occasions she could hear Haines screaming, "Stop."

(6) According to Kristine Haines' testimony, when she expressed concern about her sister's bruises and black eyes and urged her to call the police, Haines responded that "she didn't want to get [Cross] in trouble."

(7) The medical examiner testified that Haines exhibited numerous bruises and abrasions, some of them quite recent and others healing, and therefore older. She testified that some of the injuries were of the type that are usually inflicted, rather than received accidentally.

(8) Cross admitted to police, under questioning, that he and Haines had fought earlier on the evening of her death, at which time he had throttled Haines "a little bit."

On appeal, Cross argues that the admissibility of such evidence should be governed by Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), which states that:

[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In a criminal prosecution, such evidence shall not be admitted unless the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Based on this rule of evidence, Cross asserts that evidence of prior acts of domestic violence should only be admitted subject to the safeguards established by this court for admission of "other crimes" evidence in State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178-79, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284-85 (1967). Billstrom requires that a defendant's participation in other crimes must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 179, 149 N.W.2d at 285. Further, we have said that admission of "other crimes" evidence requires a prior determination by the trial court that the evidence is indeed clear and convincing. State v. Matteson, 287 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn.1979). Cross argues that the trial court erred by not subjecting the evidence of past domestic violence to judicial scrutiny before it was presented to the jury. He argues that the trial court should have scrutinized the evidence to determine whether that the prior misconduct could be established by the state by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree because in this case the evidence offered by the state on the previous acts of domestic abuse was simply not "other crimes" evidence, within the meaning of Rule 404(b).

The general rule is that evidence of prior "bad acts" or "other crimes" by the defendant in a criminal case is not admissible unless it is offered under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule of inadmissibility. State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 490, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965). "Those exceptions generally require similarity between the current and the past act as to defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity." State v. Gorman, 546 N.W.2d 5, 9 (Minn.1996).

The purpose underlying the heightened evidentiary standard required for "prior acts" or "other crimes" evidence is to prevent the jury from convicting a defendant for being a "bad person" or for having a propensity to commit crimes, even where the evidence is insufficient to convict for the crime charged....