Killough v. Jahandarfard

• Decision Date: 15 February 1991
• Citation: 578 So.2d 1041
• Parties: Lomax KILLOUGH v. Majid JAHANDARFARD, as father and next friend of Princess Jahandarfard, deceased. 89-925.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1041

578 So.2d 1041

59 USLW 2539

Lomax KILLOUGH v. Majid JAHANDARFARD, as father and next friend of Princess Jahandarfard, deceased.

89-925.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 15, 1991.

Rehearing Denied April 11, 1991.

L. Tennent Lee III of Burr & Forman, Huntsville, and Michael B. Beers and Michael S. Jackson of Beers, Anderson, Jackson & Smith, Montgomery, for appellant.

Joseph M. Brown, Jr. and Andrew T. Citrin of Cunningham, Bounds, Yance, Crowder and Brown, Mobile, and Gary V. Conchin of Higgs & Conchin, Huntsville, for appellee.

SHORES, Justice.

Lomax Killough appeals from a judgment based upon a jury verdict awarding Majid Jahandarfard $2.5 million on a claim against Killough. We affirm.

On July 18, 1988, Jahandarfard filed an eight-count complaint under Alabama Code 1975, § 6-5-391, based on the alleged wrongful death of his daughter, Princess. The child died of carbon monoxide inhalation asphyxiation due to a fire in the Jahandarfard house. The house was owned by Killough, who rented it to the Jahandarfards, and it was not equipped with a smoke detector on the morning of Princess's death. State and local law at the time of Princess's death required smoke detectors to be placed in rental units.

On November 9, 1989, the jury returned its verdict against Killough, and on the same day the trial judge entered a judgment in accordance with the verdict.

Killough filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("J.N.O.V.") or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur. Killough also requested that the trial court conduct a hearing in accordance with the mandates of Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), to review the judgment and consider remitting it based on excessiveness.

A Hammond hearing was held on January 4, 1990, but the trial court did not rule on any of Killough's motions; thus, on February 12, 1990, after the motions had been pending for 90 days, they were denied pursuant to Rule 59.1, A.R.Civ.P. The trial court failed to enter a Hammond order concerning the judgment, and Killough appealed.

We remanded the case to the trial court to enter a Hammond order, 578 So.2d 1041, and on November 8, 1990, the trial court issued the following order:

"This is an action for the wrongful death of plaintiff's minor daughter, Princess Jahandarfard. Section 6-5-391, Code of Alabama, 1975. The only claim submitted to the jury was founded on wantonness. The jury returned a verdict awarding $2.5 million and judgment was entered accordingly.

"A post-trial hearing was held at which the Court heard evidence and arguments of counsel on the issue of asserted excessiveness of the judgment. The Court failed to rule on defendant's post-trial motions and they were denied pursuant to Rule 59.1, A.R.Civ.P., on February 12, 1990. The defendant appealed.

"The case is remanded by the Alabama Supreme Court for entry of a post-trial order in accordance with the mandates of Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986).

"Having observed the trial, the actions and reactions of the jurors and the conduct of counsel, the Court is of the opinion and expressly finds that the jury's decision-making process was not tainted by bias, passion, prejudice or any improper motive. The Court further finds that the jury's award does not exceed an amount which will allow for society's goals of punishment and deterrence. Each of the factors set out in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), [has] been considered by the Court. The Court has also compared the verdict in this case with other jury verdicts in wrongful death cases. The Court finds that the verdict is not excessive and declines to reduce it.

"All other post-trial motions which have not been denied by operation of Rule 59.1, A.R.Civ.P., are overruled and denied."

Killough contends that the judgment entered against him pursuant to § 6-5-391, deprives him of his property in violation of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and deprives him of equal protection of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 1, 6, and 22, of the Alabama Constitution. Killough also argues that the award of punitive damages in his case is a violation of the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 15, of the Alabama Constitution, that the Hammond review procedure does not adequately protect his due process rights, and that the verdict below is excessive.

I. Due Process

Killough argues that § 6-5-391 provides no standards for the imposition of damages, in that a plaintiff may recover any amount a jury may assess for any wrongful act, omission, or negligence resulting in the death of a minor. This argument has been rejected by this Court; see Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 553 So.2d 537 (Ala.1989); Central Alabama Electric Co-op. v. Tapley, 546 So.2d 371 (Ala.1989); United American Ins. Co. v. Brumley, 542 So.2d 1231 (Ala.1989); HealthAmerica v. Menton, 551 So.2d 235 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1990); Olympia Spa v. Johnson, 547 So.2d 80 (Ala.1989), and it is here rejected again.

II. Equal Protection

Killough contends that the exclusion of § 6-5-391 from legislation enacted by the Legislature and codified at §§ 6-11-1 through 6-11-30 is a violation of equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 1, 6, and 22, of the Alabama Constitution. Among other things, these statutes restrict punitive damages awards in tort actions The Legislature has elected to treat wrongful death tort-feasors differently from other tort-feasors, and the ability to so classify is a power inherent in the Legislature, so long as the classification bears a rational relationship to a state interest not prohibited by the United States Constitution. Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, § 18.3 at 324 (1986).

(other than wrongful death actions) to those tort actions based upon acts of oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice, proven by clear and convincing evidence. A cap of $250,000 is placed on punitive damages awards, excluding wrongful death actions. Killough argues that, because § 6-5-391 was excluded from the operation of the legislation, he was not given the same protection of law as other classes of defendants concerning the imposition of punitive damages; he argues also that the jury was allowed to award punitive damages if it was reasonably satisfied that Jahandarfard was entitled to recover based upon the evidence, and not on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that Killough consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to Jahandarfard. Further, Killough suggests that, but for the exclusion of § 6-5-391 from the legislation, he would be entitled to the application of the $250,000 cap on the jury's verdict.

The only damages available in a wrongful death action in Alabama are punitive damages, Tapley, 546 So.2d at 376, and this is the critical difference between wrongful death actions and actions addressed by the Legislature in the recent tort reform legislation. In Tapley, we also noted the Legislature's reasoning behind allowing only punitive damages in wrongful death actions:

"The sanctity of human life, the noble goal of preserving human life, and society's desire to punish those whose conduct results in the loss of human life, have all been accepted by our Legislature as criteria outweighing the [seeming] anomaly of permitting punitive damages for simple negligence. This view rests on the premise that one may be adequately compensated for his injuries, but the value of human life has no measure. Punishing the tort-feasor dissuades others from engaging in life-endangering conduct."

Id.

In upholding our policy of awarding punitive damages in wrongful death actions, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the purpose was to "strike at the evil of the negligent destruction of human life." Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116, 47 S.Ct. 509, 510, 71 L.Ed. 952 (1927). The Court went on to conclude that "it [is not] beyond the power of the legislature, in effecting such a change in the common law rules, to attempt to preserve human life by making homicide expensive." Id. at 116, 47 S.Ct. at 510. The Legislature has obviously decided that an arbitrary cap can not be placed on the value of human life. The exemption of wrongful death actions from caps on punitive damages awards bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest not prohibited by the Constitution, and the exemption does not violate the right to equal protection under the law.

In limiting the damages in a wrongful death action to punitive damages only, the Legislature reflects the conviction of the citizens of this state that the value of human life can not be measured in dollars. The loss felt by a parent in the death of a child can not be compensated. The pain of loss of a gifted, beautiful child is no more severe than the pain caused by the loss of an impaired child. In the Legislature's view, the value of the life of the community's most prominent citizen is no greater than the value of the life of its most desolate or despicable citizen. To leave with the jury the determination of what amount should be imposed as damages to punish the defendant who caused the loss and to deter others from similar conduct is a perfectly reasonable way to accomplish the legislative goal of deterring conduct that endangers life.

This notion is not unique to Alabama's wrongful death actions. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 Alabama's law in a civil wrongful death action requires of the jury the same thing that Booth...